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THE NATURAL GAS GEOPOLITICS OF TURKEY 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the natural gas geopolitics of Turkey and explores its 
interaction with the Turkish foreign policy making of the Justice and Development 
Party (JDP). Whilst Turkey does not have enough indigenous natural gas reserves to 
meet the existing and growing demand, the country does have great advantages, as it 
is located between the major supplier countries in the Middle East and Eurasia and is 
placed at the crossroads of an energy hungry European natural gas market. Therefore, 
the major aim of this research is to explore capacity building in the creation of 
relationships of interdependence between Turkey and supplier and demanding 
countries. Rather than introducing a dependency energy mechanism, this thesis offers 
the interaction capacity of the country with natural gas suppliers and consuming 
countries. In order to explain the relationship between politics and energy variables, 
the thesis establishes the theoretical framework of the study through the use of a 
pluralistic and integrated model, by combining International Relations Theories, the 
foreign policy making process of Turkey and a conceptualisation of the relations of 
energy interdependence. 
The descriptive analysis of Eurasia and the energy profile of Turkey provide detailed 
information about the existing energy trade and dependency relations in the Eurasian 
space. Hence, it explains the importance of Turkey in Europe’s diversification of 
energy corridors and Turkey’s natural gas market, which is considered to be the 
second biggest market in Europe. The significance and role of Turkey in the 
construction of pipeline projects (ITGI, TANAP, Nabucco, Nabucco-West and TAP) 
that go through Turkey to Europe, a route which is called the Southern Corridor, are 
analysed in the thesis. 
On the other hand, this thesis offers certain perspectives for the Caspian-Turkey-
Europe natural gas corridor, focusing on Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan’s role in the 
natural gas trade for the energy security of Europe. Moreover, the natural gas potential 
of Iran, Iraq (including KRG), Qatar, Egypt and Israel, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan 
are viewed as major natural gas sources for Turkey and Europe in this thesis.  
Turkey has historical and economic ties with the Caspian Sea and Middle East 
regions, which hold immense natural gas reserves that can be marketed to Turkey and 
to the European Union (EU). Mapping Turkey’s energy relations with consuming and 
producing countries, and defining Turkey’s geopolitical space, will not only help to 
develop its energy policy to secure its own energy consumption but also to manage 
interdependence relations between Eurasia and Europe. This is a new 
conceptualisation of energy supply and transit management of Turkey in the context 
of a new model called the Anatolian Gas Centre (AGS). 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
THE NATURAL GAS GEOPOLITICS OF TURKEY 
 
…We firmly support the southern natural gas corridor 
projects that envisage transferring natural gas from the 
Caspian basin and Central Asia to Europe via alternative 
routes, in order to provide our own energy supply security 
and to contribute to the energy supply security of Europe… 
 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan1 
Due to rapid economic and industrial growth in Turkey, the Turkish government has 
moved to seek new energy sources and to diversify hydrocarbon imports from the 
Caspian and Middle East regions. In the first quarter of 2012, Turkey’s economy 
expanded by 3.2%, with the energy sector recording the highest growth rate (8.4%), 
data from the Turkish Statistics Institute showed. On 26 June 2012, Turkey finalised 
an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with Azerbaijan to construct a USD 7 to 10 
billion Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). Under the legal umbrella of 
this agreement, which was ratified by the Turkish General Assembly on 22 November 
2012, the TANAP pipeline will have the capacity to accommodate gas from full field 
development of Shah Deniz Phase 2 as well as other parts of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan as a future build-up volume prospect. 
Turkey’s fragile energy security status was evident most recently in its struggle to 
cope with dependence on oil and gas from Iran and Russia. Hence, Turkish Energy 
Minister Taner Yıldız announced that Turkey planned to construct three nuclear 
power plants by 2030 in order to reduce dependence on natural gas for electricity 
generation. In addition to this, the Turkish government offers an incentive scheme for 
coal investment used for electricity generation for the next thirty years. It is important 
to note that oil and gas currently make up 59% of Turkey’s energy supplies, and gas 
                                                          
1
 “Turkey and Azerbaijan Ink Deal for $7 bln Gas Project,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 27, 2012, 
accessed August 5, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-andazerbaijan-ink-deal-for-
7blngasproject.aspx?pageID=238&nID=24159&NewsCatID=348. 
 2 
accounts for 50% of Turkey’s electricity generation, despite having the potential to 
generate up to 90–100 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) from hydroelectric sources, 120 
billion kWh from wind farms, 5–16 billion kWh from geothermal power, 380 billion 
kWh from solar energy, 35 billion kWh from biofuel plants, and 108–116 billion kWh 
from lignite power stations. These figures indicate clearly that as Turkey’s energy 
demands continue to rise, so too do the investment opportunities in both the 
traditional and renewable sectors, though natural gas is seen as one of the key sectors 
in Turkish and European energy markets. 
1. THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
This thesis explains the geopolitical importance of Turkey in terms of the energy 
sector and explores the potential for Turkey to become an ‘energy centre’ in the 
international energy market, not only to be an ‘energy utility/transit country’, but to 
transform into a regional oil and gas power, strategy making centre and bridge 
supplier. The focus of this thesis is on the expansion of Turkey’s institutional 
development, which reinforces its ‘soft power’ strategy in the Caspian, Central Asia 
and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. The energy politics of Turkey 
increase Turkey’s economic sphere of influence by offering interdependence relations 
with its natural gas suppliers and consuming countries. Therefore, the main aim of this 
thesis is to analyse Turkey’s energy relations with consuming and producing countries 
and to define how Turkey’s geopolitical space helps not only to develop its energy 
policy to secure its own energy consumption but also to establish interdependence 
management for greater co-operation in the Eurasian energy environment. The second 
aim of this research is to develop a model suggesting that, whilst Turkey maximises 
its own interest in this regional dynamic, it also creates a new energy strategy for 
energy supplier and consumer countries, according to their own dynamics and interest 
measurements. The third aim of this thesis is to ascertain the links between foreign 
policy making and energy policy, which have come together in Turkish politics 
towards European and Eurasian countries.  
2. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The literature on Turkey’s energy politics, especially about natural gas, is very 
limited. This is because most of the works, so far, have been focused on the general 
 3 
concept of foreign policy making. The present study is the first comprehensive 
attempt at exploring Turkey’s geopolitical power and institutional development in the 
natural gas trade in energy markets over the last two decades. Therefore, it aims at 
identifying the specific incentives of Turkey in natural gas transport. This research 
utilises domestic, regional and systemic levels of analysis, which provide a new 
conceptualisation of energy fields in international politics. This research also attempts 
to clarify contemporary security studies and international relations by adding energy 
security and a new conceptualisation of the energy trade in terms of natural gas and 
geopolitics. Thus, this research goes beyond the boundaries of energy economics and 
Turkish political historiography. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW OF TURKEY’S ENERGY GEOPOLITICS 
There are several studies that have focused on Turkey’s energy relations with the EU 
and neighbouring countries. However, these studies have paid attention to specific 
territories/regions regarding Turkey’s relations on energy, and have not 
introduced/offered a comprehensive study of Turkey’s geopolitical position in the 
subject of energy related issues, natural gas in particular.   
Since Turkey is very dependent on imported energy resources, Turkey’s energy policy 
has been seen as a part of foreign policy issues. In this regard, the scholars have 
tended to investigate Turkey’s energy policies in the light of international politics. 
One of the major contributions to Turkey’s geopolitical literature comes from Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book Strategic Depth, which offers a critical 
analysis and new reading of Turkey’s geopolitical space by suggesting a ‘central 
country’ approach to neighbouring countries. We assume that, with this approach, the 
Minister provides a non-western view of geopolitical imagination by putting Turkey 
in the centre of the region. Davutoğlu’s new approach to Turkish foreign policy will 
be examined in chapter 2 in more detail. Aras and Fidan expand Davutoğlu’s principle 
of zero problems with neighbouring countries to Eurasia and his new geopolitical 
reading of Turkey by using historical experience in Turkish foreign policy making.
2
 
Also Çarkoğlu and Hale have introduced a mechanism of Turkish foreign policy and 
                                                          
2
 Aras and Fidan, "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a New Geographic Imagination," New Perspectives 
on Turkey 40 (2009): 195-217. 
 4 
provided some indication about energy relations as the instrument of foreign policy 
making.
3
 
In addition to these studies, some scholars have undertaken valuable thematic studies 
on Turkey’s energy politics. Thematic issues in energy politics are generally classified 
as energy geopolitics, energy security, import dependency, transit security 
management and supply security management. 
It is important to note that energy geopolitics and energy security are important 
subject matters of Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey’s energy strategy 
generally focuses on energy interdependence and supply security management. 
Hence, the first thematic issue is of the geopolitics of energy has been seen in various 
journals. A special issue of Insight Turkey offers the most comprehensive treatment of 
that subject. The introductory article, written by Taner Yıldız, Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources, explains Turkey’s energy strategy which emphasises the 
importance of renewable and sustainable energy resources.
4
 He also underlines 
Turkey’s geopolitical significance in being more than a bridge and having the 
potential to become a regional energy centre regarding the provision of the most cost 
effective means of transportation, access to diverse energy resources, and energy 
policies based on a political conceptual framework that could help to solve regional 
and global energy problems.  
Another analysis of Turkey’s role as a transit or hub country has been elaborated in 
Roberts’ article discussing what a hub country is and the future distinct from other 
countries in the region that make Turkey especially suitable for being a hub.
5
 
According to a common view, a hub is the same as being a crossroads for transit. 
Roberts also points out that two important features for a trading hub are the necessity 
of pipelines and liberalization of energy markets. However, Roberts asserts that 
Turkey has fallen short of these objectives for various reasons so far. With the great 
emphasis on market liberalization, Roberts contends that if the gas market in Turkey 
evolves into an open market, Turkey will become a real hub. On the other hand, he 
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remarks that the entire world has seen that there is no choice without Turkey in order 
to ensure natural gas flows in the region.  
In a further study, stressing energy geopolitics, Coşkun and Carlson show the close 
link between energy and geopolitics by illustrating how the 18
th
 century British and 
19
th
 century German power politics were based on the control of energy resources.
6
 
They propound that today’s energy geopolitics have changing dynamics regarding the 
increasing eastward demand and intense competition for energy supplies between 
Asia and Europe. Along with this competition that has given energy-rich states 
strategic and geopolitical leverage over superpowers, it has generated a wider 
possibility to manoeuvre for the states that lie at the centre of the supply and demand 
routes for oil and gas. In these circumstances, there are two main reasons to make 
Turkey an energy hub, a transit route for the so-called “southern corridor”. The first 
reason is to guarantee the security of supply by insisting on the right to take some of 
the gas from transit pipelines for its own consumption, known as offtake rights. The 
other reason is to gain political influence in the region as a result of the ownership of a 
key structure route. The authors claimed that Turkey could present itself as a solution 
to Europe’s energy problems; however they are not sure whether Turkey can take 
advantage of this strategic asset or not. 
The second thematic issue is that of energy diplomacy. Triantaphyllou and Fotiou 
suggest that Turkey’s energy strategy towards the Middle East and the Caucasus must 
become coherent in order to achieve its goals, and at the same time Turkey’s approach 
towards the US, the EU, and Russia is to be balanced.
7
 To accomplish these goals, the 
authors see the implementation of Davutoğlu’s theory, known as “zero problems with 
neighbours”, by the JDP government as a rational thing to do. Similarly, Öğütçü 
outlines the world financial system in terms of secure energy trading.
8
 However, he 
contends that the current world energy system is a long way from being sustainable, 
because of rising demand over the long term, dominance of fossil fuels, inaccessible 
supplies, price volatility, inadequate investment, geopolitical tensions and climate 
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change. Besides those problems, Öğütçü claims that Turkey has emerged as an 
important actor to reckon with as a customer, transporter, and investor in energy. 
Thus, Turkey’s rhetoric about being a regional energy hub has been turned into 
concrete actions through the alignment of foreign and energy policies, being a reliable 
transit country, making strategic investments in clean energy, energy efficiency 
improvements, and developing an integrated energy management and vision. On the 
other hand, Öğütçü praises Turkey for acting in pursuit of its own self-interest, rather 
than following the dictates of Washington or Brussels in a sheepish manner.  
In contrast to Öğütçü’s arguments, Karbuz and Şanlı criticise Turkey’s existing 
energy strategy documents for being either short term or without any time horizon.
9
 
They also indicate that the term “strategy” in these documents is misused, as they are 
talking about existing and planned oil and gas infrastructure and focusing on the 
desired ends but not on the ways and means of achieving these goals. After remarking 
on Turkey’s lack of coherent, comprehensive and flexible energy strategy, the authors 
recommend a couple of policies for formulating a new energy strategy. According to 
Karbuz and Şanlı, Turkey’s energy strategy has to focus on ensuring long-term energy 
supply at affordable prices and on Turkey’s geopolitical role with respect to regional 
and international energy concerns. As John Roberts stressed in his aforementioned 
article, Karbuz and Şanlı mention the importance of fair competition and market 
liberalization on energy for a solid strategy. As another issue for a new energy 
strategy, the authors touch upon environmental challenges and suggest that 
renewables have to be supported by the state due to their need for expensive 
investment.  
Turkey’s energy relationship with Russia is addressed by Ediger and Bağdadi.10 They 
cover the history of Turkey’s relations with Russia in the energy sector dating back to 
the early 19
th
 century and claim that the events of the early 20
th
 century in the area of 
energy in Turkey-Russia relations are quite similar to those of the present day. 
Furthermore, they emphasize the asymmetric trade partnership between Russia and 
Turkey, in favour of Russia, and Turkey’s extreme dependence on Russian energy 
                                                          
9
 Karbuz and Şanlı, “On Formulating a New Energy Strategy for Turkey,” Insight Turkey 12 no. 3 
(2010): 89-105. 
10
 Ediger and Bağdadi, “Turkey–Russia Energy Relations: Same Old Story, New Actors,” Insight 
Turkey 12 no. 3 (2010): 221-236. 
 7 
supplies. Therefore, not only diversification of energy sources but also partnerships in 
energy sub-sectors are needed as an essential part of Turkey’s energy geopolitics. 
Ediger and Bağdadi affirm that there is competition in Turkey’s territory over whether 
the western-promoted Nabucco project or the Russian-promoted South Stream project 
will prevail. Thus, the authors propose that the optimal solution for Turkey is to 
separate its relations into two as a transit and as a consumer country. With regards to 
its future as a transit country, Turkey can intensify its relations with the West, while 
as a consumer country it should concentrate on its relationship with Russia. 
Consequently, this idea seems similar to Triantaphyllou and Fotiou’s suggestion that 
Turkey’s relations with the West and the East have to be balanced.11  
By utilizing the “Heartland Theory” of British geographer Halford Mackinder, 
Alcenat and Özkeçeçi-Taner attempt to explain the current geopolitical conditions in 
Eurasia.
12
 With regard to the significance of the Caspian basin and its oil and gas 
deposits, it is indicated that access to Central Asia’s resources extends the national, 
regional, and world-wide influence of a country. Within this context, the Caucasus is 
seen as a strategic gate. The authors say that the  US failure to balance Russian power 
in energy resources and export routes in the region in an effective manner has limited 
the involvement of the US and the EU in Central Asia and the Caucasus, while 
Russian dominance in the region is currently at its highest level.
13
 On the other hand, 
a new emphasis on revitalizing pan-Turkist, pan-Ottomanist or pan-Islamist policies 
in Turkish foreign policy is seen to be avoided. Instead, the authors recommend the 
conceptualization of the region by Turkish foreign policy makers in the context of the 
“Greater Middle East Region”, a term used by the Bush Administration of 2000 to 
2008. Furthermore, the authors claim that Turkey’s moderately warm relations with 
Azerbaijan and choked relations with Armenia, mainly because of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, hinder the creation of an effective foreign policy for Turkey in the 
region. Consequently, the main point highlighted in the article is that Turkish foreign 
policy makers should take a pragmatic and realistic rather than an ideological 
approach in their actions vis-à-vis the region. After all, this point can be seen in the 
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above-mentioned studies, which argue that Turkish foreign policy towards the region 
seems to lack a realistic approach.  
On the one hand, the third thematic issue is that the domestic structure of Turkish 
energy mechanisms has not received much attention in either the policy or the 
academic environment. However, Roberts’ emphasis on the need for the liberalization 
of the Turkish energy market could be seen as an important analysis. That article also 
highlights BOTAŞ’s control of around 80% to 90% of the energy market in Turkey in 
terms of the necessity for transparency. Yet, Babalı contends that energy should be a 
main pillar of Turkish foreign policy in terms of engagement and integration in the 
region.
14
 Firstly, he criticises the EU’s attempt to sign contracts with Iran on gas 
purchases without even consulting with Turkey, while being hesitant in opening the 
energy chapter negotiations with Turkey. He proposes that Turkey should not be an 
easy target for the West and needs to be seen as a “central country” in the region 
instead of as a peripheral one. Within this context, the author suggests that Turkey 
needs to adopt a new proactive energy diplomacy in line with its own self-interest 
rather than following strictly the requirements of its traditional alliances. As 
previously mentioned, this is not the first suggestion of the necessity for the protection 
of Turkey’s own interests. Babalı sees an emerging activism in Turkey’s energy 
diplomacy, and affirms that this should be seen as a redefinition of its self-interest in 
the energy sector. He also says that Turkey is considering all options in the new 
geopolitical setting, rather than simply following Western energy security objectives 
in loyal and unquestioning ways. However, he warns that finding the right balance 
and bringing all of Turkey’s interests into harmony is going to be a challenge in the 
future. 
On the other hand, before the analysis of Turkey’s natural gas geopolitics, it is 
important to conceptualise the region and the energy routes in question. Saygın and 
Çelik provide a descriptive analysis of the geopolitics of existing pipelines and 
pipeline projects connecting with Turkey.
15
 Also, Karbuz and Castellano analyse the 
quantitative data regarding the potential and existing natural gas suppliers of 
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Europe.
16
 They basically evaluate the suppliers’ gas reserves, status of exploration, 
evolution of production, domestic consumption rates, export infrastructure and 
projects. According to this study, two possible solutions appear in order to meet 
Europe’s energy demand: finding additional suppliers and routes, and increasing 
energy efficiency. The first part of the solution introduces the importance of gas 
supply from the Caspian region to Turkey, which would allow it to diversify sources 
and routes, and to diminish dependency on Russia as well. More specifically, Bilgin 
propounds the WECT (western energy corridor through Turkey) “inner-Caspian” as a 
new concept for the route through which the hydrocarbon reserves of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are transferred to Europe.
17
 The “WECT inner-
Caspian” is the most reasonable route for Europe to diversify its energy-supply 
compared to the other alternative energy routes (WECT inner-Caspian, WECT 
Russia, and WECT Middle East) in economic, geopolitical, political and security 
terms, Bilgin argues. Furthermore, this new conceptualization underlines Turkey’s 
role as an energy corridor for the transfer of Azeri oil and natural gas, Russian natural 
gas, Iraqi oil and Iranian natural gas to Europe. However, this conceptualization of 
Turkey’s role is not clear as Winrow distinguishes the two concepts “energy transit” 
and “energy hub”.18 Based upon this distinction, Turkey, which has already been 
functioning as an energy transit country, firstly aims to meet the domestic energy 
demand rather than becoming an “energy hub” even though the latter remains as a 
strategic goal. 
Actually, energy politics has been the main tool for Turkish foreign policy makers in 
order to re-position Turkey in the post-Cold War conjuncture and adapt to the energy 
markets. Bacık argues that Turkey succeeded in integrating itself with the energy 
markets through bilateral agreements and various energy projects.
19
 During this 
adaptation process, Turkey has not only utilised the opportunities in the international 
system, but also transformed its domestic political and economic structure to meet the 
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demands of the energy market competition. Nevertheless, Turkey’s geopolitical 
position is not irreplaceable and although its geographic position provides a certain 
degree of advantage to Turkey, there are some specific events to which Turkey has to 
pay attention in order to preserve and strength its geopolitical role. First, it is in the 
interest of Turkey to combine the South-stream and Blue-stream projects. Actually, 
the agreement with Russia regarding the construction of a part of the South-stream in 
Turkey’s territorial waters in the Black Sea was a significant step in this sense. 
Second, the trans-Caspian line should be activated before Russia’s Caspian line 
project. Third, a North-South direction between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, 
which is the most preferable way for the US, would undermine Turkey’s role. 
Additionally, if the South-flow or North-flow projects of Russia are realized without 
Turkey’s participation somehow, Turkey might lose its essentiality in geopolitical 
terms. 
Despite all these exogenous developments, the new foreign policy doctrine of the 
Turkish government in recent years has stimulated a significant effort to utilize the 
energy co-operation for constructing economic interdependence and so resolving 
political disputes. The Turkish government, which has constructed a new 
“geographical imagination”, has re-defined its priorities in international affairs and 
pursuit of trade and energy partnerships have replaced security concerns in the 
relations with Caspian and Central Asian countries. The new Turkish foreign policy 
towards this region is based upon “positive sum” and “zero problems with 
neighbours” principles which lead to more co-operative approaches. This approach, 
unsurprisingly, has paved the way for new energy partnerships, those echoed in 
Turkey’s political relations with the regional actors. The Turkey-Russia relationship, 
for example, has been transformed from “adversity” to a “managed competition”, 
thanks to the energy co-operation and economic interdependence they have.  
However, this promising approach is faced with some limitations as can be observed 
in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations. Kardaş argues that strategic non-overlapping interests 
of Turkey and Azerbaijan are impeding the desired smooth energy partnerships and 
political relations. Thus, it might be necessary to consider a shift from the current 
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“overly optimistic” foreign policy doctrine.20 Furthermore, Kinnander points out, 
despite the successful political and diplomatic relations, the failure of an energy/trade 
partnership between Turkey and Iran would also undermine Iran’s position for the 
“southern corridor” in the South energy line to Europe.21 Similarly, Winrow points 
out the problematic energy supply from Iran due to the economic and financial 
sanctions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and how it distorts the calculations 
about the “fourth corridor”. 22 
Turkey’s key role in energy transfer routes from Asia to Europe also has particular 
political implications for Turkey-EU relations, namely the negotiations regarding 
Turkey’s candidacy for the EU. One of the comprehensive studies was conducted by 
Biresselioğlu in European Energy Security – Turkey’s Future Role and Impact.23 One 
of the most recent studies made in the field, it mainly analyses the energy security 
concepts of Turkey and the EU, and natural gas security is one of the issues discussed. 
His book provides a descriptive analysis and focuses on the Caspian. Also Baç and 
Başkan argue that Turkey will become an important energy hub for Europe in the near 
future and help the EU to decrease its energy dependency on Russia by making 
available the alternative energy routes.
24
 Turkey’s key position in such a vital issue 
for the EU would ease the Turkish accession process since the EU can easily realize 
the costs of not having Turkey. Similarly, Winrow points out the possible positive 
impacts of Turkey’s energy geopolitics on the candidacy negotiations and underlines 
the EU’s need of Turkey.25 However, it would be naïve to think that it is a smooth 
spill-over process in Turkey-EU relations. As Tekin and Williams assert, the EU has 
some alternative ways to satisfy its energy need, such as “conservation, ramping up 
renewables production, and, even within the narrower scope of securing gas imports, 
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creating direct access routes to Russian gas”, although all of these would cost more 
than the projects that include Turkey as an energy corridor.
26
 Thus, some member 
states, especially Cyprus, which has already impeded Turkey’s accession process for 
numerous reasons, would object to considering Turkey as an indispensable energy 
corridor. Moreover, the “cultural or normative obstacles” cannot be compensated by 
Turkey’s geopolitical significance. Consequently, the energy partnership and 
economic interdependence would not automatically bring political gains in Turkey-
EU relations, even though they can contribute positively.  
However, there are still no scholarly monographs dealing with Turkey’s energy 
geopolitics, and explaining the nexus between foreign policy and energy politics, the 
correlations between energy security and foreign policy making. There are not many 
studies focusing on the energy mechanism, which encourage producer and consumer 
countries and introduce Turkey as an energy hub from south to north and from east to 
west. Turkey’s geopolitical positioning and its management of energy relations with 
supplier and demanding countries is essential to analyse to find out the nexus between 
international relations and foreign policy making in terms of energy supply security 
and energy geopolitics. Hence, this thesis will provide a great contribution to Turkish 
foreign policy by putting natural gas at the centre of energy geopolitics. 
4. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study applies multi-paradigm perspectives and ‘integrated’ foreign policy 
analysis methodology to Turkey’s geopolitics and foreign policy making. It is the first 
study to conduct a micro-level analysis of Turkey’s geopolitical space and its foreign 
policy-making capacity in natural gas fields to build interdependent relations between 
the EU and natural gas producing countries of the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. 
In considering the influx of economic and institutional developments over recent 
decades, this study also provides a new interpretation of natural gas politics and 
energy security, and suggests some modifications to the understanding of energy 
politics in relation to the foreign policy making process. The further key significance 
of this study is that it contributes to a new definition of ‘geo-energy’ and of the 
geopolitical space of Turkey; it also identifies the boundaries of institutional 
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development in the Turkish natural gas market, which is in the process of integration 
with the European natural gas market by following common energy policies and 
seeking and strengthening interdependent relations. 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research methodology of this case study is essentially threefold: The 
methodology of data collection, the level of analysis and data analysis. 
5.1. Data Collection Method 
The study can be defined as a macro-level outlook, theoretically, but provides great 
depth to the micro-level analysis model for Turkey’s energy geopolitics. However, 
also reviewed is whatever was received from the public statements of the Turkish 
Energy Ministry, Russian Energy Ministry, Energy Directorate of the European 
Union, Official Institutions of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Qatar, 
Israel, Libya, and Algeria. The agreements between parties involve official records 
that have not yet been de-classified by either side and, consequently, are not available 
for first-hand inspection. Hence, the joint ventures announced at the end of official 
talks between the partners, of pipeline projects and companies’ annual reviews, 
including their investment plans, are valuable sources to outline the relevant 
countries’ energy profiles.  
The main sources of these were confidential energy intelligence data systems, which 
the Turkish government pays to bring together to follow developments in the energy 
markets closely. These include Cambridge Energy Associates (CERA), CEDIGAZ 
Natural Gas Information Services, and Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie 
(OME). The publications of the International Energy Agency (IEA), US-Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) and British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of 
World Energy form valuable sources for this research. This specific method of using 
data sources is also one of the significant contributions of this thesis. For instance, 
CERA is used for writing country energy profiles, BP is used to identify the natural 
gas reserves of a country and CEDIGAZ is used for the general historical data 
collection and gas trading statistical reviews. World Energy Outlook is used to 
analyse the future predictions and projections in this research. I have also had the 
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opportunity to cross-check the data collected from various resources with other 
reputable ones.  
In addition to this, I employ my professional experience and theoretical foundations in 
the interpretative method used in this research. As an energy expert at BOTAŞ 
(Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, which is the state-owned crude oil and natural gas 
pipeline and trading company) (2004–2006), assistant to H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, chief 
foreign Adviser to the Turkish Prime Minister (2006–2008), and energy adviser to the 
Turkish President (2008-2012), Deputy General Manager of BOTAŞ (since 2012) I 
have joined the technical teams of cross-border pipeline projects (Nabucco (classic 
and west), TANAP, ITGI and TAP) and attended the natural gas trade negotiations 
with Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Qatar etc.  
More specifically, I participated in the natural gas brainstorming team that has been 
established in the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. In addition, I took 
responsibility for the coordination of the ITGI project within the Turkish 
governmental institutions. Currently, I am a participant in the negotiation team of 
Turkey with the Azerbaijan- and BP-led Shah Deniz II Consortium for the 
transportation and sales of Shah Deniz II gas to Turkish markets and transit to third 
countries. My personal participation in the meetings and professional responsibilities 
are very much relevant to my research, and always keep me updated and provide vital 
information that is very useful for my research.  
I gained the opportunity to put my professional experience into an academic form at 
Durham University. I have benefitted from electronic sources and the hard copy 
collections of the university library to develop my scholarly discipline.  
5.2. Methodology for Data Analysis 
There are two types of research methods which are generally used in social sciences, 
including political science, for both data collection and data analysis: quantitative 
research methods and qualitative approaches. 
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5.2.1. Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative methods explain the characteristics of measurement and include an 
explanation of the types of categories of statistics employed in the research. Three 
chief quantitative research designs, exploratory, descriptive and causal analyses, will 
be used in this thesis. Exploratory (probing) research often employs qualitative 
methods to bring out information that can then be used to design large sample survey 
studies. Descriptive (survey) research methods provide guidance on how to design 
and conduct large-sample field surveys. They include how to construct questionnaires 
to measure public opinion and the attitudes of foreign policy making officers. It is 
necessary to put questions and opinions into a logical sequence in the formal data-
gathering instrument. Causal (experimental) research is a type of experimental 
approach to science, it describes the experimental method and illustrates how political 
scientists conduct causal research. The experiments and experimental design are 
concepts used to design and conduct cause-and-effect research studies. Interpreting 
explanatory and descriptive statistics identifies the measure of central tendency, of 
variability, of relative position and of correlation. 
5.2.2. Qualitative Analysis 
There is no single method for doing qualitative analysis but some of the tradition of 
text analysis includes: (1) Interpretative analysis, (2) narrative analysis, (3) 
performance analysis, (4) conservation analysis, (5) schema analysis, (6) content 
analysis, and (7) analytic induction. The first four of these methods depend on the 
intuition and erudition of the analyst, while the last four make increasing use of 
computer programs. 
Interpretative analysis is widely practised in social sciences, including political 
science. The objective of interpretation is to understand the meaning of the original 
words, given all the conditions of the present. Interpretative analysis is a search for 
meanings and their interconnection in the expression of political culture, especially in 
the foreign policy behaviour of states. The method requires deep involvement with 
culture, including an intimate familiarity with the diplomacy. 
The narrative analysis is the search for regularities in how people, within and across 
culture, tell stories. The major genre of narratives involves recounting an event in 
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terms of what happened, how did it happen, why did it happen and what was the 
result. The objective of the narrative analysis is to discover themes and recurring 
structure.  
The performance analysis involves the search for regularities in the delivery of highly 
stylised narrative, like folk tales, sermons, and political speeches. Turkey’s Foreign 
Minister’s and Energy and Natural Resources Minister’s policy implementation and 
speeches were evaluated through performance analysis in this research. Whilst the 
energy issue was a separate department in the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, it has become one of the main instruments of Turkish foreign policy for 
the last two decades. 
The conversation analysis is part of discourse analysis. It is the search for the 
grammar of ordinary discourse, or talk-in-interaction. It is the study of how people 
take turns in ordinary discourse - who talks first, who interrupts, who waits for a turn. 
These two-type analyses are mostly employed in the inductive tradition of social 
sciences, while content analysis and analytic induction are mostly in the deductive 
tradition. This research is mostly based on inductive or ‘open’ coding. The idea is to 
become grounded in the data and to allow understanding to emerge from close study 
of the texts. Linking themes, building conceptual models and bivariate analysis for 
testing relations between variables is essential to craft a piece of research. 
The content analysis is a set of methods for systematically coding and analysing 
qualitative data. These methods are used across the social sciences and the humanities 
to explore explicit and covert meaning in texts, which is also called manifest and 
latent content, for testing a hypothesis about texts. Sampling in content analysis is an 
essential tool of text analysis. There are two components of sampling in content 
analysis. The first is to identify the corpus of texts; the second is aimed at identifying 
the units of analysis within the texts. The next steps are to develop a codebook and to 
actually code the text to produce a text-by-theme matrix. In so doing inter code 
reliability is essential to doing cross-cultural text based research. The analytic 
induction method is a formal qualitative method for building up casual explanations 
of the phenomena from a close examination of cases.  
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5.3. The Level of Analysis 
The level of analysis is essential to determine the functionality of variables 
(independent, dependent and controlled variables), to test the hypothesis of this thesis. 
There are three types of analysis: international, regional and domestic levels of 
analysis. This thesis treats both Turkey’s energy policy and its interaction capacity 
with foreign policy changes as primary sources of explanation. Their progressive 
development has been viewed as a process that is another source of explanation. The 
methodological and theoretical pluralism in this thesis explains how holistic and 
micro level approaches work together in Turkish natural gas relations. Turkey’s 
engagement with regional natural gas supplier countries in the Caspian Sea, Black Sea 
and Middle Eastern regions and its relations with demanding European countries play 
key roles in Turkey’s energy interdependence relations. It is essential to note that, 
rather than focusing exclusively energy security of Turkey, this research is mainly 
focused on Turkey’s management of interdependence relations at international, 
regional and domestic levels in the natural gas sector. 
One of the strongest contributions of this research is that the author applies pluralistic 
approaches of theory and method to analyse Turkey’s interaction capacity with both 
sides in the energy sector. The binding of theory with other grounded theoretical and 
interpretative analysis strategies that meet the criteria of scientific method is verified 
in Turkey’s energy geopolitics and energy interdependence relations. This basically 
aims at exploring differences and similarities, and investigates whose provisions are 
more flexible comprehensively by ensuring that all texts and references are 
comparably accurate.  
At the end of the analysis of each unit, an illustrative summary is made of the main 
findings, with specific emphasis on the policy choices that could be available for 
Turkey’s energy policy. Consequently, this study applies pluralistic approaches and 
an integrated model of IRT (geopolitics, critical geopolitics and interdependency 
theory) to clarify the theoretical and intellectual bases of interpretation and content 
analysis in this study. Each theory explains different dimensions of the energy 
relations between Turkey and neighbouring countries. Hence, the pluralistic and 
integrated model provides necessary explanations about interaction capacity and 
energy interdependence relations as an instrument of Turkish foreign policy making. 
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6. THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE THESIS 
Turkey is already the sixth largest natural gas market of Europe and will become the 
third biggest energy market in Europe by 2030. Turkey’s growing economy and 
institutional development is integrated with the global economy. The positive 
developments in the economy have led Turkish foreign policy making to become 
more active in the energy sector in recent decades. Due to a lack of domestic fossil 
fuel resources, Turkey is apparently left with a choice between a ‘watch and see’ 
policy and a ‘pro-active’ foreign policy. Turkish foreign policy makers assume a 
central role in regional policy with a specific reference to Turkey’s projected energy 
hub potential. The interaction between Turkish foreign policy and energy policy 
found its expression in Turkey considering all possible east-west and north-south 
projects as possible future venues of energy and in its willingness to host pipelines 
and distribution systems. Another link is established in accordance with Turkey’s 
regional policy of promoting economic interdependence for backing political 
relations. Turkish minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu considers multi-
country pipeline projects to be constructive attempts to bring regional security and 
stability. 
The definition of Turkey’s geopolitical space as a bridge/hub or transit country 
between energy suppliers and consuming countries is still under discussion in 
international energy circles. The main determinant factor in energy politics is that of 
gathering the country’s physical and institutional total experience and to use actively 
its geopolitical condition. The first argument of this thesis is developed as follows: (1) 
Turkey has a potential to establish reliable relations between the Caspian Sea region, 
the Middle East and East Mediterranean region and European countries. Turkey has 
also great potential to manage the opening of the Southern Corridor even if the 
Nabucco pipeline project has failed. (2) Given its diplomatic and economic capacity 
and experience Turkey has the ability to introduce an Anatolian Gas Centre, which 
provides an answer to the expectations of the producer and consumer countries’ 
trading and exchange regimes by acting as a ‘regional gas balancing point’. In fact 
Turkey will have a unique, integrated and well-defined midstream network at the 
corners of Eurasia, a third-party accessed, regulated, liquid and liberalized gas trading 
centre dominated by huge expansion of downstream power facilities and gas demand, 
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and advancing and ambitious upstream efforts in the near-term. The author argues that 
(3) Turkey has capacity to build interdependence relations with natural gas producing 
and consuming countries. Because BOTAS operates the natural gas system of Turkey, 
(4) Turkey will gain a great advantage in satisfying its natural gas supply security and 
ability to negotiate price reduction due to supply diversification with the 
materialization of the Anatolian Gas Centre.  
7. THE OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The structure of the thesis is divided into substantive sections, and ultimately consists 
of nine chapters. Each part sets up a theme with the relevant chapters offering 
relatively freestanding discussion of particular macro-theoretical settings and 
empirical micro-analysis. The thesis is outlined through a theoretical approach to 
energy politics, including descriptive and experimental data analysis of analytical 
cases of Turkey’s natural gas relations. 
In Chapter 1, a literature review of international relations theory is conducted, to build 
integrated approaches to Turkey’s energy geopolitics by focusing on geopolitics, 
critical geopolitics and interdependency theory. This chapter defines the theoretical 
framework of this study of Turkey being a regional power in the energy sector. 
Moreover, two key concepts of this dissertation “the concept of energy hub” and “the 
concept of energy security” have been discussed in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 explores the nexus between geopolitics and the foreign policy making 
process and explains continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy making. Rather 
than reviewing historical process, this chapter prefers to introduce a new 
conceptualization for Turkish foreign policy periods, with a focus on recent decades. 
Especially, the foreign policy making of the JDP and Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s new ideas and perceptions have been analysed. This chapter also 
considers the limits and the problematic aspects of Turkish foreign policy. 
Chapter 3 gives detailed information on Turkey’s energy mix, its natural gas market 
structure and relations with the natural gas producers of the Caspian Region and 
Middle East - and with the EU on the other side as the biggest consumer of Eurasia - 
in conjunction with Turkey’s geopolitics and foreign policy.  
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Chapter 4 gives a detailed picture of the energy security concept in world politics that 
fits with the theory to explore the importance of the Southern Corridor. The EU 
structure and its policy making procedures could be analysed with the theory. Aside 
from the EU’s domestic energy implementations, the chapter also shows the existing 
three natural gas import corridors of the EU, Norway, Russia, North Africa, to 
demonstrate the level of significance of the Southern Corridor through Turkey.  
Chapter 5 explains the geopolitical importance of Turkey for the opening of the 
Southern Corridor. This chapter provides stories about Turkey-Azerbaijan natural gas 
relations, especially on TANAP and TAP projects. It explains Turkey’s great success 
in the realization of the Southern Corridor after the failure of the famous Nabucco 
pipeline project. 
Chapter 6 gives more priority to Turkmenistan and Iran in order to expand Turkey’s 
and the Southern Corridor’s natural gas import capacity from the eastern reserves. 
The chapter introduces Iran and Azerbaijan as transit routes of Turkmen gas. At the 
same time the new potential natural gas resources of both Azerbaijan and Iran will be 
nominated as important suppliers of the Southern Corridor. In addition, the possibility 
of a Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan will be 
questioned. The option of Turkmenistan, to dispatch gas to the west through 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish border, is another significant topic. The 
chapter also explains Turkey’s foreign policy diplomacy in the energy sector. 
Chapter 7 gives detailed information on potential natural gas suppliers of the Middle 
East (including Iraq, Qatar, Egypt and Israel) to the Turkish border, considered as the 
southern branch of the Southern Corridor. The most promising option for the short 
term seems to be Iraq. In addition the KRG of Iraq pursues independent oil and 
natural gas export policies and so Turkey is developing a special relationship with the 
region. In future, a Qatar–Iraq pipeline could be the main gas export route. The recent 
gas discoveries by Israel in the Mediterranean have potential to make Israel a natural 
gas export country in the mid-term. Turkey’s foreign policy capacity toward the 
Eastern Mediterranean region will be considered for the realization of the possible gas 
imports to Turkey. The Arab Gas Pipeline project will be briefly evaluated as well. 
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Chapter 8 is the main analytical chapter. It explains the strengths and weaknesses of 
Turkey’s foreign policy in terms of energy geopolitics, and opens the discussion about 
a European hub and hub pricing, and Turkey’s initiatives on the opening of the 
Anatolian Gas Centre and the Southern Corridor. The main conceptualization and 
theoretical discussion is given in this chapter. 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion chapter. It summarizes the main findings of this thesis, the 
main contribution of which is the combination of theoretical, descriptive and 
experimental chapters in addressing the subject. Moreover, the final section tries to 
give new ideas for further research. 
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Chapter 1 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TURKEY’S 
ENERGY POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the industrial revolution, the geopolitics of energy has been a determining factor 
in global prosperity and security. The relative importance of energy has given rise to a 
new debate in international relations. Some argue that energy variables must be 
subject to economic viability. However, the majority claims that the geopolitical 
importance of energy needs and resource management makes them subjects for the 
broader discipline of geopolitics. The present study argues that energy security 
requires an effective and coherent policy from both suppliers and buyers, including 
transporting-country-level analysis. Given the differences in energy supply 
requirements and the differing perspectives of oil and gas dependency between the 
EU and Turkey, an integrated approach to energy security is preferred to using 
geostrategic reasoning. 
First of all, geopolitical theories explain the political landscape of Turkey, in which 
the country is seen as a bridge or energy hub in terms of energy transit. Secondly, 
critical geopolitical theories suggest the responses of Turkey to demand issues and the 
enforcement of the energy lobbies, which identify its capacity or lack of it to integrate 
their energy policies into regional and global energy systems. This chapter will 
develop the research questions and hypothesis of the thesis after reviewing the 
literature of international relations theories such as geopolitics, critical geopolitics and 
interdependency theories. Since it is difficult to explain the complexity of the issue 
with one theoretical approach, combining the abovementioned theories will be the 
better method.  
Following this analysis, this chapter defines Turkey’s geopolitical landscape and 
introduces a new approach to energy geopolitics from Turkey’s perspective. 
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1.2. OVERVIEW OF GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES  
Geopolitics is not an easy term to explain. The beginning of the study of geopolitics 
could be traced to when the Swedish political scientist Kjellen used the word 
“geopolitics” in 1899 for the first time. It combines different approaches —economic 
geography, political geography, political economy and energy policy in international 
relations. However, it also covers the “conceptual and terminological tradition in the 
study of the political and strategic relevance of geography”.27 The term introduces the 
primary characteristics of the relationship between the conduct of foreign policy, 
political power, and the physical environment. Geopolitics is a basic factor in, and an 
indication of, power shifts in global politics, especially during the critical turning 
points of modern history. The constant issue in foreign policy is geography, which 
plays a dual role in international relations as a fundamental cause for international 
crises and wars and as a decisive factor in re-adjustments of the international system.  
In the international relations discipline, geopolitics is assumed to be a part of the 
realist branch. However, with the end of the Cold War, critical approaches towards 
classical theories in international relations theories have been developed and critical 
geopolitics is one of the subdivisions of the critical approaches.  
Since geopolitical thinkers present their concepts to design new maps, and to explain 
world politics accordingly, to understand contemporary politics it is essential to look 
at the geopolitics of the multi-polar world order and the theories of imperial designers 
during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. Thus, after reviewing the major works of 
geopolitical thinkers, firstly, the standpoint of critical geopolitics will be explored. 
Then, the geopolitics of energy and Turkey’s geopolitical context will be examined. 
1.2.1. Traditional Geopolitical Approaches  
The first major study on geopolitics was published by Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1890. 
He, the United States admiral and geo-strategist, had introduced the concept of “sea 
power”, which was established on the notion that “the greater naval power countries 
have, the greater worldwide influence they will have”; it was notably presented in his 
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well-known book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
28
. 
Furthermore, he introduced the foundational principles of Anglo-American (Atlantic) 
sea powers for controlling strategic locations on the globe.
29
 Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu in his article claims that five principles of Mahan were adopted by 
policy makers as the backbone of the US foreign policy. These are shown here as: “(i) 
the occupation of Hawaii, (ii) control of the Caribbean, (iii) building a canal to link 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, (iv) keeping wars away from US shores, (v) 
developing alliances for containment.”30 He stressed that the first three suggestions of 
Mahan became a permanent geostrategic principle of US foreign policy. Mahan’s 
predictions on competition between the land power of Russia in Eurasia and British 
(Atlantic) sea power - explaining the common interests of the US, the UK, Germany, 
and Japan to contain Russia and to control China - became the reality of world politics 
until WWII.
31
 Mahan maintained that naval power was the single most important 
factor in determining a nation’s geopolitical power. Sea power was the handmaiden of 
expansion, and an expansionist US would need to be able not only to project its power 
across the vast Atlantic and Pacific Oceans but also to defeat any rivals.  
As a consequence of the Wars of Religion, Europe had lost its stability, and in the late 
eighteenth century geopolitical thinking emerged as a reaction to the struggle for 
stability.
32
 The geographical arena of Europe was shifted from a physical region into a 
cultural region in this period.
33
 Furthermore, the world was divided into the civilised 
Europe, especially the British Empire, and non-civilised others. This distinction 
helped to legitimize their imperial goals by means of colonization. The architect of 
this notion was Sir Halford J. Mackinder who is regarded as one of the founding 
fathers of geopolitics. As he studied zoology and geography at university, he was 
inspired mostly by Social Darwinism. He published his most significant article, “The 
Geographical Pivot of History”, in 1904. In this, one of the most cited articles in the 
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discipline, he argues that geography shapes the racial characteristics and the racial 
capacity of adaptation.  
Mackinder is also well known because of his ‘Heartland Theory’, which was the 
geopolitical strategy about the endgame of controlling the gigantic transcontinental 
land of Eurasia or the Heartland
34
. The Heartland, including Eastern Europe, Russia 
together with the remainder of Central Asia and Africa, composed the World Island. 
He extended his Heartland area to Central Asia east of the Yenisei River.
35 
The 
Heartland itself was characterized by its inaccessibility to sea, constructing it as “the 
greatest natural fortress on earth.” The Columbian Age controlled by sea power, 
Mackinder claimed, was coming to an end, its place to be taken by a new Eurasian 
age in which land power would be dominant. The advancement of land transportation 
and communication indicated that land power could finally enter into rivalry with sea 
power. Furthermore, Mackinder’s often quoted expression summarizes the Heartland 
Theory: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland 
commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the World.”36  
The next development in geopolitical literature came from Spykman who modified 
Mackinder’s version of the theory about the Heartland. Spykman argued that the real 
power of Eurasia lay in what Mackinder called the ‘Inner’ or ‘Marginal Crescent’, not 
in the Heartland. He renamed this area of power potential the ‘Rimland’ and 
introduced a new formula into geopolitical thinking: who controls the ‘Rimland’ rules 
Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.
37
 Another contribution 
to geopolitical theories came from Saul Cohen. He used the term ‘shatterbelt’ as 
roughly equivalent to the concept of the Rimland. Cohen defines a ‘shatterbelt’ as a 
large, strategically located region that is occupied by a number of conflicting states 
and is caught between the conflicting interests of adjoining Great Powers. Cohen saw 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia as the primary shatterbelt regions.
 38
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In the late nineteenth century, Germany was not quite satisfied within its own borders. 
After the consolidation of Germany as a united political unit, it began to follow an 
imperialistic path. Instead of differentiating space according to civilized peoples or 
others, a biological understanding was adopted. Natural traits and biological needs of 
states determined the geopolitical discourse of this era. According to Friedrich Ratzel, 
space was dynamic and changing over time whilst position was fixed and perceived 
similarly by everyone. The great achievement of naturalization was to have removed 
the political aspect from inter-imperial rivalry through a set of natural and 
determining geographical ‘facts of life’.39 Friedrich Ratzel who founded the German 
school of “Geopolitik” was inspired by the Darwinian theory of ‘survival of the 
fittest’. Furthermore, he applied the study of the Darwinian struggle for existence to 
his organic theory of the state as the geopolitical struggle for space.
40
 We can see 
many of Darwin’s theoretical terms and phrases in the organic theory of the state. In 
the organic theory of the state, it was considered as a living organism that needed to 
grow. Moreover, Ratzel, who first coined the phrase “lebensraum” (or living space) as 
a main force and justification behind the German expansion, argued that there was 
acceptable space for only one great state.
41
 An older form of expression justifying 
colonialism on the grounds of moral values and religious merit gave place to a 
discourse of racial rivalry and dominance. Although these ideas were generally 
associated with Germany, they were accepted internationally. For instance, the late 
nineteenth century witnessed a process of the discursive production of racial identities 
of the Irish who were assumed as inferior before.
42
 The prominent German 
geopolitical thinker was Karl Haushofer who adapted Ratzel’s and Mackinder’s 
arguments to Germany. He persisted in arguing that enlargement of Germany’s 
lebensraum was needed, because it was obvious that there was asymmetry between 
the German population and the geographical space which was necessary to place this 
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population.
43
 In Haushofer’s own words, “Germany must emerge out of the 
narrowness of her present living space into the freedom of the world.”44 
Separately, geopolitical thinking was largely associated with Germany because of 
Hitler’s expansionist behaviour. In fact, after the Nazi movement, commentators 
hesitated to use the term ‘geopolitics’ for some time and the phrase ‘political 
geography’ replaced it.  
After the Second World War, however, geopolitical discourse was concentrated more 
or less evidently on competing insights into how best to co-ordinate the international 
political economy. Cold War geopolitics differed from civilisational or naturalised 
geopolitics in a way relating to language and culture. The world was divided into two, 
on one side the United States as representative of capitalism and on the other side the 
Soviet Union as representative of communism. One’s success hinged excessively on 
the effective existence of the other as a basis of comparison and threat.
45
 Each side 
defined itself as disproving the other side through ideology. The global space was 
separated into ‘friendly’ and ‘threatening’ blocs. The backward-modern distinction 
and the idea of ‘national security’ were the two most pronounced concepts in this 
period.
46
 In the political sphere, the  US defended ‘democracy’ as defining the other 
as authoritarian, on the other side the Soviet Union became the advocate of 
‘socialism’ as defining the other as imperialist.  
When we investigate the geopolitical discourse of this period, we can see that the  US 
made many attempts to generate a strategy for its foreign policy and its justification. 
During the Cold War, three geopolitical understandings emerged with respect to three 
periods of Cold War. Firstly, immediately after the Second World War, Wilsonian 
idealism and American pragmatism was suggested as a theoretical background by 
Bowman. However, it could be seen that its major geopolitical concept was formed 
carefully because of the Nazis’ geopolitics. In the concept of Bowman’s New 
Geography, the term ‘political geography’ was preferred to ‘geopolitics’, presented as 
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a positive science instead of political guide, and focused on voluntarism instead of 
determinism. Furthermore, he suggested American pragmatism instead of Social 
Darwinism. Bowman also advised not territorial expansion based on conflict, but 
economic expansion based on cooperation. Additionally, his theory did not divide the 
world into ‘we’ and ‘others’, he proposed not enslaving but making others partners of 
the United States. In Bowman’s view, the perception of the United States was anti-
communist and preferred British imperialism to Soviet Communism. In the period of 
the early Cold War, George Kennan proposed the understanding of the Soviet Union 
as an evil empire and an ideological threat to be contained. According to Kennan, 
containment of the USSR with security organizations was the main solution, which 
was inspired by the Rimland theory of Spykman.
47
 During the term of Kissinger, the 
rivalry was mitigated and this period was named ‘détente’. He rejected Wilsonian 
idealism and made the  US foreign policy more rational. According to his perception 
of the Soviet Union, the  US had to recognise it as a legitimate state. Moreover, he 
proposed shuttle diplomacy and triangular diplomacy for negotiations. 
1.2.2. Critical Geopolitics and Its Discourse Analyses 
It is a fact that traditional approaches to geopolitics, mentioned in the previous 
section, explore the geography of international politics, particularly the relationship 
between the physical environment (location, resources, and territory) and the conduct 
of foreign policy. Hence, the politics and ideology of these approaches shape the 
meaning of geopolitics by using different concepts of discourse. After trying to 
explain traditional geopolitical approaches comprehensively, four characteristics of 
modern geopolitical imagination can be discerned. The first characteristic of the 
modern geopolitical imagination is a distinction between ‘we’ and ‘others’. The 
‘other’ is dependent on the period of geopolitical discourse, it is sometimes called 
‘non-civilised’, ‘colonised people’ or ‘communist’. The second characteristic of the 
modern geopolitical imagination is that time is used in terms of space. As we have 
seen that means developed and backward, modern and traditional etc. The third one is 
the state-centric representation of global space. Generally, geopolitics was seen as a 
practical guide for political elites who were employed in implementing foreign 
policies of states, and as a consequence geopolitical discourse was developed in a 
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state-centred sense and with the perception that geopolitics is man-made and not 
given. The fourth feature of the modern geopolitical imagination is the struggle for 
power and dominance of the world. This was used for legitimization of expansion and 
imperialism by states.
48
 
Tuathail and Agnew have studied social and historical discourse, which was bound up 
with questions of politics and ideology. They claimed that geopolitical theory was a 
highly ideological and deeply political form of analysis and that it could never be 
objective. The study of and production of knowledge about geopolitics endorsed the 
practice of statecraft and furthered the power of the state. Tuathail and Agnew argued 
that the study of geopolitics involved the comprehensive study of statecraft as a set of 
social practices. There was another issue emphasized in geopolitical reasoning, which 
necessitated considering the production of geographical knowledge within a particular 
state and throughout the modern world system. They claimed that geopolitical 
reasoning was not formal but, rather, practical, depending on consensual and 
remarkable assumptions about places and certain identities, which relied on narratives 
and binary distinctions found in societal mythologies.
 49 
The term geopolitical discourse refers to how geopolitical realities have been written 
and read in the practices of foreign and economic policies by political elites during 
distinct eras of world politics. In the study of geopolitical discourse a set of texts or 
documents is analysed not for what it might tell us about practices or behaviour but 
for its distinctiveness, manner or ‘performative’ aspect. These texts or documents are 
not set up explicitly in order to impose on people how they should live, think and 
speak, but they affect people unconsciously. The theory of geopolitical discourse is a 
theory of how world politics is performed but it is noteworthy that it is specific to a 
certain epoch and restricted practices of world politics. All classical geopolitical 
discourses divide the world into two or three as ‘we’ and ‘others’ by the specific 
understanding of its period. 
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There is another dispute about the limits and boundaries of geopolitical discourse. 
Some argue that discourses are never static but are constantly mutating and being 
modified by human practice. Despite the fact that discourses have virtual and not 
actual existences, conductors of statecraft, security intellectuals and strategists, such 
as Kissinger or Brzezinski, employ their opinions to convince the public, thereby 
exercising their strategic thinking about world politics. That makes geopolitical 
reasoning in international relations a practical and codified system of ideas and 
principles to guide the conduct of statecraft. In tandem with critical geopolitics, one 
could apply the Foucaultian concept of knowledge-power (discourse theory) to 
geopolitics, challenging the conventional approach to geography and geographical 
reasoning. 
Critical studies in international relations began a critique of Cold War political 
discourses, which have failed to introduce a new order in the Post-Cold War era. In 
the meantime, critical geopolitics has recently emerged in economic and political 
geography and can usefully be incorporated into international relations scholarship, 
which has sought to recognise the way in which culturally manifested representations 
of space and place, together with embedded visual practices, can reproduce and 
elucidate the construction of geographical imaginations.  
Tuathail presented a number of important themes for the development of critical 
approaches to matters of geography and its role in the practices of statecraft.
50
 His 
theoretical exploration of the possibilities of a critical geopolitics focused on the 
‘writing of worlds’ or the constructions of geography - literally earth descriptions - 
and their crucially important functions in structuring political discourse by using 
critical theory and poststructuralist themes in his works. His suggestions for the 
construction of critical geopolitics drew heavily on Foucault’s writings, particularly 
on his insistence on focusing on the power-knowledge nexus in discourse. This 
suggests the possibility of seeing geopolitics simultaneously as material and 
discursive, understanding the indivisibility of military bases from the discursive 
strategies of the division and regulation of spaces. However, these also need to be 
understood in how geopolitical strategies are widely interspersed in all aspects of 
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culture. The proposal for the construction of a counter-hegemonic critical geopolitics 
being argued is nothing less than a recognition of the importance of studying the 
political operation of forms of geographical understandings, recognizing that 
geographs are specifications of political reality that have political effect. To construct 
critical political geographies necessitates identifying a study of the geography of 
politics within pre-given, taken-for-granted, common sense spaces, while 
investigating the politics of the geographical specifications of politics. That is to 
practice critical geopolitics; however, this is a very different understanding of the 
purposes of human geography from the normal positivist approach. Critical 
geopolitics looks at uncovering and explicating the circumstances and techniques 
whereby geopolitical reasoning constructs and reinforces divisions, thus underwriting 
exclusion, fear, and ultimately violence. One of the main motivations of critical 
geopolitics is the imaginative concept of Edward Said in his Orientalism. 
1.2.3. The Discourse of Imaginative Geography  
Edward Said’s formulation of orientalism provided critical analyses against 
rationalizations for intervention and for the logic of Western foreign policies.
51
 His 
definition of imaginative geography explained the geographical specifications of the 
world in the political discourses used to justify numerous imperial actions, and the 
rationales for the provision of security came under sustained scrutiny. 
Orientalism remains at the heart of the Western geopolitical image, explicitly 
structuring how the security intellectuals of our time plan for war and justify the 
construction of their military machines. Given the continuing dangers of warfare in a 
biosphere that is being radically destabilized by the modes of economy and violence 
these geopolitical texts legitimize, the necessity for critique remains compelling.
52
 
The application of Said’s imaginative geography to critical geography pays more 
attention to the boundary-drawing practices and performances that characterise the 
everyday life of states.
53
 He said that: “The Orient is an idea that has a history and a 
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tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence 
for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each 
other.”54 Derek Gregory put his new interpretation on Said’s work by saying that: 
“Said charts a series of mappings, sometimes discordant and sometimes compounded, 
through which places and identities are deterritorialised and reterritorialised. He 
describes landscapes and cultures being drawn into abstract grids of colonial and 
imperial power.”55 In line with Said’s direction, Gregory stresses that the US-led war 
against Afghanistan and Iraq after 11 September 2001 and the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict were produced through the performance of imaginative geographies.
56
  
Said’s later work, Culture and Imperialism, argues that postcolonial identities are 
intertwined, intermixed and complex, a point that continues to be relevant in the 
context of globalization and the resultant cultural hybridities that characterize the 
‘global’ era.57 The work of Aimé Césaire, in particular his Discourse on 
Colonialism,
58
 is useful in advancing an understanding of the literary critique of 
colonialism. Césaire's writings anticipated not only the work of Frantz Fanon but also 
other key postcolonial texts such as Edward Said’s Orientalism.  
Anti-colonialist discourses identify Europeans as having brought their own 
imaginative geography to bear on distant lands as a means of legitimizing and, indeed, 
promoting the often brutal institution of colonial rule.
59
 They viewed their European 
homeland as the fully modern pinnacle of civilization and most non-European regions 
as anachronistic, unclaimed, and often uninhabited stretches of territory awaiting 
settlement and cultivation. Such perceptions motivated settlers to travel thousands of 
miles in search of new wealth and opportunities. They argue that European 
administrators and settlers in colonial lands operated under an imaginative geography 
in which peripheral regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia and the 
Caucasus were seen as wild and unclaimed territories awaiting the civilizing effects of 
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settlement and cultivation. However, there have been no voices of non-European 
countries against the imaginative discourse of Western powers. 
1.2.4. Deconstruction of Geopolitical Discourse 
Foucault and Derrida have made an important contribution to post-modern and post-
structuralist theories, which is applicable to the discourse and text analysis of world 
mapping. However, the present author considers that the discourse theory of Chantal 
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau cannot explain the geopolitical space. Rather, it gives a 
societal reading from a Marxist critical perspective. Hence, critical geopolitical 
thinkers like Tuathail used both French philosophers’ discourse theories and ideas, 
which suggests some ways forward through the ‘deconstruction’ of geopolitical 
tradition.  
Foucault defined discourse as the existing order of knowledge, and he saw it as a 
powerful instrument that enables the creation of thought. The strong argument of the 
‘power of knowledge’ theory is that the one who controls the discourse controls 
everything from which political power is generated, from the dominant discourse in 
society. The discourse creates dominant knowledge, which is why those controlling 
the discourse remain more powerful than the owners of the means of production. The 
question is who creates this discourse? Foucault presumed that the masses of ordinary 
people could not generate discourse, thought or knowledge. Intellectuals generate the 
ideas that influence society for the goal of human emancipation from all distortions, to 
endorse human progress. However, discourse and thought have not been used for 
emancipation, because intellectuals employ knowledge, thoughts, and discourses as 
manipulative tricks to maintain the status quo in society. His analysis of power 
provides the tools to understand the reproduction of whiteness as a complex 
interaction of distinctive expressions of power. Foucault's analytics of power 
introduces the critical tools for understanding and addressing the gap between the 
reality that is always a complex production of difference and our analyses that seem, 
generally, to focus on one sort of difference to the exclusion of all others.  
Foucault’s ideas have been used by some critical geopolitical thinkers such as Dalby 
and Tuathail. According to Foucault’s new conceptualisation, power and knowledge 
are subject to people normalizing truth, which shapes their lives and realities; 
 34 
however, the usage of power to form global hegemony gives different meanings. 
Hence, the modern system of power is not hierarchical and centralized, but 
decentralized and localized in these contexts. In fact, the truths of the dominant power 
and culture identify the conditions of collaboration between dominant power and 
weak power.  
One of the great contributions of critical geopolitical thinkers is to unpack the 
traditional approach and reassess Anglo-American, Continental European and South 
American geopolitical thinking. They argue that it is a necessity to look at the 
historical context of geopolitical writing, but also to consider how these have been 
interpreted. Dodds claimed that critical geopolitics was an alternative account and 
explanation of geopolitical phenomena.
60
  
Foucault and Said’s deconstructive approach to geopolitical texts, the links with 
political economy, and recent debates about geopolitics provide foundational premises 
for geography as a social and historical discourse bound up in the knowledge of 
power. Orientalism gives a unique interpretation that is considered as a text of 
geopolitical awareness of aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and 
philosophical narratives. However, the Eurocentric approach to geopolitics sees the 
East as a threat or danger to the West. This oriental codification of the East has 
maintained its constituency during the Cold War and the New World Order of post-
9/11. The geopolitics of the Cold War was built around a language of blocs, 
containment, and domino theories. However, these norms cannot influence any 
international regime looking at geopolitical theories. 
Dalby argued that geopolitics is about ideological processes of constructing spatial, 
political and cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space as separate from the 
threatening other.
61
 His main argument aimed to deconstruct security in a non-state-
centric fashion, which is very close to the critical security studies of Ken Booth; 
however, Dalby focused on spatial practice, which externalizes threats, using instead a 
critical investigation of a possible new practice of security.  
                                                          
60
 Klaus-John Dodds, “Locating Critical Geopolitics,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
12 (1994): 515-524. 
61
 Simon Dalby, “Dealignment Discourse: Thinking Beyond the Blocs,” Current Research in Peace 
and Violence 13 (1994): 140-154. 
 35 
The engagement with the Derridean approach to geopolitical text is questionable in its 
ability to explain continuity of geographic production and dissemination of strategic 
text and maps. The division of the world into Security Complexes, Heartland, 
Rimland, Pivot Zones, Inner Crescents and so on, was underwritten by the 
epistemological assumptions of hegemonic discourses. Hence, the collectors of 
knowledge about geography still define agendas and create social realities. One of the 
aims of this thesis is to provide for the discipline of international relations a linkage 
and relationship between the meaning of the space used for pipelines and the policy 
behaviour of the states.  
1.2.5. Geopolitics of Energy 
As examined in the previous sections, geography has played a vital role in the foreign 
policies of countries. Thus, depending on the geographical positions of countries, 
natural resources have occupied an important place in the economic, military or 
political prospects of countries.  
Rising global energy prices, increasing demand for energy in developing countries, 
conflicts in regions of major energy sources and natural disasters lead to fear among 
countries which do not have sufficient energy resources. Energy could be categorized 
as one of the vital inputs into all economic operations. Thus, none of modern society 
can function properly without energy as a source of power, heat and mobility.
62
 After 
the oil crises of 1970s when The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) imposed an embargo on selling oil to any nation which supported Israel in 
its war in 1973, the term “energy security” became a global issue. “Energy security” 
is generally defined as a reliable and sufficient supply of energy resources at an 
acceptable price.
63
 As stated by Yergin, the current policies on energy security, born 
of the 1973 crisis, are concerned predominantly with the prevention of any disruption 
of oil supplies from exporting countries.
64
  
                                                          
62
 J. Bielecki, “Energy security: is the wolf at the door?,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance 42 (2002): 235-250. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring energy security,” Foreign Affairs (2006): 78. 
 36 
Furthermore, since the confirmed reserves of oil and gas are disproportionately 
distributed between countries depending on their geographical positions, it is not 
unexpected that the rivalry for energy resources, conceived as energy geopolitics, 
constitutes a significant share of international politics. The present study accepts the 
close link between geopolitics and energy.  
One of the classic texts written on energy politics is The Prize: The Epic Quest for 
Oil, Money and Power by Daniel Yergin.
65
 The book, focusing on seizing power, is a 
reasonably straightforward account of how oil companies have grown and changed 
and of how some of the biggest oil producers have developed since the industrial 
revolution. However, there are few explanations in his book of energy geopolitics. It 
is an undeniable fact that natural gas and oil have been two of the regulative 
instruments and variables of international geopolitics since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The issue of control and access to energy resources appears as an 
indispensable part of any state’s geopolitical considerations. The power politics of the 
British Empire in the eighteenth century and the rising of Germany in the nineteenth 
century, based on the control of energy resources, illustrate the close link between 
geopolitics and energy resource management.
66
 Similarly, after the Cold War, within 
the new global order, the United States and the EU’s quests to access oil and natural 
gas resources became major issues of energy politics for international relations 
theorists.
67
 Brzezinski argued that: “The one who controls or influences the export 
routes and the oil and gas resources of the Heartland, the geographical area that covers 
Eastern Europe including Russia and most of the Black Sea, dominates the world.”68 
This conceptualization can be perceived as a geopolitical imagination positioning the 
energy resources as central within international power politics.  
The geopolitical significance of Eurasia has continued unabated, and Western powers 
have extended their control over this energy-rich region to ensure that no single power 
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should control its geopolitical space.
69
 In the transition period from the Post-Cold War 
era to 9/11, a new geopolitics based on resource management and energy transport 
diplomacy has prevailed over the former bipolar geopolitics drawn by ideological 
divide.
70
 However, this mode of geopolitics needs to develop a reliable energy policy 
to create consent between suppliers, transporters and buyers. It is certain that there is a 
‘great game’ policy dominating energy geopolitics. It is essential to understand the 
policies of the great powers - Russia, the US-EU and China - in the energy trade in the 
region. Russia still controls most of the oil and gas trade of the former Soviet states, 
especially in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The entrance of China into the region 
and the development of an energy ‘silk road’, linking the Middle East and Asia, will 
have a fundamental impact on the whole architecture of global energy geopolitics. 
Strategists predict that, even if Russia and China maintain their security co-operation 
(under the quasi agreement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) against their 
common threat, Islamic fundamentalism, they will be faced with conflict, especially 
in energy politics. It is certain that China’s co-operation with energy giants 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan reduces Russian influence in the region. On the one 
hand, as a medium-sized state, Iran’s oil swap and Turkmenistan-Iran natural gas 
pipelines diversify the Caspian Sea state energy transport options.  
Since energy geopolitics has become so complex, many scholars argue that countries 
have to achieve energy independence. However, in a globalised and interdependent 
world, all energy producer and consumer countries, and also transporter countries, are 
attached to each other by a mutual interdependency. All of them are vulnerable to any 
incident, at some place, at any time, to some extent that has an effect on supply or 
demand of energy resources. Thus, energy independence, like many other isolationist 
policies, has the risk of leading to greater costs and a smaller amount of flexibility and 
therefore higher insecurity in the course of a supply disruption.
71
 Accordingly, it is the 
more plausible option for countries to link into the interdependent world while being 
aware of their geopolitical position in the international system.  
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Turkey is one of the regional players that desire interdependency in the Caspian Sea 
and the Middle Eastern energy environment by promising to re-arrange energy 
geopolitics and to address new energy governance or new energy policy. Hence, it is 
essential to understand the geopolitical space of Turkey in order to introduce an 
energy policy for secure oil and gas transport from supplying countries to demanding 
countries. 
1.2.6. Geopolitics of Turkey 
The geopolitical space of Turkey provides a great advantage in security, economy, 
and now energy transport. Turkey is geographically located between East and West. 
As Davutoğlu stated: “Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both Asian 
and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern 
Mediterranean”.72 Furthermore, Georgios Filis defines Turkey’s geopolitics as the 
median line between the Heartland and the Rimland (or Shatterbelt), which helps in 
understanding Turkey’s vision in the energy environment. Turkey has a median space 
identity in a specific geographical space, which has persisted throughout the eternal 
East-West competition.
73
 
Since the end of the 1940s, Turkey has been a notable ally of the United States. 
During the Cold War, Turkey was one of the pillars of the US’s ‘containment’ policy 
and a frontline state against Soviet Russia’s revisionism towards the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean.
74
 Turkey benefited from this relationship with the US by receiving 
economic and military aid. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union has not reduced 
the geopolitical importance of Turkey, the disappearance of the Soviet threat has 
affected the relationship between Turkey and the US considerably. For both sides, the 
direction of threats and security challenges has been changed. According to Larrabee, 
at present, the main threats or challenges for Turkey are coming from its southern 
border.
75
 However, the disappearance of the Soviet threat which was the main 
motivation behind the alliance between Turkey and the US had reduced Turkey’s 
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dependency on the US for its security. That might also explain the 2003 crisis when 
Turkey’s relations with Washington were strained due to the failure of the 1 March 
Memorandum in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Assembly rejected the 
US request for passage from Turkish territory to the northern part of Iraq. The 
quagmire in and later withdrawal of American forces from Iraq rehabilitated Turkish-
US relations and gave a new momentum to establishing a reliable relationship, 
especially after the emergence of the ‘Arab Spring’. Turkey further strengthened its 
relations and long-term engagement with the EU and the US with such associations as 
strategic energy cooperation, security ties, regional stability, and the global war on 
terrorism.  
The representation of Turkey in connection with Europe has been vague at all times. 
Historically, the Ottoman Empire has been perceived as a part of the Muslim world as 
well as a power in Europe.
76
 In his article, Diez notices that there has always been a 
dichotomy regarding whether Turks are part of Europe, the Western world, or the 
Muslim world. He gives as an example the fact that Turkey sent five delegates to the 
International Court of the European Movement in 1949, and then became a member 
of the Council of Europe and NATO.
77
 However, Turkey is still not a member of the 
European Union, although Turkey made an application for membership to the EU in 
1987 and finally the EU leaders named Turkey as an official candidate to the EU at 
the Helsinki Summit in 1999.
78
 Whereas the EU has acknowledged Turkey’s 
eligibility as a candidate for membership, the debates regarding Turkey’s membership 
have been continuing at different levels. Diez has illustrated these discussions with a 
couple of speeches which emphasised cultural differences by senior officials at the 
EU.
79
 The debate with regard to Turkey as a bridge or a barrier between the Muslim 
world and the West is still conducted in Europe.
80
 Since the JDP government has 
come to power, there has been a discussion on whether Turkey has turned its face 
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towards the Middle East. Davutoğlu emphasises that Turkey’s national interest can be 
shaped in line with the proper employment of its geography.
81
 Davutoğlu also 
criticises the EU by stating that: 
What disappoints and surprises us is the EU’s inability to grasp this vision. Some 
Europeans seem to have this thought in mind: the Turkish state and its people are 
not Europeans but Turkey’s geography is freely open to European use. Such 
logic does not provide a solid ground for managing Turkish-European relations. 
The fact that the countries most opposed to Turkey’s integration into the EU are 
also those that hold high expectations for these energy projects is a great 
contradiction.
82
 
Although there is ongoing disappointment in Turkey over its failure to achieve 
membership of the EU, Turkey has not given up on the goal of being a member of the 
EU. However, within the new foreign policy vision set out by Turkish Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu, it seems that Turkey has realized its potential by improving its 
relations with its neighbours while hoping that the EU also will understand Turkey’s 
importance especially for European energy security.  
Early in the Cold War, the driving force behind Turkey’s decision to join NATO in 
1952 was Stalin’s aggressive policy toward Turkey. According to Erşen, this decision 
made Turkey an enemy of the Soviet Union, which has prevented Turkish 
policymakers from pursuing an inclusive position towards the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Considering that, Turkey could develop a geopolitical concept of Eurasia only 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
83
 Since Turkey was part of the Western 
allies during the Cold War, however, the relationship between Turkey and Russia has 
improved noticeably, mainly in the economic area.
84
 Since Russia is Turkey’s major 
supplier of natural gas, energy has been an essential driver for the rapprochement 
between Russia and Turkey; 66% of Turkey’s natural gas and 25% of its crude oil 
have been imported from Russia. If current trends are maintained, it is expected to 
increase Turkey’s natural gas imports from Russia to 80%.85 These statistics have 
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shown that Turkey’s dependence on Russia regarding energy resources could make 
Turkey more sensitive to Russian concerns than to American on several issues related 
to Central Asian and Caspian security.
86
 Although Russia and Turkey have advanced 
their relations in the last decade, they are also competitors on energy in the Caspian 
and Central Asia. Since Russia wants to control the import and export channels of 
energy resources in those regions, Russia has opposed the pipeline projects that could 
offer alternative routes for the region’s energy resources to Europe and obstruct 
Russian hegemony in the region regarding energy delivery. However, Turkey strongly 
supports those alternative pipeline projects which could help Turkey to become a hub 
in the region.
87
 
After Russia, Iran is the second largest supplier of natural gas to Turkey. 
Consequently, co-operation with Iran has improved and energy has been a significant 
driver of this relationship. On the other hand, since Prime Minister Erdoğan has 
pursued a pro-Palestinian policy openly in the Middle East, the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship has been in decline, especially because of Israel’s 2008-2009 offensive in 
Gaza, the the spat between President Peres and Prime Minister Erdoğan at Davos 
Forum in 2009, and the the attack of Israeli navy to Gaza aid fleet incident in 2010.  
On the one hand, Turkey is a middle power state; it still is part of the western security 
system, though it is considered geographically and culturally alien to the European 
state system. Taroj Atabeki defined Turkey and Iran as subaltern; however, Turkey’s 
argument here is that it is neither subaltern nor a great power. Turkey has a capacity to 
create its own energy policy and discourse by looking at its geographical space and its 
diplomatic and cultural resources. Before joining the Justice and Development Party 
cabinet, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu wrote his well-known Strategic 
Depth, contributing to critical geopolitics as a subaltern voice. He has found an 
opportunity to implement his theory of ‘zero problems with Turkey’s neighbours’. 
The new vision of a middle power state in median space can provide an alternative 
approach to energy policy in the international energy environment, in contrast to 
energy lobbies and Eurocentric views about Turkey’s geopolitics. They define Turkey 
as a bridge rather than as an identity or an energy hub in energy transport. Turkey is 
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already one of the physical hubs, hosting major oil and natural gas pipelines. John 
Roberts clarifies the geographical position of Turkey and its weakness in energy 
diplomacy in a recent article. He argues that: 
The country’s inherent geography – its classic position as a crossroads between 
east and west, between north and south – makes it natural [for it] to become a 
giant centre for trading in oil, gas, and petrochemicals. But its attitude – the 
accumulation of its foreign policy, its approach to energy transit and to internal 
energy development, and its own uncertainty as to its place in the world in 
general and its involvement in Europe in particular – tells quite a different 
story.
88
 
Turkey wants to be a trading hub, a place where energy is bought and sold; however, 
to achieve this, it needs to create a reliable energy policy in which both parties can 
benefit. Turkey meets the criteria for an energy hub and for being a crossroads as a 
southern corridor in the European energy environment. A hub offers the possibility to 
do financial trading on one side and physical trading on the other; this includes 
storage, LNG, and pipelines. John Roberts presumes that if the Turkish gas market 
evolved into an open market, in which suppliers were free to strike their own deals 
with consumers, then, indeed, Turkey would become a true hub.
89
 Chapter 5 will 
analyse and detail Turkey’s energy outlook and market liberalisation policies.  
Turkish policy makers have a new geographic imagination which presents a different 
connection between power and geography under the premises of the principles and 
mechanisms of a changing foreign policy line. As critical geopolitics argues, policy 
makers’ attitude towards geography may change the policies, perception and 
strategies in a manner that may result in a certain degree of discontinuity with the 
past. Turkey’s assumed role of energy hub is a clear representation of assigning a new 
role to Turkey’s geography in between energy rich regions and energy consuming 
countries. This role reinforces a new diplomatic style, employs economic capabilities 
and brings new public and private institutions to policy planning and implementation. 
Another dimension of the new geographic imagination is the connection between 
economic and foreign policy in a way that energy policy will serve for the country’s 
strategic role vis-à-vis Europe, expand international trade, yield benefits for Turkish 
companies and provide access to cheap and reliable energy reserves. The discourse 
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around energy policy makes it a feasible project through these arguments of ideational 
and material benefits. It provides a new perception of geopolitical role and reality 
with a new formulation of power and geography.  
1.3. INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY 
In the literature of international relations, there are two main camps which analyse 
inter-state interactions on the co-operative and conflictual issues. The first side of this 
discussion is the realist camp that refuses the notion that the structure of international 
politics is determined as a consequence of international economic activities. Realists 
perceive the international arena as a playground for the power politics between states. 
In the anarchic environment of international relations, the main goal of the states is 
survival and to achieve this goal the states have to grow stronger and increase their 
security as much as they can. Realist scholars contend that the structure of 
international politics is determined as a consequence of the pursuit of powerfulness 
and security by the states. Furthermore, international trade has no feature of 
promoting peace and co-operation between states. Realists claim that political 
objectives and ruling political elites shape economic relations. According to the realist 
camp, expected loss or gain from trade most probably does not prevent political 
leaders from attempting conflict since they are more interested in relative gains rather 
than absolute gains. Relative gain, in international relations, is the actions of states 
only in respect to power balances and without regard to other factors, such as 
economics. In international relations, co-operation may be necessary to balance 
power, but concern for relative gains will limit that co-operation due to the low 
quality of information about other states' behaviours and interests. Relative gain is 
related to a zero-sum game, which states that wealth cannot be expanded and the only 
way a state can become richer is to take wealth from another state. On the one hand, 
neo-realists consider relative gains as a source of power. According to Grieco et al.
90
 
realists emphasize relative gains since allied states in the present might turn to 
enemies in the future by converting those gains into political pressure and military 
capabilities, and hesitant joint gains in co-operation might produce perilous rivalry in 
the future. Furthermore, they contend that the possibility of military conflict could 
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arise along with the alterations in the balance of power between countries as a result 
of international trade.
91
 
The liberal party, the other side of the discussion, claims that realists deemphasize the 
pacifying character of international trade. According to Polachek, states engaged in 
trade are apt to sustain co-operation so as to preserve their benefits from trade, since 
conflict turns out to be expensive by means of increasing mutual dependence.
92
 
However, liberal scholars claim that a state’s utility is merely dependent on its 
absolute gain since relative gains or losses are not so important as long as co-
operation leads to absolute gains. According to liberal international relations theory, 
absolute gain is what international actors look at in determining their interests, 
weighing out the total effects of a decision on the state or organization and acting 
accordingly. The international actor's interests do not only include power but 
encompass the economic and cultural effects of an action as well. The theory is also 
interrelated with a win-win game which proposes that through use of comparative 
advantage, all states who engage in peaceful relations and trade can expand wealth. 
Liberal theory emphasizes the association between international trade and domestic 
politics. Consequently, democratic countries offer assurances for private actors’ 
property rights, which impose the legitimacy of international exchange. Subsequently, 
international trade generates mutual benefits for parties from different countries; these 
parties behave as a lobby to diminish potential conflicts between countries.
93
 By the 
same token, Gelpi and Grieco put forward that international trade creates joint gains 
for the general public and in accordance with that democratic administrations, which 
need public support to stay in power or to be re-elected, are more keen on 
encouraging international trade than despotic ones.
94
  
Russia’s ambitious policies especially demonstrate that traditional military and 
security approaches are occupied with new understandings in international relations. 
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The arrival of interdependence in various areas challenges the longstanding patterns. 
In the period of interdependence, the hierarchy among the issues becomes invisible in 
international politics. As a consequence of that military-security concerns do not have 
superiority on the political agenda; it is not adequate any longer to use military force 
to deal with the problems of the interdependence age.
95
  
As explained by Keohane and Nye, interdependence as mutual dependence is ascribed 
to ‘situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in 
different countries’.96 These reciprocal effects depend on the type and strategic 
significance of the commodities that are being traded.
97
 In the EU’s relationship with 
Eurasia and the Middle East, it is clear that the gas deliveries from these regions are 
important commodities for the EU, and, in return, huge amounts of hard currency are 
very significant for supplier countries. Furthermore, the relationship between states 
can create asymmetrical interdependence since the expenses and the profits in the 
interactions of interdependence could be distributed disproportionately. However, this 
implies that interdependence can produce asymmetrical relations between countries, 
as Keohane and Nye stress that “an unequal distribution of gains and losses lies at the 
heart of asymmetrical interdependence, which secures the source of power”.98 Power 
is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as “the capacity or ability to direct or influence the 
behaviour of others or the course of events”. Accordingly, states could use their 
advantage on the asymmetric interdependence as a source of power against other 
states. As Gasiorowski reveals, economic links create an opening to conduct ‘war by 
other means’.99 By the same token, Keohane and Nye argue that globalization 
regarding the multidimensional ties among states brings into existence a complex 
interdependence, which plays down military-security issues.  
The theoretical scheme suggested by Keohane and Nye appears to be a midway point 
between the realist and liberal paths. They proclaim that competition among states is 
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still existent. As mentioned above, since energy resources become important as a 
source of countries' development, the energy security concerns of countries turn out to 
be a part of national security. On the other hand, with the help of complex 
interdependence, the primacy of military issues might be replaced by the economic 
concerns.  
Since the establishment of the Russia-Western European gas trade, energy relations 
have been evaluated under the interdependence theory. Each side holds a degree of 
power over the other. The Soviets (Russians) are the gas suppliers and the Western 
Europeans are the sources of the hard-currency payments and equipment deliveries.
100
 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in their work Power and Interdependence, create an 
excellent framework within which to analyse the gas relationship between the EU and 
Russia. They define interdependence as mutual dependence — in world politics, this 
refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among 
actors in different countries.
101
 These reciprocal effects depend on the type and 
strategic significance of the commodities that are being traded.
102
 In the EU’s 
relationship with Eurasia and the Middle East, it is clear that the gas deliveries from 
these regions are important commodities for the EU, and, in return, huge amounts of 
hard currency are very significant for supplier countries. 
The EU’s indigenous gas supply is expected to decline in coming decades. This 
decline in gas production will be met by gas imports in the future. This situation 
makes the gas relationship between the EU and supplier countries more complicated. 
The security of the gas supply issue has become one of the most significant topics on 
the political agenda in the EU. These issues will be discussed in Chapter 4 under the 
title of Energy Security. 
The terms ‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’ are critical when analysing this scenario. 
Keohane and Nye define sensitivity as the “liability to costly effects imposed from 
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outside before policies are altered to try out to change the situation.”103 Thus, in the 
sensitivity dimension in an interdependent relationship, international actors are 
sensitive to the behaviour of other actors or developments in parts of the system. The 
degree of sensitivity depends on how quickly changes in one actor bring about 
changes in another and how great the effects are. In their work, vulnerability is 
defined ‘as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after 
policies have been altered’.104 In the framework of this type of analysis, one could 
conclude that the high sensitivity of the EU’s dependence on Russian gas will force 
the EU to take measures to decrease its level of vulnerability. Otherwise, the EU’s 
vulnerability to a gas crisis will have a destructive effect on the EU economy and 
industry. Therefore, the EU is seeking other gas suppliers from North Africa, the 
Middle East and the Caspian region to diversify its gas sources. At this point, Turkey 
holds an important strategic position for the security and diversity of gas supplies for 
the EU. In Chapter 4, the EU’s options for taking the necessary measures to become 
less vulnerable to gas interruptions will be analysed.  
Keohane and Nye introduce a new conception into energy politics and define 
asymmetry in dependence as “that which is most likely to provide sources of 
influence for actors in their dealings with one another”.105 In the case of a 
disagreement, a less dependent side would have fewer costly effects, and thus, an 
advantageous position.  
The interdependence of the EU and energy supplier countries may have some costly 
effects on its future. Therefore, this interdependence should be constructed to satisfy 
both sides. On the one hand, Turkey, with its strategic position and dynamics, may 
contribute to the diversification of supply for the EU and the diversification of transit 
routes for Eurasian and Middle East oil and gas. On the other hand, there are some 
difficulties in the management of interdependent relations between Turkey and the 
EU.  
 
                                                          
103
 Ibid. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid. 
 48 
1.4. AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS 
GEOPOLITICS  
Three different paradigms have been covered, namely realist (geopolitics), liberalist 
(interdependence theory) and postmodernist (critical geopolitics). These theories of 
the international relations discipline outline the mainstream theoretical framework 
which will be utilized in this study. Although these approaches seem to be in 
competition and to take different standpoints, there is no one single theory which is 
able to offer a complete understanding and explanation of the countries’ foreign 
policy behaviours with regard to energy resources. Especially, understanding 
Turkey’s energy policy as part of its foreign policy requires the employment of an 
integrated model which combines the above-mentioned approaches. There are no 
directly relevant theories which explain the behaviour of Turkey and Eurasian 
countries including the EU, Russia, the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East 
region. Hence, it is necessary to employ an integrated model with the use of analysis 
to reach a testable result in this thesis.  
From a practical perspective Turkey would like to play an active role in the 
establishment of an energy mechanism between producing and consuming countries. 
The main component of its argument is that Turkey is named as having the second 
biggest growth rate in its energy market after China. Some policy analysts claim that 
Turkey can be included in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries which 
will challenge the Western financial system in global markets. It is a fact that Turkey 
is a growing country in measurement of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) rates and 
attracting of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). Turkey’s historical and cultural ties can 
be turned into social capital which develops new ties with these countries and 
contributes to adaptation of Turkey’s market regulations to the European market. 
Turkey’s answer to the expectations of the producer and consumer countries’ trading 
and international energy regimes provides the Turkish government with an active role 
in the international energy market. 
It is important to note that since the 1960s Turkey’s Europeanization policies have 
already created interdependence relations with European countries in the context of 
trade volumes and customs union. The Justice and Development Party’s new vision in 
Turkish foreign policy aims to take further steps to increase the ties between the EU 
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and Turkey in the energy sector. This co-optation strategy aims to provide long term 
security of supply of energy by building pipelines. In so doing, Turkey has already 
signed a new long term contract with Azerbaijan and is seeking for new long-term 
natural gas contracts with Iraq, Qatar, Algeria and Yemen. Turkey’s mediation effort 
between the EU and Iran is essential to transfer Iranian gas to Europe. Turkey’s other 
mediation effort between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is another regional initiative 
in the Caspian Sea region. It is essential to note that Turkey’s co-optation strategy 
includes strategic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. This thesis 
proposes that Azerbaijan can be a transit country if interdependence relations are 
developed in both countries. That means that Turkey’s new activism is contested by 
neither energy producing countries nor consuming countries. This new face of Turkey 
plays a crucial role in securing the natural gas environment of Europe (consumers) 
and Caspian Sea-Middle East regions (producers). 
From a theoretical point of view, a framework for explaining Turkey’s energy policy 
needs to borrow from realist, liberal and critical geopolitics framework. There is an 
ideational basis which relies on reformulation of the relations between power and 
geography and on making a new sense of Turkish geography to enhance a new 
geopolitical role. This role is fostered by the rhetoric of Turkey’s projection of its 
central role in regional politics and the new elements of power in foreign, economic 
and security policies. The role has a liberal dimension of cooperation and 
interdependency to promote regional cooperation, create a win-win strategy and avoid 
the potential pitfalls of a newcomer role in energy geopolitics. The liberal dimension 
is well connected to the central assumption and principles of Turkish foreign policy. 
The realist account comes to the front in the phase of implementation, which is to 
enhance the national interest and yield maximum benefits with a projection of energy 
hub centred international energy policy.  
1.5. THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY SECURITY 
The doyen of energy politics, Daniel Yergin, outlined the fundamentals of energy 
security in his speech titled “Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Oil 
Dependence” presented in the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on 22 March 2007. He claimed that “energy independence is a popular and 
appealing term, with deep political impact in international energy markets”. He 
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deliberately uses the phrase ‘energy security’ rather than ‘energy independence’. 
Yergin identifies seven factors that play an effective role in energy security in global 
energy supply:
106
 (a) Diversification, (b) resilience, (c) integration, (d) information, 
(e) supply chain, (f) flexibility, and (g) efficiency. 
Moreover, the investment flows and sharing of technological advances are the major 
principles of energy security in global energy markets.
107
 The analysis of John Gault 
also emphasizes the priorities of European energy security. He argued that energy 
security is only one of the three goals stated in the European Commission’s 
Communication on energy policy. The Communication called for “sustainable, secure 
and competitive energy.”108 Similarly, Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkin suggest a 
broader agenda of energy security: elements, components, and potential threats. 
Availability, reliability, affordability, and sustainability are the key concepts in energy 
security in their argument.
109
 
It is important to note that the current energy security system was created in response 
to the 1973 Arab oil embargo to ensure co-ordination among the industrialized 
countries in the event of a disruption in supply, encourage collaboration on energy 
policies, avoid competing for supplies, and deter any future use of an ‘oil weapon’ by 
exporters. It is unfortunate that no emergency sharing system (such as the IEA) has 
been set up to offset major disruptions that threaten the global economy and stability 
for natural gas.  
1.5.1. Defining Natural Gas Security 
Generally speaking, natural gas security has recently gained momentum for many 
commercial, industrial and government facilities. The growth in energy demand has 
increased the importance of the security of energy supply. It is an essential strategy to 
reduce or hedge risks that stem from energy use, production and imports.  
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Gas security deals with the threats of supply and price disruptions, the transit of gas 
supplies and the facilities through which gas is delivered. There are two major 
dimensions of these risks for the EU’s natural gas security: (1) Short-term supply 
availability versus long-term adequacy of supply and the infrastructure and daily 
operational security of gas markets and (2) seasonal stresses and strains of extreme 
weather and other operational problems (peak demand)
110
 versus strategic security, 
catastrophic failure of major supply sources and facilities.
111 
The present chapter deals 
mainly with the adequacy of long-term supply, and the infrastructure and the 
framework needed to create strategic security against emergency supply situations.  
1.5.2. The Traditional and New Approaches to Natural Gas Security 
The traditional approach to security of supply for European gas is to look at available 
information on remaining reserves and make judgments as to when they are likely to 
‘run out’. The remaining proven reserves in major gas-resource-holding countries that 
are existing suppliers to Europe play an essential role in gas supply security of energy. 
Reserves and reserve-to-production ratios provide some support for the proposition 
that indigenous production is declining, particularly in the UK and Norway; 
nevertheless, Europe is on track with its efficiency aims and is attempting to decrease 
dependency through efficiency even further by decreasing the carbon emissions 
levels. 
Jonathan Stern provides the basic principles of the traditional approach to European 
energy security: (1) Long-term supply arrangements in liberalized markets, (2) long 
term contracts, (3) Multi-billion dollar investments and (4) import and facility 
dependence.  
In the spring 2005 Global Energy Watch, CERA outlined the new approach to energy 
security and focused on five key themes related to the current global sense of energy 
supply insecurity. (1) New supply and demand energy maps. There is a systematic 
shift in the energy transformation map toward Asia. The supply centres have also 
shifted as new investments for oil and gas are increasingly focused on non-OECD 
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countries. (2) Operating at the edge of capacity. All fossil fuels are operating at the 
edge of their capacity as energy suppliers strive to meet strong demand for oil, gas 
and coal. A new generation of energy power companies are changing their choices for 
the next wave of power plant investment. (3) Security of supply dominating 
government energy policies. Mounting concerns about security of supply are leading 
to a new politics of energy that are visible in every region and for every energy 
source. (4) Pendulum swinging back toward statism. Increased concerns about energy 
security of supply are leading to renewed interest in statist values of nationalism, 
patriotism, and service. Governments are intervening in energy markets in order to 
balance multiple objectives. (5) Challenging social and environmental concerns. 
Demand for energy to fuel economies is global, but facilities for extracting, 
processing, transporting, and delivering fossil fuels are more local—and not always 
welcomed. In addition, certainty about the status of the Kyoto Protocol has not yet 
been achieved.
112
 
Another report from CERA, prepared by Jean-Marie Chevalier and Anne-Sophie 
Corbeau, gives us new essential insights for energy security. Both energy experts 
argue that the energy industry has an important role to play in finding the right 
balance between competitiveness and energy supply security. (1) The concept of 
security of supply is vast and multiform. It is related to a given economy’s 
dependence on energy supply. It has a global dimension, but also a number of very 
concrete dimensions: security of power supply, of gasoline supply and of natural gas 
supply. It has also an important time dimension since it concerns sudden and 
unexpected disruptions but also medium- and long-term imbalances between demand 
and supply. The security of supply also concerns the safety of energy infrastructure, 
from the oil and gas fields to the final distribution network. (2) Diversity and 
flexibility are the key elements. The search for diversity at a macro level means that 
each available energy technology has its role in building the appropriate fuel mix, 
with an emphasis given to domestic sources such as renewable, hydro and possibly 
nuclear. Diversity for a specific fuel also implies different suppliers or routes of 
supply. In addition to diversity and flexibility, the improvement of energy efficiency 
is also a means for reducing the amount of energy required. (3) Regulation ‘in 
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concert’. This is an idea developed by CERA to explain that the dynamic 
liberalization of the European energy industry cannot be based solely on market 
mechanisms. It has to be monitored through a permanent dialogue among European 
institutions, national governments, and the energy industry.
113
  
The report revisits the concept of security of energy supply, which is given in the 
following: (1) A reliable supply of energy. (2) Reliable transportation of supply. (3) 
Reliable distribution and delivery of supply to the final customer. Energy ought to be 
efficiently delivered to the final customer according to particular time and quality 
standards without any form of discrimination. (4) A ‘reasonable price’ over a 
continuous period. (5) Environmental costs. (6) Short-term disruptions. (7) Longer-
term impacts. (8) Technological jumps. (9) Storage capacity. (10) CO2 emissions. (11) 
Short- and long-term surplus contracts.
114
 
1.6. THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY HUB 
Due to the lack of comprehensive abstract definition and different meanings attached 
to the concept by practitioners, the notion of energy hub is an elusive concept. 
Overall, the concept of energy hub is used in the context of a certain country and its 
prospects of becoming a key actor in energy policies. There is no single study which 
treats the concept of energy hub at a theoretical level. Accordingly, there is no agreed 
upon definition of energy hub in the literature. However, in the extant literature, one 
could detect different uses, hence features, of what an energy hub looks like.  
Firstly, the dictionary definition of the concept of hub is a useful place to start. The 
hub in Oxford dictionary is defined as “the effective centre of an activity, region, or 
network,”115 while the hub definition from Longman dictionary is “the central and 
most important part of an area, system, activity etc., which all the other parts are 
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connected to centre.”116 It could be inferred from these definitions that hub refers to a 
centre and a central role played by an actor, more or less.  
However, in the literature on Turkey’s energy policies, the concept of ‘energy hub’ 
has been used in different meanings, referring to various related but sometimes 
distinct roles. Kramer defines an energy hub country as a country which buys the 
energy resources from producer countries and re-exports them to others.
117
 In this 
sense, he asserts, being an energy hub requires substantial energy infrastructure and 
the capability to influence trading conditions independently of the producers and 
clients.
118
 Similarly, Bilgin states that an energy hub country has “extensive influence 
on a web of oil and gas pipelines as well as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trade, not 
only in terms of its ability to influence transit terms and conditions, but also in re-
exporting some of the hydrocarbons passing through this system.”119 Moreover, he 
argues that being an energy hub is strongly related to regional and global dynamics 
beyond the foreign policy of a single actor.
120
 Tagliapietra also underlines the 
importance of regional dynamics, particularly the regional cooperation between the 
actors of a web of energy routes, for achieving and sustaining the energy hub 
position.
121
 
Furthermore, when we look at the recent uses of the concept of an energy hub in the 
context of other actors, especially in the field of natural gas, Toula Onoufrio defines 
the energy hub as a place which offers alternative reliable gas suppliers to satisfy and 
diversify current and future energy demands of importing countries by emphasizing 
the importance of the strategic location.
122
 Souleimanov and Kraus describe the 
concept of energy hub as an arena that provides great transit potential for raw 
materials. They also underline the stability in the region in the sense that economic 
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and security interests of exporting and importing countries play a significant role in 
making feasible the transition projects for infrastructure developments in the region. 
As such a hub may offer a stable connection which is free from any hindrance such as 
terrorist attacks or political deadlock throughout the route from exporting countries to 
importing countries.
123
 Moreover, John Roberts offers a definition of a major physical 
hub as “a host of major oil and gas pipelines already transit the country, with gas 
supplies further augmented by liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification facilities.”124 
Roberts also emphasizes the geopolitical position of the energy hub which has the 
current or future ability to provide natural gas from not only one direction but many 
directions.
125
 According to Roberts, an energy hub suggests the possibility to do 
financial trading on one hand while physical trading on the other.
126
 
On the other hand, Winrow distinguishes the “physical energy hub” and “trading 
energy hub” concepts. Physical energy hub, according to him, refers to “a state in 
which there is substantial energy infrastructure –i.e., pipelines and facilities such as 
refineries, storage units, terminals, petrochemical factories, gas liquefaction plants, 
etc.” , whereas, a “trading energy hub” is a state in which “suppliers and consumers 
meet and trade in hydrocarbons in an open and transparent market.”127 Furthermore, 
Roberts also describes that an energy hub is an arena which several suppliers and 
customers meet in an open and transparent market place to guarantee the procurement 
of good quality gas at competitive prices on stable basis.
128
 
For the case of Turkey, Bilgin specifically analyses different labels for Turkey’s role, 
such as energy transit corridor, energy hub, or energy centre, and stresses that the 
differences between these three labels depend upon the numbers and capacities of the 
pipelines crossing to Western purchaser via Turkey.
129
 Additionally, Tagliapietra 
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attempts to answer the question of whether Turkey can become a regional natural gas 
hub. He states that in medium term it is not likely for Turkey to become a natural gas 
hub, while it is uncertain and highly depends on regional dynamics in long term.
130
 He 
asserts, for example, resolving the political aspects of Cyprus crisis would reinforce 
Turkey’s role in the natural gas market and increase the possibility of becoming a 
natural gas hub.
131
   
Furthermore, Winrow asserts that a physical energy hub role is achievable for Turkey 
while becoming a trading energy hub “will only be possible in Turkey after the 
planned liberalization of the gas market is implemented, when proper legal and 
regulatory frameworks could then be in place.”132 Additionally, he also underscores 
the importance of stability and security in the territory and immediate neighbourhood 
of Turkey in order to achieve and maintain the role of energy hub. In this sense, how 
Turkey deals with the conflicts in the Caucasus or Middle East will influence 
Turkey’s role in the regional energy politics.133 Furthermore, Souleimanov and Kraus 
emphasize that becoming an energy hub for Turkey, apart from all of the transit 
projects that have been completed or to be completed in the near future, also depends 
on the successful lobbying efforts by other countries.
134
 According to Krauer-
Pacheco, Turkey will be able to boost its role as one of the main transit routes of the 
European Union for energy resources which may support its ground in the EU 
accession by materializing the Nabucco and Arab natural gas pipelines.
135
 
We could gather the following two different meanings attached to the concept of an 
energy hub from the discussion so far: First and foremost, the concept of an energy 
hub has a physical meaning; i.e., it implies a central geographic position in the sense 
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that the country is placed favourably between the producers and consumers. It is also 
a geostrategic concept because the physical geographic meaning needs to be 
substantially complemented by deliberate policy planning and strategic thinking, 
where that particular country has to move in the direction of creating major 
interdependencies between the producers and consumers, so that it can gain leverage 
vis-à-vis both. In this first meaning, to realize the connecting role between the two 
ends, the hub country has to establish or control a significant amount of physical 
infrastructure such as pipelines, terminals and other transportation and storage 
facilities. Secondly, the concept of an energy hub has a market-based meaning in the 
sense that it refers to a country where not only a major volume of trading takes place 
but also prices are also set. In order to realize such a role necessary legal 
infrastructure in the form of norms and regulations needs to be put into action, while it 
also requires substantial degree of physical infrastructure to be available in the first 
place. 
In this dissertation, the two meanings of the concept will be acknowledged but it will 
be argued that Turkey does have the potential to achieve a hub role in the physical 
sense of the concept. This geopolitical role will also be in alignment with Turkey’s 
overall strategic orientation and foreign policy behaviour. As will be elaborated 
further in Chapter 8, this meaning will be reframed in the framework of a new 
concept, “Anatolian Gas Centre” that captures cogently the various roles Turkey seeks 
to play in energy relations. 
1.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The combination of theoretical propositions here suggests that there is no single 
explanation in trying to understand energy policy formation between Eurasia, the 
Middle East and Europe. The power-based approach to energy geopolitics and 
discourse analyses critical geopolitics and provides some incentives about power, 
which act as a coercive or benign hegemony during the negotiation process. 
On the other hand, the interest-based approach provides significant contributions to 
co-operation in the international regime. The interdependence theory explains that 
there is a necessity for co-operation for oil and gas supply security. The energy 
security phenomena play a central role in foreign and energy policies of the countries. 
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Within this framework Turkey has its role in the international energy arena to meet its 
energy demands and to contribute to the global energy security solutions with its 
geography, foreign policy and energy market structure capacities.   
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Chapter 2 
TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY MAKING 
 
2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE PHASES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
Turkish foreign policy has different phases with changes and continuities since the 
late Ottoman era. One of the distinguished recent studies of Turkish foreign policy is 
that of Kösebalaban. He emphasized the importance of Ottoman influence in Turkish 
foreign policy. According to him, Turkish foreign policy can be analysed within six 
periods: (1) Kemalist nationalism and foreign policy isolationism (1923-1950), (2) 
liberal reorientation of Turkish foreign policy (1950-1960), (3) foreign policy in the 
shadow of military intervention (1960-1980), (4) post-cold war identity (1983-2002), 
(5) emerging power in the age of globalisation (2002 to present).
136
 In order to explain 
the nexus between energy politics and foreign policy we conceptualise Turkey’s 
chronological history of foreign policy within four concepts; anti-revisionist, active 
neutrality, multidimensional and proactive. These four concepts have been 
implemented in the phases of Turkish foreign policy. In terms of conceptualisation of 
Turkish foreign policy, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the anti-
revisionist approach has been a main principle of approach to the country’s foreign 
relations. The active neutrality concept was the preferred strategy of Turkish foreign 
politics during WWII (1939-1945) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Due to 
unstable relations and changes in the international system, Turkey has been forced to 
use a multidimensional foreign policy, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the 
Post-Cold War, proactive and multidimensional foreign policy strategy has increased 
Turkey’s initiatives and strengthened the voice of the country in the international 
community. This section will first give an overview of Turkish foreign policy and 
identify the continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy making since the 
beginning of the Republican period. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey followed the anti-revisionist policy 
in order to maintain its sovereignty in international society. Turkey gained 
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international legitimacy when European powers accepted the Ankara government 
headed by Mustafa Kemal as the sole legitimate government of the new nation state at 
the Lausanne conference. During the years between WWI and WWII, Atatürk 
followed rational policies according to a consideration of Turkey’s economic and 
military capacity.
137
 It is widely accepted that Mustafa Kemal established modern 
Turkey on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire by rejecting the policies and aims of the 
imperial past and imperial experience. However, the new republic established its own 
centre and periphery with the major population element coming from the Southern 
Caucasus and Balkans due to a series of wars in these regions.
138
 During the late 
1920s, Turkey undertook institutional restructuring in bureaucracy and foreign policy 
making. The Ankara government successfully took control of the boundaries of the 
country by signing agreements with neighbouring and European powers. 
Due to the rise of socialist nationalism in Europe, Turkey signed the Sadabat Pact and 
the Balkan Pact in the 1930s in order to protect itself from armed conflict. It is 
broadly considered that Turkey’s policy can be summarized as an anti-revisionist 
policy aimed at preserving the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. In a sense, during 
the course of WWII, the President of the Turkish Republic, İsmet İnönü, followed the 
‘active neutrality’ policy.139 As a result, he successfully kept Turkey out of WWII. 
Later, Turkey joined the new international system of NATO. 
Although the Ankara government benefited from NATO and the Marshall Aid 
program, structural engagements with the Western security system established 
patron–client relations between the United States of America and Turkey, 
respectively.
140
 Turkey’s security and economic dependency on the USA was tested 
by the Jupiter missile crisis in parallel with the Cuban missile crisis, followed by 
Johnson’s blunt letter to the Turkish President about the Cyprus problem, which 
created distrust between the two allies. Consequently, Turkey started to review its 
                                                          
137
 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). 
138
 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics 
(University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). 
139
 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
140
 Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursalı, The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle 
East, 1950-59 (Oxon, UK; New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005). 
 61 
foreign relations and look at different options such as a new approach to Soviet 
Russia, Gulf Arab countries and Europe. It seems that its Europeanization policy led 
to diversification of Turkey’s foreign relations, especially after the signing of the 
Ankara Agreement with European countries in 1963. Most analysts believe that 
Turkey’s new policy approach in the 1960s could be classified as multidimensional 
foreign policy. Though Turkey had chances to join the European Economic 
Community on many occasions, Turkey has failed to enter the group as a full member 
state. In the context of energy, for instance, Turkey has been excluded from a key 
institutional body of the EEC, Euratom. 
During the Cyprus crisis, Turkey claimed that she made a ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
against Greek Cyprus in 1974. This was one of the exceptional cases which was a 
departure from the principle of anti-revisionist foreign policy. However, Turkey was 
faced with a US arms embargo and suffered from international isolation. The situation 
in Turkey’s domestic politics was also critical due to rising internal conflict between 
left-wing and right-wing groups. In order to rehabilitate internal and external 
dynamics, the Turkish army performed a military coup d’état on September 12, 1980. 
One of the first policies that captured the attention of international society was that the 
military government (1980–1983) reduced its diplomatic relations with Israel from 
ambassadorial level to secondary level representation. In addition to this, Turkey 
launched an Islamisation policy in domestic politics to adapt to the rising of political 
Islam in the Middle East, especially from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  
Following full engagement with the global capitalist system, Turkey’s leading 
politician at the time, Turgut Özal, made another structural change in Turkish 
domestic and foreign policy. During the period of his government (1983–1989) and 
presidency (1989–1993), Turkey followed active neutrality to benefit from war 
economic relations during the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988). Özal believed that 
economic relations were more important than political relations, because if economic 
relations grow in the right direction, political relations become interdependent 
relations. On the one hand, the 1990s was one of the important turning points for 
Turkish foreign policy making; however, Turkey could not benefit from structural 
change in the international system. Therefore, most of the analysts believe that, due to 
a series of coalition governments in the 1990s, these years can be seen as the lost 
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years of Turkish foreign relations. Although Turkey improved its relations with Tel-
Aviv, and consequently signed a military training agreement with Israel in 1996, 
Turkey’s relations with Iran and Iraq were generally tinged with enmity. Turkey faced 
a diplomatic crisis with Iran in 1997, and had an undeclared war with Syria in 1998. 
The end of the Cold War was a critical turning point for Turkey in terms of searching 
for a new geopolitical identity. The decline of the Soviet Union threat, which has been 
on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy for a long time, was a significant 
development for Turkey; although the cautious stance has been maintained in the 
senses of preserving the commitment to the Western system and avoiding direct 
confrontations with the new Russia.
141
 The initial challenge for the Turkish policy 
makers was to redefine Turkey’s strategic role and reemphasize its importance for the 
Western states (particularly for the  US). Secondly, the aim was to employ a more 
active foreign policy in the new geopolitical environment of Turkey -  such as 
Ukraine in the North, the new Balkan States in the Northwest, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan in the Northeast - without conflicting with Russia.
142
 Thus, the post-Cold 
War context brought both opportunities and risks to Turkey.  
Meanwhile, the domestic political dynamics of Turkey also influenced Turkish 
foreign policy. For instance, the activities of the Kurdish separatist movement affected 
relations with Iraq and Syria, while the rise of political Islam intensified relations with 
Muslim countries (particularly during Erbakan’s term). Additionally, the export-based 
economy led Turkey to have a neo-liberal foreign policy doctrine that aimed to 
increase political stability and cooperation through economically interdependent 
relations between the states in its geopolitical environment.   
In Turkish foreign policy, the first important event after the end of the Cold War was 
the Gulf War in which Turkey joined and attempted to remind the  US that Turkey 
could still play a crucial role in regional security.
143
 Secondly, Turkish policy makers 
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desired to spread a “Turkish Model”, which was basically based on parliamentary 
democracy, a free market economy and secularism, in Central Asia where the new 
independent Turkic republics replaced the Soviet Union. Beyond the cultural and 
historical links with these countries, Turkey would gain strategic importance, meet 
increasing energy demands and establish political stability in the region by reinforcing 
relations with the Turkic states.
144
 Therefore, as Sayari states, Ankara’s goal was not 
rebuilding a neo-Ottoman order or pursuing pan-Turkic ambitions, but maintaining its 
strategic role, preventing conflicts from reaching its own territory, protecting regional 
stability and enhancing economic interdependence in the region.
145
    
In this context, the most important determinants of the Turkish foreign policy were 
economic relations and energy politics. Avoiding conflicts with the trading partners, 
avoiding isolationist policies and benefiting from new markets were the basic 
implications of the economic concerns for foreign policy. Particularly, energy politics 
played a significant role in Turkish foreign policy due to increasing domestic energy 
demand and the strategic importance that would be gained through energy pipelines. It 
was widely believed that Turkey’s role as an energy corridor between East and West 
would enhance its strategic role for the West and limit the influence of Russia’s 
energy card in the region.
146
 In this regard, Turkey signed a number of agreements 
with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to meet its own energy demand and 
developed alternative projects for new pipelines from the Caspian Sea to the West. In 
the early1990s, the most prominent projects were the BTC pipeline to transport Azeri 
oil and the trans-Caspian pipeline to transport Turkmen natural gas to Europe. 
Although Turkey did not have any immediate benefit regarding the BTC pipeline, 
Turkish policy makers paid great attention to this project as an opportunity to express 
Turkey’s strategic position in between East and West as an energy gateway. Although 
the project itself was meaningful in terms of transit revenue and access to Caspian oil, 
Turkey’s main perspective was connecting Caspian reserves to the West, creating an 
alternative and secure energy supply, securing itself a role and a renewed Western 
identity in regional politics. Nevertheless, Turkish governments pursued a 
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multifaceted energy policy and avoided by-passing Russia totally. In 1997, firstly, the 
existing pipeline capacity between Turkey and Russia was increased, and the Blue 
Stream project was developed that would transport natural gas from Russia under the 
Black Sea to Turkey.
147
 Moreover, the West Line II agreement was also a clear 
indication of Turkey’s willingness to buy Russian natural gas. 
On the other hand, Turkey’s involvement in energy routes competition made Turkey 
more sensitive to conflicts in the region. For instance, the invasion of Nagorno-
Karabakh by Armenia and then the Khojali massacre in February 1992 damaged 
political stability in the region. During the crisis, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan 
caused discomfort between Turkey and Russia who stood behind Armenia. 
Nevertheless, since Turkey’s primary concern was the stability and continuance of 
economic and energy co-operation, Turkish policy makers attempted to solve conflicts 
through diplomacy and partly became successful.  
In 1992, when Elçibey was elected as the president of Azerbaijan, Turkey-Azerbaijan 
relations gained momentum, particularly regarding the BTC pipeline which would 
make Turkey a significant player in the “Caspian oil game” and decrease Russia’s 
influence.
148
 However, this honeymoon did not last for a long time, as Elçibey was 
overthrown in 1993. Nevertheless, the successor of Elçibey, Haydar Aliyev, did not 
oppose the BTC pipeline and the project preserved its prominence. Additionally, in 
the late 1990s a natural gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Turkey was also 
negotiated. In 1999, an agreement between Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 
Turkmenistan was signed to construct a 2000 km natural gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan, under the Caspian Sea, to Azerbaijan and then to Georgia and 
Turkey.
149
 Moreover, Turkey negotiated with Kazakhstan to construct an extension of 
the BTC to transport Kazakh oil through Turkey’s territory.150 Therefore, it is 
plausible to assert that a multifaceted energy policy has been pursued by Turkey in 
consistency with its foreign policy preferences. Although its aim is to utilize 
opportunities in Central Asia and Caucasia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
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Turkey avoided confronting Russia who desired to preserve its influence in the region. 
Turkey’s goal included meeting domestic energy demand, keeping its strategic 
importance and enhancing political stability in the region through intensifying 
interdependence between regional actors. 
This period had started with ambitious plans for establishing utmost links with the 
newly independent states in Central Asia and Caucasus but fallen short of 
expectations mainly due to the repeating economic crises in Turkey. The gap between 
the expectations and performance created a traumatic memory for the years ahead 
with a hesitance to engage and a cautious attitude on the other side. The major 
achievement in the 1990s was preparing the ground for further energy cooperation 
between Turkey and Caspian energy riches, and in particular, with Azerbaijan. The 
wider context of regional rivalry would not prevent design of first generation 
pipelines despite lack of economic resources and foreign policy capabilities.  
In the 2000s there have been some structural changes in Turkish foreign policy 
introduced and contextualized by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. He 
introduced a critical geopolitical reading of Turkey’s space and place in the globe and 
presented the discourse of ‘zero problems with neighbouring countries’, which is 
opposed to the Cold War attitude of Turkey (that it was encircled by enemies and that 
Turks had no true friends except themselves). 
2.2. DAVUTOGLU’S VISION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY MAKING 
Even though the Turkish foreign policy acquired a new character during Davutoğlu’s 
term, it is not an overstatement to say that the basic determinants of Davutoğlu’s 
policies indicate consistency with previous periods of Turkish foreign policy, such as 
with Özal’s activism in foreign policy or the EU-oriented foreign policy of the 
coalition government from 1999 to 2002.
151
 Thus, rather than a revolutionary change, 
Davutoğlu’s term presents a new doctrine of Turkish foreign policy that is based upon 
new vision, principles and approaches in order to respond to the changing dynamics 
of regional and world politics in a better way.  
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Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu explains the new vision of Turkey’s 
foreign policy in terms of three principles: a visionary rather than crisis-oriented 
approach; consistent and systematic foreign policy toward international society; and a 
Turkish oriented discourse of new diplomacy which has resulted in the spread of 
Turkish soft power in the region. Davutoğlu introduces five operational principles that 
help to enforce the main principles in Turkish foreign policy: (a) Balance between 
securitisation approach and democracy, (b) zero problems with neighbours, (c) 
proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, (d) multidimensional foreign policy, (e) 
total performance.
152
  
The first principle, a balance between democracy and security, has been considered as 
a necessary condition at home for an active policy abroad. The idea is to democratize 
the country, while achieving a greater security. Such a domestic atmosphere would be 
a strong support for a confident foreign policy attitude. Turkey’s past problem of 
putting its house in order would be handled in this way and the domestic landscape 
would produce positive feedback for the foreign policy making process. It is both an 
ideational and a structural background at home for the initiation of a new foreign 
policy. This principle connects domestic landscape to foreign policy in a way that 
produces trust and confidence in regional and international levels; however, it relies 
on the assumption that there will be democratization, pluralism and rule of law in 
domestic arena. However, there are criticisms for restrictions of freedom of press in 
Turkey and the harsh measures against protesters of Gezi Park raised attention to 
democratic standards in Turkey. Gezi Park is one of the few green areas in central 
Istanbul turned to a battleground between Turkish government and protesters, which 
led to an escalating polarization in Turkey. This delicate balance between domestic 
and foreign policy may take foreign policy hostage to domestic struggles if it does not 
occur in the direction Davutoğlu puts forward. 
Davutoğlu’s second principle of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ aims to utilise 
changing domestic psychology and confidence in appropriating a new philosophy in 
foreign policy. The usual approach to Turkey’s neighbourhood in the past was to 
consider it as a geography of problems and keep the country away from it. There is a 
popular perception of Turkey’s being surrounded by enemies in its neighbourhood. 
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Davutoğlu has targeted changing this perception so that a new popular perception of 
minimizing problems with the neighbouring countries will replace the old one. The 
new approach considers the neighbouring geography as a geography of opportunities 
rather than problems. Turkey has taken serious initiatives and succeeded to a 
considerable extent in easing tensions with the neighbours, and in developing political 
and economic relations with almost all of them in varying degrees. Although it has not 
yielded a problem-free neighbourhood for Turkey, the progress has been considerable. 
Turkey has signed high level political dialogue agreements with a number of 
neighbouring countries, which assume joint cabinet meetings and maximum 
integration. For instance, Turkish policy makers have made an effort to find a 
diplomatic solution to the Cyprus crisis in accordance with the Annan Plan which is 
considered adequate by most of the international actors. Also, Turkey has improved 
its economic and political relations with Georgia and intensified the interdependence 
between two countries.
153
 Even though it would be naïve to expect all of the problems 
with the neighbours to be solved solely by goodwill, the diplomatic attempts for this 
purpose clearly have strengthened Turkey’s position in the region. 
Additionally, use of soft power is also an important part of the Turkish foreign policy 
in conjunction with the “zero problems with neighbours” policy. Soft power, as a 
foreign policy tool, refers to “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments” by using the cultural or ideological policies.154 For 
instance, despite the previous policies based upon the use of hard power against Iraq, 
Davutoğlu favoured the use of soft power to reduce the hostility between the two 
countries, and beyond the “neighbouring countries” initiatives, a Turkish-Arab forum 
was established in 2007.
155
 Similarly, after the 2008 War between Georgia and 
Russia, Turkey attempted to form a “Caucasus Solidarity and Co-operation Platform” 
which aimed to promote diplomacy and co-operation not only regarding the Georgia-
Russia conflict, but also the other confrontations in the region that would be resolved 
without transforming to conflicts. 
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Having achieved considerable success in solving problems in the neighbourhood, 
Turkey was able to go beyond it and establish links and pursue policies in close 
geographies. Turkey developed political relations with the countries in the Balkans. 
Turkey is an active participant in regional politics and a contributor to peace attempts 
in the Balkans. Turkey has a similar active policy line in the Caucasus. Turkish 
diplomacy in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 was very effective in 
cooling down the situation and containing the crisis within the region. Turkey 
developed special ties with the Gulf region. Turkey is probably one of the most active 
countries in the Middle East in the search for peace and stability under the difficulties 
of the ‘Arab Spring’. The countries in Middle East and North Africa are facing an 
unprecedented transformation with popular revolts and Turkey plays a role of peace-
maker and stabilizer in this critical region. 
However, Turkey’s role as a peacemaker in the region has some limitations, 
unsurprisingly. Moreover, Öniş argues, when Turkey performed this role unilaterally 
it engendered some counter-productive results. For instance, Turkey’s high-level 
diplomatic contacts with Hamas after 2006 had some negative implications for 
Turkey’s international relations in the sense of damaging the relations with not only 
Israel and the Jewish lobby in the  US, but also with the EU and other Western actors 
who were sceptical about Hamas’s role and legitimacy.156 Turkey’s deteriorating 
relations with Israel and the worsening ties with Syria put an end to its mediator role 
between these two countries. Similar problems occurred during the Arab Spring since 
Turkish policy makers sided with the popular demands. There are also increasing 
allegations that Turkey for pursued sectarian policies in the course of Arab Spring. 
Rhythmic diplomacy assumes a change in understanding and practice of diplomacy 
among Turkish foreign policy makers. This is a search for a global role and influence 
in international issues, which will make Turkey a global player in the end. Turkey’s 
search for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council by 2015 during the2008-
10 period is a clear indication of the search for an active diplomatic presence at the 
international level. The number of high level Turkish diplomats in international 
organisations is higher than ever. There is also motivation for searching for peace-
maker roles in different parts of the globe to bring the Turkish diplomatic service to 
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the solution of problems. Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is one of the most visible 
signs of Turkey’s multi-faceted peace-building attempts outside the country. In 
addition, Davutoğlu suggests a pro-active foreign policy based upon rhythmic 
diplomacy. In this sense, his attempt to increase Turkey’s diplomatic influence in the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which resulted in the election of a Turkish 
academic (Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu) as the general secretary of the OIC, is a good 
example of such a pro-active vision. Moreover, acquirement of a non-permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council, observer status in the African Union, the Arab League, 
the Association of Caribbean States, and the Organization of American States clearly 
demonstrates how Turkey’s diplomatic efforts were extended and gained momentum 
in a variety of international organizations.
157
 As one can see, the rhythmic diplomacy 
and pro-active foreign policy vision led Turkey to a multidimensional foreign policy, 
which is another principle of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy doctrine. This doctrine 
proves successful in some areas, while facing difficulties in other fields. The 
multidimensional nature of foreign policy makes success and failure impossible in 
terms of foreign policy assessment. The rhetorical strength of the doctrine, however, 
faces with the challenges on the ground. There is criticism up to the point of declaring 
total failure of Davutoğlu foreign policy.158 It would be unfair to consider it as a 
failure but this doctrine is not a complete success story.  
In the framework of the fourth principle, a multidimensional foreign policy, Turkey’s 
foreign policy is not restricted to neighbouring countries and the regions, but also 
reaches beyond them. There is also a new ambitious policy of opening up to Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. As an example, the number of Turkish embassies in Africa 
rose to 34 in 2014, while it was 12 in 2002. While Turkey is planning and pursuing 
new openings and polices, it also continues its traditional partnership relations. The 
West and trans-Atlantic relations are at the centre of Turkish foreign policy, while it 
tries to expand the horizons of its foreign policy. The idea with multidimensional 
foreign policy is to be able to reconcile old partnerships and patterns of relations with 
the new ones in a way that they will support each other. The last thing policy makers 
want is a conflicting agenda of detrimental relations between different engagements of 
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Turkey in different geographies. The best example that reflects the 
multidimensionality in Turkish foreign policy would be Turkey’s attempts to find 
diplomatic solutions to the Cyprus crisis and the Gazan crisis at the same period. 
Since labelling Turkish foreign policy as Cyprus-oriented or Middle East-oriented by 
looking at only one of these issues would be misleading, it is wiser to consider 
Turkish foreign policy as a multidimensional and integrated one.
159
  
The final principle is total performance, which aims to mobilize, among others, civil 
society, the business community, think-tanks, universities and the public in general, 
behind foreign policy goals. The idea is to draw the widest legitimacy for pursuing a 
confident foreign policy abroad. Foreign policy aims to open the new geographies to 
the interest and attention of Turkish people, and motivate them to import value back 
to the country. It may be business investment, civil society activity for peace-building 
or charity assistance to zones of natural disasters and war geographies. Recent years 
have witnessed an ever increasing presence of Turkish people in Africa and other 
geographies of the new foreign policy. The Turkish public sometimes plays a 
motivator role for further expansion and deepening involvement of Turkey in new 
geographies 
In addition to the core principles of Turkish foreign policy, one needs to frame 
Turkey’s energy policy in a policy environment shaped by these principles. In such a 
framework, the necessary components would be likely to be as follows: (a) a policy 
aiming to integrate Turkey’s neighbouring regions, (b) a new diplomatic style of 
energetic negotiations and agenda setting, (c) a multidimensional nature of reconciling 
interests of actors in a plural environment, (d) successful integration of the Turkish 
business community, (e) coordination of this policy in close cooperation with national 
actors and international partners, (f) the ability to operate in a rapidly changing 
environment and preservation of a proactive stance, and (g) providing Turkey with a 
central role with a suitable discourse and policy. 
Davutoğlu considers the human aspect of foreign policy as important as the official 
track. From his perspective, Turkey’s major strength is human resource of country 
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and foreign policy should facilitate their access to new initiatives, business 
investments, among others, in outside world.
160
 In this sense, the collaboration and 
cooperation between the NGOs and business community and official policy line has a 
considerable importance for sustainability of foreign policy. In this sense, it is still a 
work in progress and needs to build up sustainability strategies with some solid base. 
This new conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy overlaps with the critical 
geopolitical reading of Turkey and Turkey’s awareness of the capacity of its own 
resources and social capital — as a nation and as a state — to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives.
161
 Davutoğlu noted many occasions on which Turkey has had to 
design its ground strategy according to new global situations. One of his key 
arguments is that if Turkey reads its own geopolitics rightly, and uses the historical, 
cultural and economic resources within its former sphere of influence, Turkey can 
establish its own hinterland and contribute to peace in the Middle East and Caspian 
Sea regions.
162
 The Turkish geopolitical hinterland can be divided into three. The first 
two are (1) the nearest land hinterland (Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus) and (2) 
the nearest sea hinterland (Black Sea, Adriatic Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea 
region, Gulf region and Caspian Sea region). In addition to this, Davutoğlu 
emphasizes (3) the nearest continents that Turkey can effectively develop relations 
with: Europe, North Africa, and South Asia.
163
 Turkey’s new opening up to Africa 
and South Asia is the new direction for Turkish foreign policy. The Minister also 
rejects the idea of a ‘watch and see’ policy when crisis develops in the hinterland(s) of 
Turkey. It is believed that proactive policies establish peace and confidence building 
between conflict parties with Turkey’s new initiatives. However, Turkey’s multi-
channel diplomacy and peace-building role has been suspended by the ‘Arab Spring’ 
in North Africa and the Middle East.
164
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Although Turkish foreign policy witnessed certain setbacks during the ‘Arab Spring’, 
one may need to discuss a number of initiatives Turkey pursued to utilize an energy 
policy within its new foreign policy vision. The most visible one is the policy shift 
toward Iraq. Turkey’s policy toward Iraq was a myopic one with a limited focus on 
Northern Iraq. The major concern was PKK terrorism and the spill-over impact of a 
potential Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. The interest and policy was not able to go 
beyond the northern part of Iraq. Turkey’s de-securitization at home, progress in the 
Kurdish problem and the ‘zero problems’ approach in foreign policy paved the way 
for a holistic change in foreign policy. Turkey has developed substantive relations 
with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq and been able to play 
a constructive role in post-2003 Iraq. Turkey’s economic and political relations with 
the KRG are at the highest level and there is mutual confidence to pursue joint energy 
projects. 
Turkish policy in the Caucasus prioritized relations with Azerbaijan. The attempt in 
2008 at normalization with Armenia did not work, mainly due to the Armenian 
authorities’ failure to persuade relevant parties to move forward in this direction. The 
distrust between Azerbaijan and Turkey led to speculation that relations would not 
recover from the negative impact of the normalization attempt. The post 2008 period 
brought Turkey and Azerbaijan closer and the two states pursued regional policies to 
initiate energy projects, i.e. the Southern Gas Corridor. The TANAP pipeline was 
added to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum 
gas pipeline. Turkey and Azerbaijan have the upper hand in the TANAP project and 
the Azerbaijani authorities have made Turkey also a stakeholder in the Shah Deniz II 
gas field.  
Turkish policy in the Balkans deserves attention in terms of Ankara’s successful 
policy of generating support for Turkish initiatives. The Balkans are a transit 
geography of energy routes and they are also potential consumers of the same energy 
networks. Turkey’s multi-faceted policy prepares the ground for economic 
involvement and energy projects. Another geography is the East Mediterranean. It is 
full of problems as well as newly discovered energy reserves. Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Syria, Egypt and Libya in the post ‘Arab Spring’ environment 
changed to a considerable extent. However, Turkey has a new awareness of this 
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geography and has made clear that it will not allow unilateral action in the energy 
field in the East Mediterranean. Turkey follows a constructive policy on the Cyprus 
question despite the international community and the EU leaving Northern Cypriots 
isolated after the ‘Yes’ vote to the Annan plan for unification of the island versus the 
‘No’ vote of Greek Cypriots. 
Turkey’s policy toward the  US has always been sensitive on energy issues. Ankara 
has been able to have the support of the  US on energy projects. The prime example is 
the  US backing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline in the 1990s. There is 
an agreement among all parties that this project would not have been possible without 
open and strong  US support. Turkey’s relations with the EU face a deadlock and have 
almost stopped due to inactivity on the EU side. However, despite this problematic 
situation in the membership process, there has always been a mutual understanding on 
the mutual benefit from East-West energy corridors. Turkey expects the EU to 
recognise the real importance of Turkey in terms of EU energy security. 
On the one hand, Turkey promises to continue its quest to maintain a balance between 
promoting democracies and defending its own national interest in the region. Turkey’s 
confidence about its Islamic identity supports the holistic and value-based approach in 
foreign policy making. As opposed to previous governments and to the Turkish 
army’s security-oriented policies, Davutoğlu has also introduced a new balance 
between security and freedom in domestic politics. He believes that domestic stability 
develops Turkey’s positions on regional and international issues, with careful 
consideration of the country’s own conditions and historical and cultural resources. 
The strength of Turkish foreign policy lies in its reconnecting with the people in 
Turkey’s hinterland with whom they share a common history and could have common 
destinies in international society. However, this is not a policy in which Turkey is 
turning its face to East or West. Rather, Davutoğlu argues in his seminal work, 
Strategic Depth, that foreign policy should weave elaborate connections between 
Turkey’s past and present and among its relations.165  
                                                          
165
 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey’s Cabinet Reshuffle: Another Balancing Act,” The German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, May 11, 2009, accessed May 20, 2012, 
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/turkeys-cabinet-reshuffle-another-balancing-act/. 
 74 
This research can clarify that the major objective of Turkish foreign policy is to 
encourage security and nurture a peaceful, stable, prosperous and co-operative 
regional and international environment that is conducive to human development at 
home as well as in neighbouring countries and beyond.
166
 Turkey’s proactive foreign 
policy has made it an effective regional power and, thus, a global actor, which are key 
objectives of Turkish foreign policy. In order to reach these goals, Turkey needs to 
establish a circle of security and welfare around itself by consolidating economic, 
cultural, and political interdependent relations with neighbouring countries. The 
energy variable is to play an essential role in the use of interdependent relations and 
soft power strategy in Turkish foreign policy making. 
Political scientist James N. Rosenau identified five potential sources that influence a 
state’s foreign policy: external environment, societal environment, governmental 
structure, bureaucratic roles and personalities of individuals.
167
 The dynamics of the 
international and domestic environments are mentioned above; however, analysis of 
actors in the government, bureaucratic experience and the role of leaders required 
ascertaining the sources of conduct for Turkish foreign policy making.  
The Foreign Ministry has full responsibility for conducting daily and long term 
strategic relations with foreign countries. The ministry’s bureaucratic resources go 
back to the long-term diplomatic experience of the Ottoman state. Hence, the author 
can claim that there is a strong continuity in the state’s behaviour and conduct of 
foreign policies. There is another institutional body in the form of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, which is responsible for controlling the Minister’s policy and 
provides recommendations on occasions of crisis management. The Prime Minister 
and President also have great influence in Turkish foreign relations — both accept 
representatives of foreign states and visit foreign countries in official contexts. The 
National Security Council and Turkish Armed Forces deal with security-related 
foreign relations. In addition to this, over the last two decades, public opinion has 
become one of the key factors in Turkish foreign policy. This has been apparent in the 
Serbian–Bosnian, Russian–Chechen and Israeli–Palestinian conflicts. Turkey’s 
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demographic and cultural ties with these countries, which directly influence public 
opinion and foreign policy making, fuelled this situation. 
Turkey’s changing foreign policy is largely the result of de-securitization at home, 
namely moving the political agenda away from a security oriented discourse. The 
process of normalization of politics and decreasing domestic bonds on foreign policy 
paved the way for a greater flexibility and autonomy in international politics. In 
addition, democratization at home served also in the democratization of the foreign 
policy making process. Foreign policy has started to be shaped in a democratic 
environment of multiple actors and under the increasing impact of societal demands 
from different segments of the Turkish people. There are new actors in both public 
and civilian realms, and foreign policy makers have adapted to the new situation of a 
plural environment of policy makers. The civilian input occurs through various 
channels ranging from think-tanks to international NGOs. The private sector and 
business community have started to have an influence on foreign policy in the context 
of Turkey’s foreign economic relations, namely in the energy sector.  
2.3. TURKEY’S ENERGY STRATEGY IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA 
In the Turkish case, energy security was linked to the concept of economic 
development and the necessity of welfare for society. However, it is now considered 
one of the significant variables of foreign policy making. Turkey’s principal aims 
include diversifying its energy supply routes and sources, having a diversified energy 
mix and taking significant steps to increase energy efficiency. According to CERA, 
Turkey is the fastest growing market (after China) in terms of natural gas 
consumption and electricity demand.
168
 It is expected that Turkey will have become 
one of the most dynamic energy economies of Europe and the world in terms of 
increase in energy demand by 2020.
169 
Due to not having enough domestic energy 
sources, Turkey’s energy security depends on energy imports that account for 74% of 
the total consumption.
170
 Hence, another major aim of Turkish foreign policy is to 
realize its own energy security, with a secondary goal being to provide a secure 
supply route and sources for Europe’s energy security.  
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Turkey is geographically positioned near 72% of the world’s proven gas reserves and 
around 73% of oil reserves (in the Caspian and Middle East regions).
171
 Hence, 
Turkish foreign policy makers see Turkey’s role in energy politics and the 
international energy regime as a reliable transit country for the East–West and North–
South natural gas and oil pipelines. Turkey’s policy is to support all Southern Gas 
Corridor projects passing through the Turkish territory, which comprise an essential 
component of Europe’s energy diversification efforts. Turkey’s co-operative relations 
with Russia, Iran and the Caspian and Middle Eastern states work for this aim in 
parallel with its own natural gas supply security. As mentioned previously, Turkey’s 
soft power strategy and interdependent relations with suppliers and demanding 
countries could contribute increased energy supply security for Europe. 
Turkey’s new energy market regulation also contributes to Turkey’s energy politics, 
making the country an energy corridor and a terminal.
 172
 Turkish Minister of Energy 
and Natural Resources, Taner Yıldız, outlined Turkey’s energy strategy plan in his 
speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on December 15, 2011: 
(a) Turkey’s indigenous energy resources will have the first priority for utilization to 
provide resource diversification; 
(b) the share of renewables in primary energy supply will be increased; 
(c) energy efficiency will be improved; 
(d) rehabilitation of free energy markets and investment environments will be 
realized; 
(e) diversification in oil and gas supplies will be maintained; 
(f) Turkey’s geostrategic space will be utilized to make Turkey a secure energy 
corridor; 
(g) energy activities will be carried out in an environment-friendly manner; 
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(h) the best efforts will be made for the contribution of energy resources to the 
Turkish economy; 
(i) indigenous production of raw materials will be increased; and 
(j) energy will be provided to the final consumers under the best terms of time, 
quantity and price.
173
 
In terms of implementation of Turkey’s energy foreign policy, more importantly, the 
national companies such as TPAO have been playing major roles in Turkey’s oil and 
natural gas activities. For instance, TPAO has been increasing its investments at both 
domestic and international level. Particularly the exploration projects in the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea and other efforts to contribute natural gas supply to 
Turkey from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Libya, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Northern Cyprus and 
Russia reinforced the Turkish government’s energy policy.174 Similarly, BOTAŞ has 
been improving Turkey’s capacity in the energy market by key projects. In the 
TANAP project, for example, BOTAŞ is one of the main actors and executes the 
important part of the project.
175
 Moreover, BOTAŞ has partnerships with its 
counterparts at the international level, importing natural gas from Russia, Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Algeria and Qatar. BOTAŞ also operates the Iraq-Turkey Crude 
Oil Pipeline and the Turkish section of the BTC pipeline.
176
 In Chapter 5 the role of 
the company in Turkish energy policy and the activities of BOTAŞ in the energy 
market will be discussed. The capacity and success of BOTAŞ directly affects the 
capacity of Turkey’s energy policy and foreign policy. Energy politics is twisting 
diplomacy in certain parts of the world, therefore.  
In order to establish more coherent relations abroad, the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources plans to establish energy attaché cadres in Turkish embassies in 
Russia, the US, the UK and in other countries with which Turkey has significant 
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energy relations. The special Turkish energy attaché is to monitor the use of oil and 
gas for political ends in certain part of the world. The energy attaché will also provide 
daily information to the Ministry to enable the operation of effective energy 
diplomacy abroad. 
2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has shown that Turkish foreign policy prior to the JDP government 
coming to power in November 2002 can be conceptualized as follows: (a) anti-
revisionist, (b) active neutrality, (c) multi-dimensional, and (d) proactive. The major 
innovation in Turkish foreign policy occurred when the current Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, introduced new dynamics into Turkish foreign policy, as 
follows: (a) rhythmic diplomacy, (b) multi-dimensional foreign policy, (c) zero 
problems with neighbours, (d) order-instituting actor, and (e) international co-
operation or proactive foreign policy and total performance. 
The major aim of the present Turkish foreign policy is to move Turkey from being a 
passive player to pursuing a proactive foreign policy in order to establish Turkey as a 
regional and global actor. This chapter also concluded that energy security is a crucial 
element associated with foreign policy making by Turkey. Thus, economic 
interdependence is one of the components of the soft power strategy of Turkish 
foreign policy making. 
Finally, the natural gas geopolitics of Turkey has evolved with the above mentioned 
new openings of Turkish foreign policy creating two significant dimensions: (1) the 
natural gas needs of Turkey could be met securely from the existing natural gas 
suppliers and future possible producers of the Middle East-Caspian region and (2) 
Turkey makes efforts to become a centre of attractiveness for the regional gas 
suppliers and to be a secure and transparent corridor in natural gas transportation 
between producers and consumers. However, it is important to note that the 
challenges of Turkish foreign policy have potential to limit the role of Turkey in 
Eurasian energy environment. 
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Chapter 3 
TURKEY’S ENERGY MIX AND NATURAL GAS 
PROFILE 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
The geographic position of Turkey offers a great opportunity to be an energy centre 
between the oil-and-gas-rich Caspian region, the Middle East and the huge gas market 
of Europe. The potential pipeline projects can easily transform Turkey into a ‘gateway 
country’ for the EU’s energy supply security. Therefore, Ankara sees itself as a major 
natural energy corridor country to Southern Europe. In the late 1990s, Turkey suffered 
from coalition governments, which caused a political crisis in 1997 and a financial 
crisis in 2001. After the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government took power 
in November 2002, Turkey started the new liberal, developmental policies — named 
‘opening policies’— that sped recovery from the financial crises.  
Turkey’s fast-growing economy brings about higher energy demand caused by new 
investment, thus requiring a better-structured energy sector. Therefore the structure of 
the Turkish energy market directly affects the Turkish economy and so in this chapter 
we will analyse the characteristics of the Turkish energy system. 
3.2. TURKEY’S ENERGY PROFILE  
Since the 2001 economic crisis, Turkey has implemented significant economic 
measures and reforms, driven by the World Bank, the IMF and the European Union, 
and has been on a steady growth course. Despite the slow start to the year 2007, 
government tightening measures stimulated improved momentum in the Turkish 
business environment. Some issues still remain though, such as high public debt, 
fiscal imbalance and a trade deficit. GDP growth expectations are stabilized at around 
6% until the end of the next decade. Population is also expected to grow by a 
cumulative 6.6% by the end of the decade, reaching more than 78 million. Turkey has 
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a young population, of which a relatively high proportion (70%) is of working age, 
unlike much of Europe.
177
 
With Turkey’s economic development, the demand in the energy sector is becoming 
high; however, the country has few domestic sources of energy. Indeed, the country is 
importing 71% of its energy needs and producing small amounts of oil and poor 
quality coal, marginal amounts of natural gas and no nuclear energy at present.
178
 
Energy imports constitute one-fifth of the nation’s import bill. In 2012, Turkey spent 
USD 60 billion on the import of energy supplies, including fossil fuels, lubricants and 
related materials, according to the Turkish Statistics Institute.
179
  
It is obvious that Turkey’s energy profile clarifies the market potential of natural gas 
and the necessity to create energy strategies for the country. According to the Ministry 
of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey’s total 
primary energy demand was 119 million tonnes of oil equivalent (toe), comprising: oil 
26%, natural gas 32%, coal 31%, combustible renewable and wastes 11%. Nuclear 
electric energy consumption was zero in 2012.
180
 According to the MENR, Turkey’s 
anticipated primary energy demand growth is expected to be 4% per year over the 
next few years.  
3.2.1. Turkey’s Energy Mix 
Oil, gas and coal are vital components of Turkey’s energy mix and are extensively 
used for electricity generation. Turkey also considers nuclear energy to be an 
important route to diversify its power generation mix and to play a key role in 
Turkey’s low-carbon future. This section explains what is included in Turkey’s 
energy mix and the capacity of Turkey to diversify its energy portfolio as an energy 
centre in the Eurasian energy environment.  
In 2010, MENR introduced the four-year energy strategy, which provides the 
country’s proven and potential energy resources. The Ministry’s two strategic reports 
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(Blue Book and Energy Strategy 2010–2014 reports) also give new guidelines for 
Turkey’s new energy venture. Turkish strategic goals for the period 2010–2014 
basically are to diversify domestic energy sources and to diversify the oil and gas 
imports from different energy import countries. Turkey has begun to check its own 
domestic sources of renewable energy and to improve her energy efficiency policies.  
However, Sohbet Karbuz, who is a well-known energy expert, offers a critical 
analysis in his recent article. He emphasizes that: “there is an urgent need for 
formulating longer term energy policy goals that are precise, comprehensive, 
measurable, concrete, coherent, and in line with both the economy and Turkey’s 
foreign policy and security goals. These goals, which should be determined and set by 
the Turkish Energy Ministry, are the prerequisite of any sound plan and the sine-qua-
non of any energy strategy.”181 The fact is that Turkey is one of the biggest energy 
markets in the Eurasian energy environment. Turkey derives 90% of its energy needs 
from fuels of fossil origin, and oil meets one third of the total energy demand, 
followed by coal and natural gas (as given above). It is obvious that hydrocarbon 
resources are a huge majority in Turkey’s energy mix. The other important figure in 
the energy mix is the electricity consumption, which reached 242 billion kWh at the 
end of 2012.
182
 According to the MENR the electricity generation projections indicate 
that this level is expected to increase 7.5% (in a high case scenario) or 6.7% (in a low 
case scenario) annually.
183
 The distribution of resources in electricity generation are: 
natural gas 45.9%, hydro 24.5%, coal 18.4%, imported coal 6.9%, liquid fuels 2.5% 
and other renewables, including wind. 1.8%. In 2023, Turkey’s electricity 
consumption is expected to be 450 billion kWh.
184
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Table 3.1: The Resource Distribution of Electricity Generation in Turkey 
Source: MENR. 
The total installed capacity of Turkey reached approximately 61,984 MW at the end 
of 2013.
185
 In 2002, the installed capacity was 32,000 MW; therefore, as a result of 
huge investment in the energy sector over the nine years of the JDP government, the 
total installed capacity increased approximately 64% (the number of power plants was 
300 in 2002, at the end of 2013 the total number of power plants was 883).
186
 The 
distribution of installed capacity in terms of resources is: hydro 32.9%, natural gas 
30.8%, coal 15.8%, imported coal 6.4%, wind 3.1%, geothermal 0.2%, other 
renewable 0.2% and other resources 10.6% (see Table 3.2).
187
 It is very important to 
note that hydro has significant installed capacity, but in terms of electricity 
generation, natural gas generates twice as much electricity as hydro. Therefore 
Turkey’s electricity sector is very dependent on natural gas. 
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Natural Gas 45,9%
Hydro 24,5%
Coal 18,4%
Imported Coal 6,9%
Liquid Fuels 2,5%
Other Renewables 1,8%
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Table 3.2: The Resource Distribution of Installed Capacity in Turkey 
 
Source: MENR. 
Turkey has very ambitious targets for 2023, which is the 100th anniversary of the 
Turkish Republic. According to the MENR, until 2023 it is expected to invest at least 
5 billion USD every year in the energy sector.
188
 The total installed capacity is 
planned to be 100,000 MW, in which the total capacity of wind will be 20,000 MW, 
solar 3000 MW and geothermal 600 MW. According to the Electricity Market and 
Security of Supply Strategy Document of the Turkish Republic, approved in 2009, the 
share of renewables in electricity generation is expected to reach the level of 30% by 
2023. The share of natural gas in electricity generation is envisaged to decrease from 
46% to 30% by 2023; however at present it is 33%, higher than the European mean 
percentage.
189
 Moreover, nuclear energy is planned to provide 5% of total electricity 
generation in 2020.
190
 Natural gas consumption in Turkey has increased in the last ten 
years by 230%.
191
 Below, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 give the consumption figures of 
Turkey since 2007.  
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Hydro 32,9%
Natural Gas 30,8%
Coal 15,8%
Imported coal 6,4%
Wind 3,1%
Geothermal 0,2%
Other Renewables 
0,2%
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Table 3.3: Turkey’s Natural Gas Consumption Between the Years 2007 – 2010  
 
Source: Deloitte, 2012. 
As seen below in Table 3.4, residential use in Turkey is substantial; since the 
distribution network is not complete yet the expectation of the future consumption in 
this category is high and almost certain.  
Table 3.4: Consumption by Sector Since 2000 
 
Source: BOTAŞ, EMRA, Deloitte 2011. 
It is obvious that Turkey is very much dependent on natural gas in electricity 
generation and in total primary energy supply. The above mentioned targets are 
primarily focused on decreasing the level of imported energy resources, especially 
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natural gas. In order to achieve the targets, the first step is considered to be the 
maximum utilization of national reserves. 
3.2.2. Turkey’s Energy Potential and Indigenous Production 
As mentioned above, Turkey is heavily dependent on energy imports, exceeding the 
level of 70%. In terms of natural gas, Turkey is a net importer, with 98% import 
dependency.
192
 Turkey began exploring for and producing natural gas in 2004 in the 
Western Black Sea. Ayazlı has one well and is still exploring in Akçakoca. In 2011, 
TPAO signed an agreement with Shell to open up another well by 2016 in either the 
Mediterranean Sea (conventional gas) or South West Turkey (shale gas).
193
 Turkey 
also expects to increase its production of shale gas from North West Turkey, 
Hamitabat and Mezdere. Table 3.5 gives the natural gas production of Turkey 
between 2005 and 2010. It is very clear that while the natural gas production is 
declining, Turkey’s natural gas consumption is increasing.  
Table 3.5: Natural Gas Production of Turkey Between 2005 – 2010 
 
Source: BOTAŞ and EMRA, 2011. 
Table 3.6 gives brief information about the proven energy resources of Turkey. In 
recent years, the most prominent discovery was the increase of lignite and hard coal 
                                                          
192
 Ibid. 
193
 “TPAO in Turkiye,” TPAO, accessed August 12, 2012, 
http://www.tpao.gov.tr/tp2/sub_tr/sub_icerik.aspx?id=29. 
 
 86 
reserves as a result of the activities of the state’s Directorate of Mineral Research and 
Exploration. Since 2005, lignite reserves of 4.2 billion tonnes have been 
discovered.
194
 The Afşin-Elbistan and Konya-Karapınar regions alone are expected to 
have an additional 18,500 MW of capacity by utilization of local lignite reserves.
195
 
Table 3.6: Turkey's Energy Resource Reserves, 2011 
Hard Coal Reserves 1.34 billion tonnes (proven, possible and probable) 
Lignite 11,45 billion tonnes (proven, possible and probable) 
Crude Oil 41,17 million tonnes (proven) 
Natural Gas 5,6 billion cubic metres (proven) 
Geothermal 
600 MWe (proven) 
31,500 MWt (proven) 
Solar 380 billion kWh/yr (potential) 
Hydro 
140 billion kWh/y (economic potential)  
433 billion kWh (theoretical potential) 
Wind 120 billion kWh/yr (potential) 
Biomass 8.6 million tonnes 
Source: MENR. 
The second chance for Turkey is to utilize the potential of renewables to decrease 
import dependency and maintain energy security. According to the MENR, Turkey 
has the potential to have the installed capacity of 36,000 MW hydro, 48,000 MW 
wind, 50,000 MW solar, 600 MW geothermal and 2,000 MW biomass.
196
 It is 
important to note that the necessary investments are expected to be realized by the 
private sector. Kemal Barış and Serhat Küçükali, in their article Availability of 
renewable energy sources in Turkey: Current situation, potential, government policies 
and the EU perspective, underline that the market regulation and the necessary legal 
and economic environment will determine the utilization of the renewable potential of 
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Turkey.
197
 As Turkey is in the accession process to the EU, Turkey harmonises its 
regulations with those of the EU, which is expected to create the most suitable 
environment for the attraction of foreign investment. Barış and Küçükali also 
emphasize that Turkish industry is currently not capable of producing all renewable 
power plant components.
198
 
After commenting on the utilization of national coal and renewable potential, the 
increase of hydrocarbon reserves could be considered to be the third most important 
aspect of increasing indigenous energy production. In 2010, Turkey consumed 32 
million tonnes, while the indigenous production was 2.3 million tonnes. At the end of 
2011, Turkey had crude oil reserves of 41.17 million tonnes.
199
 
Turkey’s oil production is primarily run by the Turkish State Petroleum Company 
(TPAO) and other private oil companies, with TPAO exploring new deposits focusing 
on the South-Eastern, Southern and North-Western provinces, and in the Black Sea 
and Mediterranean Sea regions. In addition, TPAO explores unconventional oil shale 
and tight oil reserves in Turkey with its foreign partners in Dadas Shale in South 
Eastern Anatolia, e.g. Shell, Trans-Atlantic, Valeura. TPAO has a very dominant role 
in Turkey’s oil production; in the last ten years, TPAO has been responsible for 71% 
of total domestic oil production in Turkey.
200
 Offshore oil exploration activities have 
been increased in the last decade. TPAO has cooperated with BP, Exxon, Chevron 
and Petrobras in the Black Sea on oil exploration. After the recent discoveries in Israel 
and South Cyprus, TPAO signed a strategic agreement with Shell to explore the 
potential oil reserves of Antalya bay in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, TPAO 
drilled an onshore well in 2012 after signing agreements with the authorities of 
Northern Cyprus in September 2011.
201
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Map 3.1: Turkey’s Oil Blocs in Black Sea 
 
Source: TPAO 
Turkey’s nuclear energy strategy is essential to reduce Turkey’s dependency and 
increase its energy security (which is, for the time being, essentially non-
existent).There are on-going developments in terms of the nuclear ambition of 
Turkey; the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) for Mersin-Akkuyu nuclear power 
plants were signed with Russia in May 2010. In parallel with the Turkish 
Government’s nuclear energy targets (5% of total installed capacity in 2020), the 
Mersin-Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Project is planned to have 4800 MW capacity 
and is expected to be commissioned in 2019.
202
 Moreover, the nuclear power plant 
project in Sinop is under consideration with Japan. In total, Turkey aims to have an 
annual electricity generation of 80 billion kwh/year from the Akkuyu and Sinop 
nuclear power plants, which is calculated as equivalent to 16 BCM/year of natural gas 
consumption to generate the same amount of electricity.
203
 This calculation 
demonstrates simply that the nuclear capacity of Turkey can improve its energy 
security and resource diversification.  
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The major energy resource in Turkey’s energy consumption is natural gas (the 
indigenous production was 0.8 BCM, while total consumption was 46 BCM in 
2012).
204
 In the next sections of this chapter, the natural gas market of Turkey will be 
analysed in detail. However, it is important to note that, currently, the national 
production of natural gas meets only 1.7% of total natural gas consumption and that 
this endangers the security of energy supply of Turkey. 
3.3. TURKISH ENERGY MARKET STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 
Turkey’s domestic energy production, distribution, and energy transit infrastructure 
are still predominantly in the hands of state-owned companies. While the Turkish 
Parliament passed an energy liberalization law in early 2001 in order to end the 
government’s monopoly in the energy sector, the privatization process is still in its 
early stages. The significant progress has been achieved in restructuring and 
liberalizing the Turkish energy markets in parallel with the EU Directives for the 
purpose of integration with the EU Internal Energy Market. Turkey, as a very active 
member, also benefits from IEA-coordinated policies and its institutions. Moreover, 
the Turkish power system has been connected to the EU electricity grid since 2010 as 
the Turkish Electricity Distribution Company (TEIAS) and European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) co-operate closely. 
Turkey’s energy policy principally aims at providing safe, green, cost-efficient and 
sustainable energy, securing a strong position in regional and global trade of energy, 
and increasing energy efficiency. After the EU Helsinki Summit of 1999 where 
Turkey was declared a candidate for accession to the EU, Turkey started to change its 
energy policy fundamentally to comply with EU energy market practices. New 
Turkish energy policy focuses on restructuring and liberalizing the Turkish energy 
markets in tandem with the EU Directives, since the enactments of the Electricity and 
Natural Gas Market Laws in 2001.
205
 
In December 2003, Turkey’s parliament passed additional legislation — the 
Petroleum Market Law — removing state controls on the oil sector and lifting price 
ceilings. This legislation led to comprehensive reform of the oil sector. With the 
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Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Market Law (2005) and the Law on Utilization of 
Renewable Energy Resources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy (2005), 
Turkey maintains her commitment to liberalization in the energy market with other 
legal practices. In order to use energy efficiently, the Energy Efficiency Law was 
enacted on 2 May 2007. The other legal regulations include: 
 Law on Geothermal Resources and Mineral Waters (2007),  
 Law on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Energy Sale 
(2007), 
 Law on Utilisation of Domestic Coal Resources for the Purpose of Generating 
Electrical Energy (2007), and 
 Law on the Amendment of Electricity Market Law No. 5784 on Supply Security 
(2008).  
These and certain other laws have created competitive mechanisms in the Turkish 
energy markets.
206
 
An independent regulator, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), has 
been established to be in charge of regulation and supervision of the electricity, gas, 
petroleum and LPG markets, to make sufficient investments and increase economic 
efficiency for structuring the energy sector around the central element of competition. 
Turkey has ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Turkey is in relatively close proximity to much of the world’s current energy 
production; it also sits on several important waterways. Thus, Turkey is well-
positioned to become a significant energy hub and transit state.  
Privatization is viewed as the key for Turkey’s future energy market. This includes 
new hydroelectric dams and natural gas-fired power plants, geothermal power plant 
and renewable energy facilities. So far, Turkey has employed Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) or Build-Operate (BO) models with private contractors for energy investment 
and utilities. It is estimated that Turkey will have to spend over USD 128 billion on 
energy investments by the end of 2020, including USD 91.276 billion on new power 
                                                          
206
 “Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources,” accessed May 23, 2013, http://www.enerji.gov.tr. 
 91 
generation facilities. However, the government can only set aside USD 500 million a 
year from its tight budgets.
207 
3.4. TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS OUTLOOK 
Turkey’s domestic gas demand is growing rapidly. Following several years of double-
digit growth and an annual consumption of 46 BCM in 2012,208 Turkey has become 
Europe’s sixth largest natural gas consumer.209 In 2011 the chairman of Gazbir, 
Turkey’s union of natural gas distribution companies, valued the Turkish natural gas 
trade in the natural gas market at USD 5.5 billion.
210
  
Table 3.7: Natural Gas Consumption of First Six European Countries 
 
Source: BP and CERA. 
The Turkish government still drives gas prices and held retail prices below market 
rates from 2002–2007, leading to large debts for BOTAŞ. With a move to more 
liberalized markets in 2008, prices rose by up to 75% as a result of rising import costs, 
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before dropping 20% in 2009 on the back of lower oil prices.
211
 However, in 2012 the 
increase in oil prices forced the Turkish government to introduce a price increase of 
18.72% that is expected to create a negative effect in natural gas consumption.
212
 
One of the key issues in the Turkish gas market is import contract management, as it 
has very critical effects on the current and future situation. The volume of BOTAŞ’s 
natural gas import contracts are 46.6 BCM/year in 2012. This is at the peak levels of 
contracts-ACQ (annual contract quantity), including the Shah Deniz Phase II 
agreement which will be initiated in 2018 and excluding the 10 BCM/year Western 
Line contract with Russia transferred to the private sector and 1.2 BCM/year volume 
of the Shah Deniz Phase I (SD1) contract transferred to SOCAR. The contractual 
imports fell below take-or-pay obligations from 2007 to 2009, resulting in Turkey 
creating a burden of around USD 160 million. In 2010, however, Turkey successfully 
negotiated a 6.5% discount on gas purchased from the Russian Gazprom for a final 
gas price of USD 330 per thousand cubic metres (MCM). In 2011, Turkey paid 
approximately USD 1 billion for 2.5 BCM of gas that could not be imported in 
2010.
213
 Moreover, in 2011 Turkey agreed with Russia to consume the gas that had 
not been consumed in the previous years in substitution of a 6 BCM contract renewal. 
Turkey is now looking to make similar deals with other sources to relax the burden of 
take-or-pay commitments. Turkey has chronic eastern supply insufficiency due to the 
lack of infrastructure along the Eastern Anatolian Pipeline. Since 2007, Iran and/or 
Azerbaijan contracts have been accounted as a “penalty” for BOTAŞ every year due 
to lack of two compressor stations. Especially in winter 2011-12, which was referred 
to by BOTAŞ as ‘Hard Day’ due to the lack of enough supply and sudden reduction 
of pressure in the system, an ironical simultaneous situation (‘take-or-pay burden for 
Turkey in eastern Azeri contract during sharp supply request boom in the west’) was 
recorded.214 The above mentioned compressor stations were commissioned in 2013 to 
increase the daily flow rate from both SD1 and Iranian gas contracts.215 It is obvious 
that the investment performance of BOTAŞ is crucial for Turkey’s natural gas 
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consumption that significantly affects the Turkish economy. In 2013 BOTAŞ’s 
realization rate of investments increased to 89% from 73% in 2011.216 
The growth in Turkish gas demand has a direct relation with the increase of electricity 
demand. As mentioned above, the Turkish electricity system is very much natural gas 
dominated, and electricity demand is expected to trigger greater natural gas demand in 
future. In 2010, the shares of gas consumption by sector are: electricity 51%, industry 
32% and households 17%.
217
 The other significant driver of the natural gas demand 
increase is the use of natural gas in households. The cities that are newly connected to 
natural gas distribution pipelines will increase the gas consumption. At the end of 
2011, seventy-one of the eighty-one cities in Turkey have a connection to main natural 
gas pipeline systems, while the total length of natural gas distribution lines has 
reached 12,216 km.
218
 It is important to note that the industrial demand also increased 
in 2011 as the economy started to recover from the recession in 2009. According to 
the analysis of Deloitte, the natural gas demand will exceed the level of 60 BCM in 
2017.
219
 
3.4.1. Turkey’s Natural Gas Imports  
Turkey began importing natural gas in 1988
220
 because the national production is very 
little (less than 1 BCM), although some fields are currently being developed by 
TPAO, Turkey’s oil and gas company. In addition, Turkey wants to promote gas trade 
with potential suppliers and shippers. Within this framework, to meet the increasing 
natural gas demand and also to diversify its gas trade portfolio, Turkey plans to 
develop new LNG terminals in Izmir (Aliağa), Saros Bay and Ceyhan by private 
companies as well as having expansion plans for the existing Marmara Ereğlisi LNG 
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facility of BOTAŞ. Turkey’s energy strategy envisages that Ceyhan will become one 
of the major energy hubs in the Eastern Mediterranean.
221
 
Turkey imports gas from Russia, transiting through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria 
(14 BCM) and through Blue Stream (16 BCM). The South Caucasus (or Baku Tbilisi 
Erzurum) Pipeline (SCP/BTE) became operational in 2007 and has an actual capacity 
of 7 BCM but an ultimate physical capacity of 20 BCM with further installations of 
new compression stations. Technically, the Blue Stream system could accommodate 
these volumes at its current supply levels as well, but the potential role of Gazprom 
would then be reduced (given the need for other imports at the expected high levels of 
demand). The doubling of Blue Stream announced in the past would help, but the 
timing of that expansion is unclear.
222
 Table 3.8 shows the major imports suppliers to 
Turkey. Until 2010 Russian gas dominated the Turkish market and the diversification 
of natural gas supply is extremely important for the Turkish natural gas market. 
Table 3.8: Major Import Suppliers 2005–2010 
 
Source: EMRA. 
The pipeline to Iran has an actual capacity of 10 BCM but has an ultimate physical 
capacity of 26-28 BCMA (up to Kayseri) and 16-18 BCMA (Kayseri-Ankara 
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segment) with the addition of new compressor stations.
223
 Iran has regular supply 
problems in winter, and gas flow to Turkey tends to be very low between December 
and March every year. Due to these significant gas supply problems with Iran, Turkey 
imported extra LNG in winter 2006/07 (1.5 BCM) from Algeria and Nigeria,
224
 and 
some spot LNG has been imported through the only receiving terminal built by a 
private company (in Izmir), EGEGAZ, which has been operational since 2006
225
 and 
importing LNG since 2009.
226
  
New developments in Turkmenistan (especially exploitation of 14 TCM supergiant 
Galkynysh, rich in gas resources and already a large exporter to Iran, Russia and 
China) and Kazakhstan, where considerable volumes of associated gas and 
unconventional gas will be produced from oil field development, mean that new 
volumes are likely to become available close to the Turkish market (see also the 
Central Asian section). Discussions are taking place about future gas supplies from 
northern Iraq (KRG), including a potential LNG liquefaction plant in Ceyhan. Such 
plans may need to await an improvement in the situation in Iraq. 
Map 3.2: Import Capacity of Turkey 
 
Source: CEDIGAZ. 
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Azerbaijan is likely to emerge as an important source of gas for Turkey, but in the 
medium-term (until 2015) export volumes to Turkey are likely to remain limited to the 
capacity of the South Caucasus Pipeline. It is expected that, post-2018, exports could 
be boosted by the second phase of Shah Deniz, the world’s ninth largest gas field with 
reserves of around 1.2 TCM.
227
 According to SOCAR Trading, Azerbaijan’s prospect 
for growth in production is “50 BCM per year by 2025”.228 However, Turkey (and 
Europe) will face competition from increasing demand on Azerbaijan’s reserves, 
which may further increase with the volumes of Umid, Absheron, etc. fields after 
2020. Their resident in Azerbaijan recently stated that, over the last year, proven gas 
reserves in Azerbaijan increased by about 600 BCM.
229
 The total export potential of 
Azerbaijan (including Shah Deniz Phase 2) requires further clarification — it could be 
as high as 15–20 BCM by 2020.230  
Although in the short term it appears that current production does not allow the Azeri 
gas industry (SOCAR, BP Statoil, Total) to fulfil all domestic and export 
requirements plus the needs of Georgia as a transit country, Azeri and East Caspian 
gas potential still have considerable upside in the medium- to long-term. Azerbaijani 
gas production increased by around 50% to 16 BCM in 2008 on the basis of Phase I 
development of the offshore Shah Deniz field. Phase II field development, which 
could bring an additional 16 BCM/year to market,
231
 will be the main incremental gas 
supply potentially available for European markets from the Caspian region. According 
to SOCAR: “By 2025, Azerbaijan wants to raise its gas production to 35 BCM (low 
case) or 55 BCM (high case). Such a big jump can only be achievable with the start of 
Phase II of Shah Deniz” with “an estimated cost of at least USD 40 billion including 
investment on export infrastructures”.232 Initially, Azeri gas was to be transported to 
Europe as destination and Turkey and Georgia as transit countries. This could be 
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considered as the backbone of the Southern Corridor that will be analysed in detail in 
the following chapters of this dissertation. 
3.4.2. Turkey’s Storage Capacity  
Turkey’s storage capacity regulation is another case for domestic natural gas security. 
Turkey has very little storage capacity compared to markets similar in size; daily 
swings are usually met with line packing. The TPAO storage facility in Silivri (1.6 
BCM) has been operating since 2007 and a regulatory document was published by the 
government about the terms and conditions of fair use of this only underground 
storage unit in Turkey.
233
 It is a depleted field. TPAO plans to convert other depleted 
fields into storage facilities. BOTAŞ is planning to build a new storage facility in a 
salt formation in Tuz Gölü in Central Anatolia234 and organised a tender in early 2008 
by utilizing World Bank funds. The construction activities were started in 2012. The 
facility will have a working capacity of 1.2 BCM annual storage capacity and it would 
be expanded to 4 BCM with further phases. The facility could be ready by 2018 with 
initial capacity.235 BOTAŞ is also studying the possibility of converting two mines, 
Arabalı and Tarsus, into storage. According to the 2001 law, storage facilities will be 
privatized. There are two LNG terminals of 6 BCM each in Marmara Ereğlisi 
(BOTAŞ) and Aliağa (Egegaz). Aliağa terminal has been operational for LNG import 
since 2009, and it has 6 BCM regasification capacity. The BOTAŞ Marmara Ereğlisi 
LNG terminal has been operational since 1994, and it has 6 BCM/y regasification 
capacity and will be upgraded to be operational until 2017 to expand capacity beyond 
8 BCM/year.
236
  
In Turkey, the first sizeable storage in Marmara Silivri of TPAO is operational for 
BOTAŞ, with 2.1 BCM and 561 MCM for third Parties.237 This is a depleted gas field 
to the west of Istanbul. There are ongoing expansion studies (Phase II and III) for the 
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storage facility. Plans are also being made for a smaller 0.6 BCM storage in the salt 
formations in the South of Turkey near Mersin (Tarsus).238 
3.4.3. BOTAŞ and Natural Gas Market Law 
The Turkish gas sector is regulated by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA); though currently not a member of the European Union, the country has 
already aligned many of its policies with EU legislation. Both the gas contract release 
program (the transfer of import contracts to the private sector) and the unbundling of 
the state-BOTAŞ, conform to the Third Energy Package of the EU.  
The 2001 Natural Gas Market Law established the basis for the liberalization of the 
gas sector. It set up EMRA and aimed at abolishing BOTAŞ’ monopoly position over 
imports, transmission, marketing and gas sales. EMRA is the energy regulator and is 
responsible for energy policy and legislation. The 2001 Natural Gas Market Law 
required account unbundling by 2003 and legal unbundling by 2009 for BOTAŞ, and 
account unbundling for private companies. At one end, the question of market 
opening stresses that customers consuming more than 1 MCM in old distribution 
regions and more than 15 MCM in new distribution regions are eligible. New 
importers must have 10% of imported volumes within five years. Price regulation and 
tariffs are determined by EMRA.
239
 However, the World Bank expressed concerns and 
suggested that prices be proposed by the transmission system operator and approved 
by the regulator. There are regulatory issues that form a barrier to new entrants to the 
market. BOTAŞ holds a dominant position in import, transmission, and wholesale.240 
Although the 2001 law set up the basis for a competitive market, very little has been 
achieved so far. The gas release program to limit BOTAŞ’ import share to 20% by 
2009 started end-2006. Only 11.2 BCM/year have been released. Following this 
unbundling, privatization of BOTAŞ trading and storage activities is expected by the 
end of 2013 or early 2014. BOTAŞ is obligated to supply gas to 70% of the Turkish 
customers and still holds the majority of import contracts.
241
 Competition is therefore 
limited. There are uncertainties on the future transport code and its implications for 
                                                          
238
 BOTAŞ. 
239
 Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), Natural Gas Sector Report 2010. 
240
 BOTAŞ. 
241
 Özen. 
 99 
transit or transmission tariffs through Turkey. The future role of BOTAŞ was set to be 
only an importing and wholesaling company, but as a national champion its status did 
not change substantially.
242
  
Two key state-owned distribution companies, Esgaz and Bursagaz, were the first to be 
sold - in 2003 and 2004 respectively - under the Natural Gas Market Law 
privatization act. Although it had no distribution network at the time, municipality-
owned and licensed company Agdas was also transferred to the private sector. In 2009 
it was announced that 80% of Başkentgaz, previously under the control of Ankara’s 
Metropolitan Municipality, was to be transferred to the privatization administration, 
with plans to complete a sale within two years; however, the attempt was unsuccessful 
in 2011 because of the shareholder disputes of the newcomer firm.
243
 The initial 
tender for Başkentgaz’s remaining 20% was cancelled after the bidder was unable to 
finance the bid, and was tendered in January 2013 again and successfully privatized to 
Torunlar Holding.244 Following the completion of the administrative requirements for 
Izgaz (tendered in August 2008), only one distribution company will remain to be 
privatized, İGDAŞ, responsible for distribution activities in Istanbul. In April 2010 it 
was announced that, subject to a ‘good’ offer, İGDAŞ was intended for complete 
privatization before the end of 2010 but it is also not privatized yet and expectation of 
this has been postponed to 2013.
245
  
BOTAŞ maintains its position as Turkey’s principal importer, despite plans to reduce 
the company’s import contracts to just 20% in 2009 and to zero by the end of 2010;246 
nevertheless, many authorities do not consider this aim to be unrealistic when the 
market conditions, such as lack of incentives for contract release for the supplier and 
European examples of similar firms in Italy, France, Spain, and the Netherlands, are 
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considered.
247
 Thus far Turkey’s gas release program has transferred 10 BCM of 
Western Line gas to seven companies (Enerco 2.5 BCM/year, Bosphorus 2.5 
BCM/year, Akfel 2.25 BCM/year, Kibar Gaz 1.0 BCM/year, Batı Hattı AŞ 1 
BCM/year, Avrasya 0.5 BCM/year and Shell 0.25 BCM/year) as well as 1.2 
BCM/year direct transfer to SOCAR Gas Turkey.248 
The Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) issued a report on the natural gas market 
of Turkey in summer 2012. Mainly the report argued that Turkey’s attempts to 
liberalise its natural gas market were lagging behind schedule and the government 
should abandon attempts to transfer import contracts and instead launch a gas release 
programme.249 The report also recommended splitting off a commercial sales branch 
from BOTAŞ so that there would be a gas pricing mechanism. Moreover, the report 
also recommended that separating BOTAŞ’ import business from its wholesale 
operations would help foster a deeper market because the present price system deters 
investment and new entries into the market.  
On the other hand BOTAŞ reported a loss of 1.3 billion Turkish lira ($720 million) in 
2011. Even though there are 37 licences for wholesale sales, BOTAŞ dominates the 
market and there is “no developed liquid wholesale market at present”, according to 
the report. Only 3.5% of market buyers — companies that purchase more than 
300,000 m³/year — changed their supplier in 2010, partly because there is “no 
environment in which competitive offers can be made”, the report said.250 
The TCA has also tracked BOTAŞ’ pricing and found no reason to investigate the 
company for uncompetitive practices. But it is clear that the firm’s pricing bears little 
relation to international energy costs. BOTAŞ was briefly bound by an automated 
pricing mechanism until it was exempted in 2010. The company acts less as an 
independent commercial entity and more as “a reflection of state policy”, the report 
added. Turkey’s authorities should also stop trying to transfer BOTAŞ’ gas import 
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contracts to the private sector and instead use a volume transfer method that 
reallocates gas from existing contracts to non-state-run companies, the report urged. 
BOTAŞ has so far only transferred 10 percent of its gas contracts, half the goal of 20 
percent set for 2009. The contract transfers may have been hampered by the fact that 
private companies cannot match the undertakings that a state-run company can make 
in negotiations with suppliers such as Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom, the report 
said.251 Many contracts also contain take-or-pay clauses, making them potential 
liabilities for companies that take them over. So far, only 4 BCM of such contracts 
have been transferred. 
3.4.4. Gas Transport Network in Turkey 
After completing the East–West connection to allow for the import of gas from Iran in 
2001, BOTAŞ (the Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, a 100% state-owned 
company) more than doubled its grid between 2002 and 2005, giving it a total length 
of more than 12,000 km, with 10 million users and 3,339 vehicles in 2011.
252
 In 2003, 
only 6 cities were connected to the grid, whereas in 2013 this number was 72.253 
The five older grids in the main cities are well developed. They were owned and 
controlled by the municipalities, but two have now been privatized, leaving Istanbul, 
Ankara and İzmit. These grids have over 4 million connections and aggregate sales of 
8 BCM per year. The Government started a privatisation process for the grids in 
Istanbul (İGDAŞ), Ankara (EGO and later Başkentgaz) and İzmit (IZGAZ); however, 
the tender has been withdrawn and retail distribution to the rest of the country is well 
underway. Concessions for thirty years are being issued by the Regulatory Body 
(EMRA) after a tender process. Local investors have shown particular interest in the 
27 new grids currently operating.
254
 That of IZGAZ is now owned by a French 
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company, Gaz de France, that of Başkentgaz was transferred to Torunlar Holding and 
the İGDAŞ grid’s privatization is expected to take place in 2015.255  
The competition for Turkey’s national grids is strong, despite the fact that owners can 
only charge customers a connection fee (currently USD 180) in addition to the city 
gate price. The fixed and variable costs of distribution for a fixed period of eight years 
are resulting in very low margins. The investor and owner, typically a construction 
company, is obviously banking on the regional monopoly concession of twenty-two 
years following purchase, as well as the income from associated services. Some 
smaller grids have been sold and acquired by other grid owners. The largest number 
of grids in the hands of one owner is eleven. All grid operators/licence holders, 
including the old ones, are members of an active new grid organisation, Gazbir 
(Union of Natural Gas Distribution Companies), which is well recognised by the 
authorities and involved in international bodies like Eurogas and IGU.
256
  
Map 3.3: Natural Gas Supply and Grid Lines in Turkey 
Source: BOTAŞ. 
It is noted that natural gas distribution rights are privatized in more than sixty-two 
cities, and these have begun to transfer the multi-billion dollar natural gas import 
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contracts of BOTAŞ to private natural gas distribution operators.257 Residential and 
industrial demand is expected to continue a sustained growth as new cities get 
connected. The import law prevents companies from receiving gas from companies 
other than BOTAŞ and the gas release program winners. Unbundling and privatization 
of BOTAŞ into three sub companies handling trading, transportation, and LNG and 
storage activities respectively is scheduled,
258
 though realistically it will not be 
completed anytime soon.
259
  
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Turkey, which does not have major energy resources, is very much dependent on 
energy imports. While Turkey has energy potential in coal and hydro, Turkey does not 
have significant oil and gas reserves. The renewable energy sources seem new to 
Turkey’s energy system, among others wind energy is pioneering renewable energy 
investments in Turkey. As mentioned above the government is trying to incite nuclear 
investments in order to strengthen the Turkish electricity generation system.   
Turkey’s current installed capacity and the shares of energy sources in electricity 
generation demonstrate that natural gas is very critical for Turkey’s energy system. 
The liberalization of the Turkish gas market in a manner similar to EU gas market 
regulations encourages the private sector to make investments that are very beneficial 
for Turkey’s energy market. On the other hand it is very obvious that BOTAŞ and its 
investments are the backbone of the Turkish natural gas system. As Turkey is one of 
the biggest natural gas markets in the world it needs more investment in natural gas 
storage facilities.  
The structure of the natural gas system is important but the issue is more with the 
natural gas itself. The biggest problem is that Turkey has very little indigenous 
production of natural gas. The Russian dominance in the Turkish gas contract 
portfolio endangers Turkey’s energy security. The diversification of natural gas 
supply sources could decrease the level of risk of being dependent on Russian gas.  
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Turkey has to tackle the risks of natural gas for its well-functioning energy system. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Turkey has foreign policy capacity that could 
establish strong interconnections to find solutions for secure natural gas relationships 
at the regional level. Not surprisingly, the European Union has very similar risks for 
natural gas imports and energy security issues, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR IN THE FRAMEWORK 
OF THE EU’S ENERGY SECURITY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The extensive dependency of producer and consumer countries on the international 
energy trade creates dependence in the EU’s natural gas relations. There is a partial 
interdependence relation between producer and consumer countries. That does not 
provide natural gas supply security for Europe. Natural gas exporting countries 
benefit from the wealth that can contribute to social welfare or rent distribution for 
controlling of domestic instability. This internal motivation forces producers to seek 
higher prices as long as those prices do not influence demand destruction — by, for 
instance, fuel exchange, technological advances and general reduction in energy 
consumption. Energy-hungry countries depend on plentiful supply to ensure adequate 
power for their economies. Over the coming decades, energy politics will determine 
survival in international politics. Two of the major global energy consumers, the 
United States and the European Union, have similar needs but different practical 
perspectives on energy imports. Whilst the United States has achieved a shale gas 
revolution and so the dependence of the US is no more a problem for its internal 
market supply, the EU is highly dependent on imported gas from Russia and North 
Africa. Therefore, the EU has launched a new energy strategy, namely the Southern 
Corridor, which will diversify the supply security of the EU by accessing the Caspian 
Sea, Middle East and East Mediterranean natural gas networks. This chapter aims to 
explore what is/will be Turkey’s role in the EU’s energy supply security in the context 
of the Southern Corridor. Hence, this chapter will identify what the concept of energy 
security means for Turkey and Europe, and analyse the capability of the EU for a 
common energy policy. In order to explain the importance of the Southern Corridor, it 
is necessary to explain the existing pipeline options, which reach the EU’s border 
from Russia, Norway and North Africa. 
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4.2. THE EU’S CURRENT GAS SUPPLIERS 
There are two main reasons behind European energy dependency on Russia: Russia’s 
pipeline connection and huge natural gas resources. Russian gas reaching Europe 
transits either through Ukraine or Belarus. The other gas pipelines to Europe are from 
Algeria transiting through Tunisia or Morocco, before reaching a European border.
260
 
Therefore, Europe has to preserve a good relationship with its two historical suppliers 
(Russia and Algeria). However, internal instability in Algeria and a series of crises 
between Moscow and Kiev (Russian gas passes through at least two further countries 
before reaching the EU) have put European supply security at risk. 
According to Eurogas, the European Union’s natural gas consumption was 522 BCM 
in 2010.
261
 In the World Energy Outlook 2011 Special Report on the Golden Age of 
Natural Gas, the IEA forecasts that the total natural gas consumption of the EU will 
reach 587 BCM in 2020 and 621 BCM in 2030. 
262
 At present 33% of EU gas imports 
come from Russia and in the next decades, whatever scenario is considered, Russian 
gas exports seem to preserve their position.
263
 According to the IEA, the North 
African region is expected to continue to be one of the most significant sources of 
natural gas supply for southern Europe.
264
. As mentioned in Chapter 3, by 2030 
Algeria alone will account for approximately 20% of total EU gas imports. The other 
corridor, from the North Sea to Europe, plays an essential role in the EU’s imports.  
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Table 4.1: The Shares of Natural Gas Imports of EU in 2010 and 2011 
Source: European Union. 
It is important to note that the imports from the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea are 
at a very low base, around 6 BCM, which only accounted for 2% of total imports 
according to 2010 figures.
265
 However, this figure will change completely when the 
pipeline network reaches the European market in the future. The Persian Gulf will be 
able to provide above 15% by exporting over 50 BCM and 22% by over 140 BCM by 
2030. 
When we consider the additional gas from the Russian route to Europe, we see the 
monopolistic attitudes of a Russian pipeline system that bans any gas producer access 
to the existing pipeline system connected to the European network. In this context, it 
is very important to underline the significance of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
The Charter was signed by 51 states in 1994 in order to establish a transparent and 
stronger energy environment in Eurasia.
266
 Moreover, a Transit Protocol that would 
aim to enable marketing of the share capacities in pipeline systems to third parties has 
been discussed since 2000. Nearly all European countries and the states of the former 
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Soviet Union ratified the Charter. The notable exceptions, as far as gas is concerned, 
are Russia and Belarus — which have not ratified it but are applying the Treaty 
provisionally — and Norway. North African countries were not involved in the 
agreement process.
267
 When the Charter is fully functional, we may consider Russia 
as a transit country for additional gas supplies from private gas producers or gas-
producing countries in Central Asia. In Map 4.1, all the natural gas options of Europe 
are presented, along with their contribution to energy supply. Under these 
circumstances, when we exclude the options through Turkey (Fourth Corridor or 
Southern Corridor), the new gas supplies can be delivered from North African gas 
reserves and additional LNG capacities to Europe. Hence, if the Southern Corridor 
concept becomes operational, the EU will be able to directly access the natural gas 
sources of the Caspian Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East regions. This new 
corridor will diversify the supply options and reduce the EU’s dependence on a 
Russian gas monopoly. Comparing the Russian and North African options, Southern 
Corridor transportation prices are lower. Together with the Southern Corridor, 
Norway, Nord Stream, and the existing pipeline systems of Russia and North Africa 
provide EU energy security with the signing of long term natural gas contracts. It is 
essential to note that pipeline systems create a relationship of interdependence 
between suppliers and demanding countries, including transit countries such as 
Turkey. 
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Map 4.1: Main European Import Routes 
Source: CERA. 
Russia, Norway, the Netherlands and Algeria are the main natural gas suppliers of the 
EU, in that order of importance.
268
 In order to understand the significance of the 
Southern Corridor, the following section will analyse the existing natural gas 
corridors (from Russia, Norway, and North Africa) reaching the EU’s border. 
4.2.1. Russian Export Capacity and Pipeline System to Europe  
Russia holds the largest natural gas resources, which are estimated to be around 32.9 
TCM and constitute nearly 17.6% of the world total natural gas reserves,
269
 which is 
why Russia is considered to be a major partner of the European energy market. The 
major fields of Gazprom are located in Western Siberia (Urengoy, Yamburg, 
Medvezhye and Zapolyarnoye), the Yamal Peninsula (Bovanenkovskoye and 
Kharaseveyskoye), the Barents Sea (Shtokman), Southern Russia (Astrakhan) and the 
Volga Region (Orenburg).The Nadym Pur Taz (NPT) region is where most of the 
currently producing gas fields are located and the Yamal Peninsula has large gas 
reserves in undeveloped fields. Since the West Siberian fields in the NPT region are 
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rapidly being depleted, the Yamal fields and the Shtokman field are Gazprom’s 
planned next large-scale sources of supply.
270
  
The cost of production and transportation to markets are substantial factors that may 
affect the development of the fields in these regions. The development of current 
fields and finding new sources are crucial for Gazprom to maintain or increase its 
production for domestic supply and exportation. Additionally the domestic natural gas 
consumption of Russia constitutes approximately 55% of the Russian primary energy 
demand.
271
 However, Russia plans to reduce the share of natural gas consumption. 
These savings arise mainly from improvements in the efficiency of power and heat 
generation, and from lower demand for electricity in a more efficient economy.
272
 On 
the internal demand side, Russia had a huge consumption, equalling 416 BCM in 
2012.
273
 Russia’s total gas production was 592 BCM in 2012.274 The total export to 
customers was approximately 176 BCM in 2012.
275
  
4.2.1.1. Gazprom in world natural gas market 
Gazprom is the largest Russian foreign investor in the world. The investments are 
mostly located in Europe. The main goal of Gazprom is to boost its share in the 
European gas market.
 276
 Therefore, Gazprom is willing to acquire firms in Europe in 
order to secure its supply deliveries. Europe is the core market for Gazprom and it 
simply wants more access to gas distribution in Europe. Gazprom invests in all sectors 
of production to delivery, such as gas trade, transport, transit, distribution and storage 
sectors.
277
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The monopoly of Gazprom with the factionalism in Russian politics maintains their 
imperial ambition in Central Asia and the Caucuses, which threatens the long term 
energy security plan of Europe. Central Asian gas was primarily supplied to Ukraine 
and the Transcaucasia republics. Therefore, there is a perpetual competition between 
the EU and Russia revealed in the control of Caspian region hydrocarbon sources. The 
EU is trying to find out how to solve the problem of diversification in energy supply 
and transport because the figures indicate that EU dependency on natural gas is 
enormous. In 2008, Gazprom Group acquired 66 BCM of contracted Central Asian 
gas, including 42 BCM of Turkmen gas, 14 BCM of Uzbek gas, and 9 BCM 
of Kazakh gas. 
The gas resources in Central Asian countries open new opportunities to expand sales 
markets and maintain reliable supplies to traditional consumers. Gazprom needs to 
increase its production to fulfil its long-term aim of increasing European and Asian 
sales. According to the IEA, Russian exports to the European Union are projected to 
climb to 155 BCM in 2030.
278
 In 1997, Gazprom began importing natural gas from 
Turkmenistan to help fulfil its supply contract with its European customers. After the 
explosion of the Central Asia Centre pipeline in April 2009, Turkmen and Russia 
suspended their 80 BCM sales agreement. After the negotiations, Turkmenistan’s 
agreement with Russia was revised at the end of 2009 to supply 30 BCM gas to 
Russia.
279
 Russian imports from Central Asia may also reduce Gazprom’s need to buy 
gas from independent Russian producers, which has very significant effects on foreign 
investment in the Russian energy sector. 
On the one hand, the European governments are not keen to be more dependent upon 
Russia, and there is some resistance to Russian investments in the gas sector. The 
expansion of Gazprom in Europe would increase the level of interdependence 
between the EU and Russia. However, the expansion would be limited by nationalistic 
attempts of the European governments to protect their gas markets from Russian 
dominance. On July 10, 2007 the European Parliament adopted a resolution that 
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emphasized that any company from outside the EU may buy energy infrastructure in 
Europe if there is reciprocity with that country.
280
 
4.2.2. Security of Gas Transportation and Transit 
The EU region is heavily dependent on Russian and Algerian pipeline gas and LNG, 
with very little supply diversification aside from Spain and Italy. “Europe’s natural 
gas imports are mostly (89%) delivered by pipelines that run across, at least, one 
transit country before reaching the EU border.”281 “As the EU’s borders enlarge, the 
transit risk decreases, but being at the end of a transnational pipeline will always 
entail a certain amount of uncertainty for European importers.”282 The transit of 
natural gas exports across Ukraine has encountered particular problems in the delivery 
of Russian gas to Europe in the post-Soviet era. The basis of the problem has been a 
lack of money in Ukraine to pay for Russian gas supplies. Natural gas transiting 
through Ukraine was interrupted by Ukrainian companies as a result. These 
difficulties have caused Gazprom to devise an entirely new export route strategy 
based on avoiding transit countries wherever possible, and, in particular, reducing 
volumes in transit through Ukraine. The source of insecurity comes from the internal 
instability of natural gas consumer countries; for example, in November 1997, a 
terrorist bomb exploded at an onshore Algerian section of the Trans-Mediterranean 
pipeline to Italy.
283
 Therefore the stability of the gas producing countries is another 
security dimension in the natural gas production-consumption chain. 
Whilst Russia’s military intervention into Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 
challenged Turkey’s transit initiatives from the Caspian Sea region, Putin’s 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the most recent interventions into Ukraine’s 
eastern cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv are further increasing the importance 
of Southern Corridors. One the one hand, the nuclear negotiations between Iran and 
the P5+1 world powers introduce new options for Southern Corridors. If the “Action 
Plan for Peace” reaches final agreement between parties, Iran will become one the 
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biggest feeders of the Southern Corridor for the EU’s natural gas supply security. Iran 
will also be a transit country for Turkmenistan gas towards Europe. 
4.2.3. The Gas Pipelines and Projects From Russia to Europe 
There are currently nine major pipelines in Russia, seven of which are export 
pipelines. The Yamal-Europe (Europol), Northern Lights, Soyuz, and Bratrstvo 
(Brotherhood) pipelines all carry Russian gas to Eastern and Western European 
markets via Ukraine and/or Belarus. These four pipelines have a combined capacity of 
113 BCM. Three other pipelines, Blue Stream, North Caucasus, and Mozdok-Gazi-
Magomed connect Russia’s production areas to consumers in Turkey and FSU 
republics in the east.
284
 There are two other strategic projects of Russia in the North 
(Nord Stream) and South (South Stream).  
4.2.3.1. Nord Stream Pipeline Project 
Nord Stream is a gas pipeline to link Russia and the European Union via the Baltic 
Sea. This new channel would increase the Russian natural gas exports and is a major 
infrastructure project that sets a new benchmark in EU-Russia cooperation. Nord 
Stream has a capacity to transport up to 55 BCM of gas each year with double strings. 
Hence, this offshore pipeline project is viewed as a Trans-European Energy Networks 
(TEN-E) priority project for the security of European energy supply. According to the 
European Commission approval statement in mid-2006, the Council of the European 
Union and the European Parliament regarded the project as key to ensuring the 
sustainability and security of energy supply in line with EU energy policy.
285
  
Nord Stream is 1,223 kilometres long and consists of two parallel lines. The first line, 
with a transmission capacity of around 27.5 BCM per year, was completed in June 
2011, and transportation of gas through Line 1 began in mid-November 2011.
286
 The 
second line’s construction began in November 2011 and it was commissioned in the 
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last quarter of 2012, doubling annual capacity to around 55 BCM.
287
 The shareholders 
have ensured the project’s financing by providing about 30% of the project costs 
through equity contributions proportionate to their share in the joint venture: OAO 
Gazprom – 51%, E.ON Ruhrgas AG – 20%, BASF SE/Wintershall Holding AG – 
20%, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie – 9%. Some 70% will be financed externally through 
limited recourse finance. Nord Stream is already connected to the OPAL pipeline on 
landfall Germany. There are two new proposals for expansion of Nord Stream: (1) 
Extension of Nord Stream into UK through landfall Netherlands (Gazprom signed 
MoUs in 2012 with BP and Centrica), and (2) expansion of Nord Stream by addition 
of two more strings (up to 110 BCM per year capacity). The expansion option is on 
hold due to the ongoing reservations of the EU (third package) and the German 
Government.  
Map 4.2: Nord Stream Pipeline 
 
4.2.3.2. South Stream Pipeline Project 
In addition to this pipeline, the South Stream is a transnational gas pipeline project 
being developed for the purpose of diversifying the routes of natural gas supplies to 
European consumers and stipulating the conveyance of the blue fuel to South and 
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Central Europe across the Black Sea. The South Stream project is another pillar of the 
strategic agreement, and memoranda were signed between Eni (20%) and Gazprom 
(50%) in 2000 and on June 23, 2007, respectively. European major energy companies 
Wintershall (15%) and EdF (15%) are other shareholders of South Stream AG. The 
pipeline system is designed for a total capacity of 63 BCM per annually.
288
 
Map 4.3: South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
 
Source: South Stream.  
There are many controversies about Turkey’s position and its relation with Russia. 
Initially, Turkey was considered as an alternative route to balance Russia’s usage of 
energy for political aims. However, Turkey began to use a multi-dimensional policy 
framework to become a balancing actor between Europe and Russia and between 
Russia and Caspian and Central Asian states. Unlike previous governments, the 
Justice and Development Party of Turkey introduced the policy of ‘zero problems 
with Turkey’s neighbours’289, including Russia. Hence, Turkey’s natural gas 
diplomacy with Azerbaijan does not challenge Russian initiatives. In so doing, Turkey 
pursues creeping rehabilitation policies towards Russian initiatives and the South 
Stream pipeline. Strategically speaking, the Turkish authorities do not evaluate the 
pipeline as an alternative or competition for the Southern Corridor, and it does not 
assume any more that the Russian South Stream pipeline project is an alternative 
pipeline for Turkey’s energy strategy. In fact, Russia transports 80% of its gas through 
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Ukraine to Europe. It can be added that Turkey does not have such certain policies 
about South Stream but is keeping its options flexible because of the conditionality in 
the energy environment. Turkey keeps itself away from the controversy over merging 
South Stream and Nabucco, which is luckily out of fashion in the European energy 
environment. That certainty gives more confidence in building its energy relationship 
with Russia as a ‘transit country’ to Europe. There exist three pipeline corridors to 
Europe: the Russia, North-West Africa, and North Sea corridors. 
4.2.3.3. Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline  
Before the construction started, some circles in the energy environment raised various 
criticisms of the project. They claimed that the pipeline was technically not possible; 
hence they named it ‘Blue Dream’. The environmentalist protestors also disputed the 
construction of the pipeline. However, the pipeline is one of the important parameters 
between Russia and Turkey to create interdependency relations, which develop further 
co-operation on many occasions. The US publicly criticised the pipeline, calling on 
Europe to avoid becoming any more dependent on Russia for energy.  
The legal basis of the pipeline started with the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) 
on construction of the subsea pipeline signed between Russia and Turkey on 15 
December 1997.
290
 Within the IGA, Gazprom and the Turkish BOTAŞ signed a 25-
year contract for the supply of 16 BCM/year of gas to Turkey via Blue Stream 
(starting from 2000).
291
 
The Blue Stream pipeline, officially launched in 2005, laid on the seabed of the Black 
Sea, establishes a direct interconnection between Russia and Turkey, avoiding 
intermediary transit states, contrary to the existing Balkan route in which Russian gas 
has to cross four sovereign territories before it reaches the Turkish border. The other 
point is that the pipeline has been constructed by the Blue Stream Pipeline, B.V., 
which is a Netherlands-based joint venture of Russian Gazprom and Italian ENI. The 
consortium is the owner of the subsea section of pipeline, including Beregovaya 
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compressor station, while Gazprom owns and operates the Russian land section of the 
pipeline and the Turkish land section is owned and operated by the Turkish gas 
pipeline company BOTAŞ. Map 7.1 demonstrates Russian and Turkish sections of the 
pipeline. 
Map 4.4: Blue and South Stream Pipelines 
 
Source: Gazprom. 
The total cost of the Blue Stream pipeline was USD 3.2 billion, including USD 1.7 
billion for the subsea part.
292
 However, no information is publicly available 
concerning the tariffs or tariff methodology specific to the Blue Stream pipeline. The 
technical features of the pipeline are important for the state-of-the-art offshore 
technology used by the international consortium of Blue Stream Pipeline B.V., the 
1213 km pipeline.
293
 It is considered one of the deepest pipelines in the world, laid in 
depths down to 2150 m. There are two sections of the Blue Stream pipeline; the 
offshore section and the onshore section, running under the Black Sea and the Black 
Sea coastline.  
The Blue Stream pipeline also serves as an emergency call-in option for Turkey if 
Iran stops transporting gas from the Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline. This has happened in 
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the past when, for instance, Iran defaulted on its supply obligations in early 2008, 
where gas delivery shortfalls were compensated by Gazprom through the Blue 
Stream. Furthermore, during the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in January 2009, the 
Russian supplies to Turkey via the interrupted Balkan route were partly diverted to the 
Blue Stream. Gazprom is also capable of covering peak energy demand in Turkey 
connected with regular low temperature periods. 
4.2.3.4. Blue Stream II Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
The idea of laying a second pipeline next to the existing one, to be called Blue Stream 
2, was first put on the table in 2002. It has long been discussed since then, though no 
concrete steps have so far been taken for its realization.
294
 In 2005, discussions on 
Blue Stream 2 heated up with a possible extension to the Balkans (and, further, to 
Europe). An agreement was signed between Gazprom and MOL in June 2006 for 
feasibility studies of the South European Gas Pipeline (SEGP). However, given the 
tendency of some potential transit/buyer states (Bulgaria and Hungary) towards 
reduced Russian dependency and the Turkish Government favoured Nabucco, interest 
in Blue Stream II has weakened and eventually been replaced by the South Stream. 
This is an alternative Russian project to supply pipe-gas to Europe through a direct 
connection from Russia to Bulgaria under the Black Sea (see section on South Stream 
Pipeline). The South Stream project has also found support from Turkey as a part of 
the broader energy co-operation package between Russia and Turkey. In 2009, the 
idea of Blue Stream II was revived by laying another seabed pipeline parallel to the 
first. The route was reconfigured to go overland in Turkey in the north-south direction 
across Anatolia all the way down to the Mediterranean coast (indeed, to follow the 
Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline path) with up to 8 BCM annual delivery to the 
Mediterranean market.
295
 
In addition to Russian initiatives in the Black Sea, it is necessary to explain that 
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Russian offshore in the Caspian Sea shows some promise for future prospects. 
According to a Russian energy strategy 2009 paper, gas production from offshore 
Caspian Sea fields will rise gradually to reach 21 to 22 BCM by 2030 at the 
Tsentralnoye and Khvalynskoye fields operated by Lukoil, Gazprom and 
KazMunaiGaz.
296
 It is certain that Russia has more political power in terms of 
defining the legal status of the Caspian, rather than having hydrocarbon sources in the 
Caspian Seabed. 
4.2.4. North African Natural Gas Corridors 
Algeria and Nigeria account for over 80% of both proven reserves and production in 
North Africa. Nevertheless, these reserves are small compared to the world total; for 
instance, Algeria and Nigeria together have only close to 3% of world reserves. 
Nevertheless, their current production rates are high; thus, their comparative effects 
on the countries they export to are high. Some experts argue that Algeria’s effect will 
be temporary because it cannot sustain the supply for more than 10-15 years.
297
 
Map 4.5: Export Infrastructure and Projects From North Africa to Europe 
Source: OME. 
                                                          
296
 IEA. World Energy Outlook 2010, 546. 
297
 Yuri Yegorov and Franz Whirl “Gas Transportation, Geopolitics and Future Market Structure,” 
Futures 43 (2011): 1056-1068. 
 120 
The proven reserves of North Africa as a whole total 14.7 TCM, equal to about 8% of 
the world total. The region’s estimated remaining recoverable resources, including 
undiscovered volumes, are about 7% of the world total.
298
 
On the other hand, new campaigns of the Algerian Government predict that the 
unconventional resources of Algeria will be huge but need experienced IOC 
investments. Although the numbers are highly speculative, the unconventional 
potential of North Africa and future offshore campaigns in Western Mediterranean 
basins are quite important for feeding the EU natural gas system and its neighbouring 
countries. 
4.2.4.1. Gas export potential from Algeria to Europe 
Algeria was also the eighth largest natural gas producer in the world in 2010 and the 
third largest gas supplier to Europe after Russia and Norway.
299
 As of January 2013 
Algeria had 4.5 TCM of proven natural gas reserves — the second largest in Africa 
after Nigeria — with 192 BCM of production in 2010, and exported 55 BCM of this 
production in 2010.
300 
Natural gas flow from Algeria to Europe goes by pipeline and 
LNG trade. For instance, Algerian–Italian natural gas trade via pipeline was about 24 
BCM in 2008 while LNG trade only accounted for 2.4 BCM. Spain is another natural 
gas buyer from Algeria via pipeline, with purchases of about 8.4 BCM, with the LNG 
trade figure at about half of the pipeline figure. 
Algeria–Portugal natural gas trade had the lowest rank among the countries of the EU, 
at about 2.4 BCM by pipeline transport. Algeria’s LNG trade with Turkey and France 
is also essential to the energy security of the EU. France bought 7.9 BCM via LNG in 
2008, while Turkey bought only 4.5 BCM of natural gas from Algeria.
301
 This balance 
between pipe and LNG (around 60–40%) has been at the heart of state-owned 
Sonatrach’s exporting strategy. The routes of piped and LNG gas from Algeria can be 
seen in Map 4.6. 
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Map 4.6: Export Infrastructure in Algeria 
Source: European Commission. 
Transmed and GME are the two export pipelines to Europe through Tunisia and 
Morocco, respectively; however, the new pipeline-based and LNG export capacity are 
going to play an essential role in diversification of transit routes.
302
 
Sonatrach is aiming at diversification of outlets, and it will reach the most profitable 
markets after the new pipeline and LNG project are completed.
303
 State-owned 
Sonatrach dominates natural gas wholesale distribution in Algeria, while state-owned 
Sonelgaz controls retail distribution. The company operates the project of Medgaz, 
which was online in 2011, directly linking Algeria to Spain. Although most of the gas 
sold will be through long-term supply contracts, Sonatrach also sells gas on the spot 
market, mainly in the United Kingdom and Asia (Japan, India and South Korea). The 
long-term contracted gas with Algeria reached 65 BCM, split into 43 BCM pipeline 
(contracted mainly with Italy) and 22 BCM LNG (contracted mainly with France, 10 
BCM) in 2009.  
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According to 2010 figures, Algerian export capacity was around 60.5 BCM. In 
general terms, the export capacity is set to rise to less than 100 BCM as and when all 
planned projects are completed. The Algerian government is targeting exports of 100 
BCM by 2015.
304
 The increase will be possible due to the expansion of Transmed. 
GALSI was previously planned for 2012 after several postponements and is now 
further delayed to 2016 at the earliest. This will make it harder for Sonatrach to 
achieve its export targets.
305
 
Table 4.2: Algeria’s Gas Export Capacity in 2008 (BCM/year) 
Source: IEA. 
4.2.4.2. Gas export potential from Libya to Europe 
Libya is one of the oil- and natural gas-rich countries in North Africa. It aims to 
increase gas production significantly in the coming years to supply the domestic 
market and to increase exports to Europe. The country’s proven natural gas resources 
are 1.5 TCM, which would last almost ninety years at current rates of production. 
However, according to Yegorov, Libya and other countries in North Africa are 
consuming their reserves so fast that their relatively important impact in international 
energy markets will effectively vanish within ten years.
306
 In 2008, Libya produced 
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about 17 BCM of marketed gas (plus about 10 BCM of re-injected gas); however 
Libya only sold approximately 10 BCM to the international gas market that year.  
Libya’s exports are predominantly made via the trans-Mediterranean Greenstream 
pipeline, although small volumes are also exported from a single-train LNG plant with 
an effective capacity of 1 BCM. Libya is consuming natural gas at around 7 BCM per 
year in her domestic market. The government plans to expand the capacity of 
Greenstream and has been trying to upgrade the LNG plant, to bring it up to its design 
level capacity of 4 BCM/year and to initiate new LNG projects. In 2010, Libya 
exported 9 BCM of natural gas via the Greenstream pipeline. However, according to 
the experts, Libya could be exporting up to 40 BCM/year by 2030.
307
 Several 
international companies, including Shell and BP, have recently launched new 
exploration drilling programmes in Libya, which could pave the way for higher 
production in the longer term for Libya’s natural gas market. It is expected that the 
project output is going to rise more than 16 BCM by 2015 either via LNG or piped-
gas to Europe.
308
 Nevertheless, Libya is a small gas exporter at the present time. Total 
exports in 2009 were about 9.9 BCM, which was 12% of the regional total. Of that 
total, 9 BCM in 2010 were exported to Italy via the Greenstream pipeline and 0.7 
BCM to Spain as LNG.  
The Greenstream pipeline and its associated upstream developments, together 
comprising the Western Libya Gas Project, will make the country a substantial gas 
exporter for the European energy market. The Greenstream pipeline is the ‘longest 
underwater pipeline’ ever laid in the Mediterranean Sea. It has a diameter of 32 
inches, is ‘520 kilometres long’ and crosses the sea at the ‘depth of 1,127 metres’. On 
the one hand, the ‘Western Libyan Gas Project’ is the first major project to sell the 
natural gas produced in Libya through export to and marketing in Europe.  
Libya’s natural gas comes from two fields: the first, the ‘offshore field Bahr Essalam’, 
is located 110 kilometres off the Libyan coast; the second, the ‘onshore field Wafa’, is 
close to the border with Algeria. The political and economic cooperation between 
Libya and Italy provides a strong interdependency between Libya and European 
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countries.
309
 The lion’s share of Libya’s natural gas and oil is run by Italian energy 
giant Eni, with a 50% stake in the joint development of the fields. The other partner is 
National Oil Corporation (NOC), the Libyan state-owned oil company. 
310
 
Bahr Essalam field is where the first offshore platform, called Sabratha, will be put in 
place. Thirty eight wells will be drilled, fifteen from the platform and twenty three 
subsea. When fully operational, annual production is expected to be around 6 BCM of 
gas.
311
  
Map 4.7: Greenstream Pipeline 
Source: Greenstream Pipeline, ENI, 2010. 
The development of the ‘onshore Wafa field’ includes twelve oil and seventeen gas 
wells. The gas and condensates produced and processed at Wafa will be sent to the 
Mellitah plant through a 530 kilometres-long pipeline.
312
 According to ENI, when the 
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Wafa field will be fully operational, annual production is expected to be around 4 
BCM of natural gas. At ‘Gela’, in Sicily, a ‘reception terminal’ has been built, 
connected to the Snam Rete Gas national network. This energy interdependency 
creates a balancing relationship between the EU and Libya after the cancellation of 
ILSA (the Iran Libya Sanctions Act) in 2006. As part of this, Libya has given certain 
guarantees to stop its nuclear program. However, this ‘new opening’ in Libya’s 
foreign relations has not worked out properly. The Libya-Swiss crisis created a 
political crisis with the United States. Due to an offensive address by the American 
ministry, Libya started to use energy weapons against both Europe and America in 
early 2010.
313
 More recently, the ‘Arab Spring’ and the fall of Qaddafi’s regime 
created new uncertainties that are expected to negatively affect the natural gas 
industry. Greenstream operations ceased many times in 2012 and the first quarter of 
2013 due to successive attacks by the local rebels. Although the new administration of 
Libya strongly underlined guaranteeing the previous hydrocarbon agreements, on-
going political instability is slowing down the industry’s progress.314 
4.3. LNG CAPACITY AND NEW LNG PROJECTS OF EUROPE 
LNG is becoming more popular because it uses a technology that has a compression 
ratio of 600:1. This is almost equal to 600 times the amount pumped from a regular 
pipeline in one LNG tanker in liquefaction terminals and decompressed in 
regasification plants of importing countries. It must be noted that pipeline deliveries 
from these sources emerge as significantly less expensive and more secure than LNG 
shipments, since the capital costs of building LNG infrastructure mean that shipping 
LNG short distances is not economical (Map 4.6). However, LNG has flexibility in 
terms of destination, and this continues to underpin interest in LNG projects. 
Moreover, LNG can be considered economical when compared to long-term ‘take or 
pay’ contracts, because LNG has a bigger spot market and only the LNG financial 
futures market affects the current price. 
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The cost of producing and delivering gas to European markets is a critical part of 
energy security. The integrated map describes graphically the results of our analysis 
of indicative cost levels for new supplies from different sources for delivery to 
European borders. In some cases, such as that of Qatar, the low estimate of production 
costs is at zero since the costs of gas production are typically covered by output of gas 
condensate and liquids. The integrated map analysis suggests that the lowest price 
sources of gas to the main European gas markets are to be found in North Africa, 
notably in Algeria, and in the Norwegian Sea.
315
 
Map 4.8: Indicative Costs for New Sources of Gas Delivered to Europe, 2020 
(USD/MBtu) 
Source: IEA. 
4.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The major decline in the indigenous production in EU member states and import 
dependence upon Russia endangers the security of gas supplies. Hence the security 
perspective for European natural gas markets has been reviewed here. Europe is on 
track with some common policies about environmental issues, which have reached 
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some success in the 20-20-20 strategies, but failed to introduce a common energy 
policy to create bargaining power against the Russian monopoly in the natural gas 
market. In terms of long-term sustainable energy supply, South and Nord Stream 
pipeline projects will satisfy the EU energy demand if the EU and the Russian 
Federation should go through reliable energy cooperation either by pricing or by LNG 
and pipeline trade. For the EU complacency about future security is not easy to 
achieve, the need is to develop the Southern Corridor option and LNG options from 
different sources. It is noted that the previous energy crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine and the most recent Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention into 
Ukrainian southern and eastern cities demonstrates that Russia maintains its policy 
strategy to use energy as a weapon against Ukraine and Europe. On the one hand, 
Russia’s entrance into the Asian natural gas market, especially the Chinese and 
Japanese market, further reduces its market dependency on Europe. It seems that the 
EU should act fast to secure access to the Caspian Sea, Middle East and Eastern 
Mediterranean regions to secure its energy resilience. The suppliers of the Southern 
Corridor have all capacity to satisfy the main feature of energy security, which was 
classified above as availability, affordability, reliability and sustainability. In so 
doing, the EU can integrate its energy policy with exporter countries, and establish 
supply chain systems. The EU can also increase efficiency and competitiveness, the 
liberalization of the EU gas market in domestic markets. Moreover, with a common 
energy policy, the EU may take necessary measures to diversify its gas supplies from 
the Middle East and Caspian regions via alternative routes such as Turkey.  
While North African and Norwegian reserves are declining rapidly, it is difficult to 
presume that the position of European countries in respect of source or transit 
dependence will substantially improve in the next two decades (except for the 
increase in LNG trade) because of loose contracting options and diversity targets and 
price mechanisms with the addition of the Southern Corridor. As seen in Map 4.6, the 
gas transportation cost of the Southern Corridor has been calculated by IEA as one of 
the most economic options among others. While some believe that LNG exports and 
unconventional and renewable energy can mitigate these negative effects in Europe, 
the picture is grimmer for some other players in the region, such as Turkey. In terms 
of transit security, with the concentration of policy attention on source and transit 
security, facility security may have received less attention than it deserves. Moreover, 
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there is reason to believe that maintenance has been neglected in most countries, and 
an ageing system will be subject to a greater risk of technical failure and hence 
disruption. 
In a sense this chapter outlined three pipeline corridors (North Africa, Russia, 
Norway) to Europe but also gave some indication for the Southern Corridor, which is 
divided into three regions; Caspian Sea, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. 
Although there are on-going uncertainties in the Arab Middle East and North Africa, 
where the ‘Arab Spring’ has brought about (or is about to bring about) new rulers, the 
new independent states of the former Soviet Union have achieved co-operation with 
European states. The chapter emphasized that the alternatives for the EU without the 
Southern Corridor may not maintain the security of natural gas in the following 
decades. All other options of the EU can meet the increasing demand and compensate 
for the decline of indigenous gas production at a certain level.  
  
 129 
Chapter 5 
TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS DIPLOMACY FOR THE 
FIRST STAGE OF THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The politics of the pipeline is a new phenomenon of (critical) geopolitics. This new 
area of study brings new dynamics to the field of international politics. In this 
research, the geopolitics of energy give a great depth to the elements of energy supply 
security, which is outlined (by Jonathan Stern in Chapter 1) as involving (i) reserve 
depletion, (ii) the structure of supply contracts, (iii) the investment regime, (iv) the 
insecurity of energy sources, (v) the insecurity of energy transit routes, and (vi) the 
insecurity of energy facilities.
316
 However, this chapter focuses on two elements of 
these risks — (iii) investment regime and (v) energy transit route — in order to 
introduce the main parameters of a reliable investment regime for long term 
contracting issues of pipeline politics through Turkey to the European mainland.  
After the disappearance of Soviet Russia, Turkey has, unexpectedly, found itself as an 
actor in the ‘New Great Game’ in the energy transportation sector, being strategically 
located on pipeline routes from the Caspian Sea, Black Sea and Middle East regions 
to Europe. Turkey’s new geopolitical vision provides for the Ankara government to 
act as a transit country. Turkey buys its own gas needs from Russia through two 
pipelines, one through Bulgaria and the second one under the Black Sea. Other major 
gas suppliers to Turkey are Iran (by pipeline), Azerbaijan (by pipeline) and Algeria 
and Nigeria (in the form of LNG). 
After the signing of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) in 26 June 2012, Turkey and Azerbaijan agreed 
on the construction of a standalone pipeline that will deliver Azeri gas from the 
eastern to the western border of Turkey. Beyond Turkey the Shah Deniz Phase II 
consortium members will decide the final destination through TAP to Italy and the 
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West Balkan Corridor.
317
 Moreover, this chapter will explore the fundamentals of the 
interstate natural gas pipeline system and explain Turkey’s distinction from the other 
three corridors of the European natural gas network. 
There are some elements to the transport security of natural gas that are viewed as 
more difficult and costly than oil transport.
318
 Transportation of natural gas is closely 
linked to storage capacity, because should natural gas being transported not be 
immediately required, it must be stored in a safe condition.
319
 One of the advantages 
of a pipeline is that it guarantees a long term contract for supply security of gas 
consuming countries and economic security of supplier countries. This chapter 
focuses on the western section of the Southern Corridor (Fourth Corridor) of the 
European natural gas network. This chapter will give an analytical overview of the 
major pipeline connecting Turkey to Europe, notably the failed Nabucco project, the 
on-going ITGI project and the TAP project under the spine of the Southern Gas 
Corridor and will assess the reasons behind the failure of the Nabucco project and 
explain whether Turkey has a capability for being an energy hub between Asia and 
Europe or not.  
5.2. THE CONCEPT OF THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR 
Although the geopolitical reasoning defines Turkey as a ‘natural hub’ in transport of 
Caspian and Middle Eastern gas,
320
 Turkey needs to follow multi-dimensional politics 
to operate the Southern Corridor by developing its relations with Russia, Iran, Caspian 
and Middle Eastern states.
321
 The Southern Gas Corridor can be replaced with the 
‘New Silk Road’ links between Europe and the Caspian, Middle East and East 
Mediterranean regions. This Southern Corridor also acts as a catalyst for co-operation 
and an investment regime of long term contracting in the transport sector. Hence, the 
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European Commission identifies a number of partner countries for the Caspian 
Development Corporation (CDC) to operate the bloc-purchasing mechanism of the 
EU from the Caspian region. This initiative includes Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, Iran should be represented 
when the political conditions permit new investment in Iran.
322
 This development 
would make Iran a more significant supply source for the EU.  
In principle, four projects of the Southern Corridor were listed officially by the EU: 
ITGI, Nabucco (Classic), White Stream, and TAP. These projects have capacity to 
transport 60 to 120 BCM from the Central Asia and Caspian regions to Europe.
323
 The 
series of summits and meetings have worked for the development of the Southern 
Corridor. In so doing, on January 13, 2011, the visit of the European Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barosso and EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger to 
Baku and Ashgabat empowered the ties between Europe and Caspian Sea states.
324
 
The Barroso-Oettinger joint visit to both countries could be seen as immense support 
for Caspian gas’s transportation to Europe with construction of the Southern Corridor 
to Europe. Under the Baku declaration, Azerbaijan and the EU affirm their “common 
objective to see the Southern Corridor established and operational as soon as possible, 
and Azerbaijan as a substantial contributor to the Southern Gas Corridor to 
Europe.”325  
The only LNG project, AGRI, was introduced to transport liquefied gas by ship across 
the Black Sea by passing both Turkey and Ukraine; it goes through Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Romania and reaches the European gas market.
326
 However, the project 
is viewed as technologically unreliable and expensive for marketing evaluation. At the 
one end, Russia’s South Stream would also bypass Ukraine, via a large offshore 
section, which avoids the country’s territorial waters. South Stream has a bigger 
capacity (63 BCM/year) than Nabucco (31 BCM/year); they have similar target dates 
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for completion and would largely reach the same Central European consumers. 
Alongside South Stream, a little-publicised and disfavoured project known as White 
Stream, a Ukrainian initiative, could also be seen as a competitor in the southern gas 
corridor, as it aims to bring gas from the Caucasus across Georgia and Ukraine to 
Romania with further supplies to Central Europe.
327
 
Turkey’s preliminary approval to carry out a survey of the seabed in Turkish 
territorial waters for construction of the South Stream pipeline (and optionally 
construction of a Blue Stream II pipeline) will be to broaden Turkish-Russian co-
operation in the Black Sea. In a sense, Turkey’s positive attitude towards the pipeline 
changes the route of South Stream from Ukrainian territorial waters to Turkish 
territorial waters, despite adding an extra 100 km to the length of the line and extra 
investment cost of up to USD 1.5 billion.
328
 Turkish-Russian energy co-operation will 
also be extended to the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline and construction of the first 
nuclear plant in Turkey.
329
 
There are many advantages of the Southern Gas Corridor. Three of them are essential 
to highlight its importance for the EU’s energy supply security. Firstly, the European 
Union nominated the Southern Corridor as a ‘New Silk Road’ at the May 8, 2009 
summit in Prague, and has given its whole diplomatic and financial support for the 
projects.
330
 Secondly, there is no dispute about the status of the Black Sea because it 
does not constitute international waters. Hence, the control of the waters of the Black 
Sea is divided between coastal states. Each coastal state has the right to control the 
routing of the pipeline projects and to apply its national laws to the establishment and 
use of installations, exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the 
seabed within its territories.
331
 Hence, South Stream or other pipelines from Russia 
have to cross either Turkish or Ukrainian exclusive zones before landing in Bulgaria 
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or Romania. Thirdly, the Southern Corridor integrates with the Turkish consumption 
points and interconnects with European downstream.  
Map 5.1: Southern Corridor Pipeline Projects  
Source: BP 
The Southern Gas Corridor projects include the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), 
South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion (SCPX), Trans Anatolian Pipeline Project 
(TANAP), Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project (TAP), Interconnector of Italy and Greece 
(ITGI), Nabucco, and optionally any Iraqi and Eastern Mediterranean feeder 
interconnected with the Turkish system. The feeder of the Southern Corridor is 
controversial and needs to find a reliable long-term contracting and investment 
regime. The first stage of the Southern Corridor will start with Azeri gas, which is 
going to be pumped to the Southern Gas Corridor in 2018. 
5.3. TURKEY’S INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND DIPLOMATIC 
EFFORTS 
There are three international institutional bodies, which operate the common energy 
policy of the EU: Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), Energy Treaty Community (ETC) 
and Caspian Development Co-operation (CDC). Turkey is a member state of the ECT 
international organisation and continues to contribute to the EU’s energy security 
relations for the security of natural gas transport and supply. CDC was an institutional 
body of the EU’s initiative to find necessary natural gas supplies for the Nabucco 
project.  
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5.3.1. Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Community Treaty 
The initiatives of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) aimed to create a stable legal 
regime for cross-border transport and a new energy regime for the Eurasian energy 
environment. ECT and Transit Protocol offer the best multilateral framework of rules 
on transit in Eurasia.
332
 Fifty-three states signed the ECT; however, due to some 
concerns, Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation have not 
ratified the Charter. As mentioned above, Russia and Norway are prime energy 
suppliers of Europe and they do not want to restrict their initiatives in the energy 
environment. However, Russia agreed to apply the Treaty to the extent that it was 
consistent with its own constitutions, laws and regulations. On 20 August 2009, the 
Russian Federation officially informed the Depository that it did not intend to become 
a Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty.
333 
Turkey is one of the signatories 
of the ECT, but due to having a transit country strategy, is curious about the 
realization of the international regime of the ECT. 
334
 
On one side, Turkey does not want to join the EU’s other initiative called the Energy 
Community of South Eastern Europe (ECSEE).
335
 The EU established ECSEE in 
order to create a common energy regime in South Eastern Europe, especially with 
Non-EU member states. While Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and UNMIK (Kosova) signed the ECSEE 
document,
336
 the Turkish government does not want to give any commitment to the 
ECT without being a member of the European Union. In addition, Turkey views the 
EU’s attitude from the critical geopolitical perspective that Turkey does not prefer to 
play a passive role in energy issues in the region. The major goal of the ECT is the 
                                                          
332
 Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat, Legal Framework for International Energy Cooperation (2004), 
accessed December 23, 2012, http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document 
/document1158668600.pdf#page=165. 
333
 “Turkey's Future Orientation in the Rapidly Changing Global Energy System,” Energy Charter 
Treaty Secretariat, (Secretary General André Mernier on 10 May to the Forum Istanbul 2007), accessed 
December 23, 2013, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=59&id_article=108&L=0. 
334
 “Russia's status with the Energy Charter,” Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat, 2004, accessed 
December 23, 2013, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18&L=0. 
335
 Energy Community, Turkey - Country Report 2006 (2006), accessed January 6, 2013, 
http://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/55845.PDF. 
336
 “Facts and Figures,” Energy Community, October 16, 2012, accessed October 16, 2012, 
http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME 
 135 
integration of SEE to the domestic energy market of the EU. Due to certain political 
and technical reasons, Norway, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are observers of the 
process, in a way similar to Turkey. 
337
 
5.3.2. Caspian Development Corporation 
As mentioned before briefly, the CDC was established in order to develop a 
mechanism to secure the gas demand and supply from the Caspian region. The EU 
Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review announced a commission report that 
the establishment of a CDC has been proposed by the European Commission on 13–
14 November 2008. The report introduces the concept of a CDC, which is defined as a 
gas purchasing company combined with an obligation to sell to others at ‘pass 
through’ or other prices.338 The CDC’s goals will focus on the development of 
Turkmen gas reserves and subsequent delivery of that gas to Europe through a 
dedicated infrastructure which was the Nabucco project in the Southern Corridor.
339
  
Even though Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are competitors in the view of the market 
and in the legal status of the Caspian Sea, Turkey can contribute to a convergence of 
mutual interest for both parties in entering the international energy market as either 
suppliers or transit countries. Turkey supports the possible scenarios of Caspian 
natural gas export strategies.
340
 The CDC concept has been reduced in priority due to 
lack of confident support from Caspian States and strong backing from the EU. 
5.3.3. The Failure of  Nabucco Pipeline Project Diplomacy 
Due to the EU’s natural gas demand dramatically increasing in the 2000s, the 
European Commission started to take necessary precautions for energy 
diversification. The most prominent precaution could be considered to be the new 
alternative pipelines to Russia, which are called the Southern Corridor. The Nabucco 
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Pipeline project is designed to realize the Southern Corridor concept with other 
pipeline options. 
In 2002 the project was first designed to start at the Georgian/Turkish border and 
finish in Baumgarten near Vienna, crossing Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. 
The pipeline was intended to carry gas from the Caspian Sea and Middle East to 
European markets, with an annual capacity of 31 BCM.
341
 The Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
International GmbH (NIC) launched with the proposal of the Austrian OMV and 
Turkish BOTAŞ energy companies OMV in 2002. After the signing of a protocol of 
intention between OMV, MOL, Bulgargaz, Transgaz and BOTAŞ in June, and a Co-
operation Agreement in October 2002, the NIC was founded on June 24, 2004 to 
construct and operate the Nabucco pipeline by Bulgarian Energy Holding (Bulgaria), 
BOTAŞ (Turkey), MOL (Hungary), OMV (Austria), Transgaz (Romania).342 The 
other commercial contract, a Joint Venture Agreement, was dated June 28, 2005. With 
the joining of the German RWE, the Nabucco project strengthened the consortium of 
leading European energy companies. Nabucco’s cost was estimated at EUR 7.9 billon 
(USD 9.96 billion).
343
  
The cost and length and starting sections of projects were always under discussion and 
challenging bottleneck points. For instance, in February 2011, it emerged that the 
pipeline would cost more and takes longer to complete than originally estimated. This 
was due to the international tension surrounding Iran’s controversial nuclear program. 
The Nabucco consortium decided to divert a stretch of the pipeline to Iraq instead, 
which would add a further 550 km. The project length was estimated at 3900 km with 
connections to the Turkish/Iraqi border.
344
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The main turning point in the Nabucco project was the signing of an 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) in Turkey in 2009, which increased project 
potential in the energy environment.
345
 In September 2010, the Nabucco project struck 
a preliminary deal for another USD 5 billion in loans from the World Bank, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). According to the commercial contract between companies, 
each of the parties holds a 16.67% stake in the project. The financing strategy of 
Nabucco would consist of 30% equity and 70 % debt financing by the International 
Financing Institutes (IFIs) i.e. lenders.
346
 
On the other hand, the controversial concept, challenging points, spiralling cost (up to 
15-16 billion Euros), lack of enough gas, tough decision processes on the board, 
falling gas demand in the EU and strong competition with South Stream (and the 
Turkish Government’s decisions on the permit for South Stream and joining to 
TANAP) resulted in shortening and withdrawal by Turkey. A new concept of the 
Nabucco Pipeline Project called Nabucco West that starts from the Turkish/Bulgarian 
Border and ends in Baumgarten, Austria was announced in May 2012 by NIC.
347
 It 
was dramatically declared by NIC that this announcement was made just one year 
later after strong Nabucco XL and robust Nabucco Prosperity Pipeline announcements 
of NIC for extension to Baku or even the Turkmen coast of the Caspian.  
The main reason behind the change of the concept of Nabucco occurred with the 
transit agreements between Turkey and Azerbaijan for Shah Deniz Phase II gas which 
were signed in October 2011 and December 2011. The Shah Deniz Phase II 
Consortium clearly opted for the BOTAŞ Grid and/or New Standalone Pipeline, 
which will be regulated, owned and operated by the consortium rather than the 
struggling and cost-overrun Nabucco Classic, which is owned and operated by transit 
and downstream countries’ companies. However, the base concept of Nabucco may 
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be theoretically still valid for future prospects. It is very unlikely to compete with 
TANAP.
348
 Due not to having commercial reliability and affordability, the Shah 
Deniz Phase II consortium did not choose the Nabucco and decided to launch the TAP 
option for transportation of Azeri natural gas on June 29, 2013. Hence, NIC had to 
announce its dissolution and closed its website and offices in January 2014. 
5.4. TURKEY AND AZERBAIJAN NATURAL GAS RELATIONS  
After the collapse of the Soviet system in the Caucasus, Turkish-Azeri relations have 
improved dramatically, especially in the energy sector through the signing of several 
oil and gas contracts, and mutual trust building and interdependence relations 
strengthen their economic and political relations. In this section, we focus on Turkey’s 
natural gas relations to emphasize the importance of Turkey’s energy diplomacy, 
which has already achieved some success such as BTC and TANAP. 
5.4.1. Azerbaijan’s Natural Gas Market and Export Routes 
According to WEO-2010, natural gas reserves of Azerbaijan are estimated at 1.4 
TCM — a major part of the natural gas is located in the Shah Deniz Field.349 The 
discovery of natural gas in the Shah Deniz field in 1999 and further development of 
the field made Azerbaijan a net exporter for the first time in 2006. Azerbaijan is no 
longer dependent on Russian gas exports, having the Shah Deniz gas consortium 
established by BP, as the operator, and SOCAR, Statoil (Norway), Total (France), 
Lukoil (Russia), OIEC (Iran) and TPAO (Turkey).
350
 The estimated cost for 
development and infrastructure at Shah Deniz Phase I is about USD 4.5 billion, and 
production started in 2006.
351
  
Azerbaijan became a net exporter of natural gas in 2006 with the start-up of the Shah 
Deniz natural gas field; previously it had been importing natural gas from Russia. In 
2010, Azerbaijan exported an estimated 6.7 BCM, mostly shipping it via the South 
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Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) or so called Baku-T'bilisi-Erzurum pipeline (BTE).
352
 In 
2011, Azerbaijan produced 14.8 BCM of natural gas and consumed 7.3 BCM.
353
 On 
March 25, 2002, the government issued Decree 893 on Strengthening of Financial 
Discipline in the Energy Sector.
354
 It set the goal of switching all thermal power plants 
to natural gas. Gas demand has increased in recent years to reach a level of 8.5 BCM 
in 2005. Almost half of it is for power generation, and the rest is shared between 
industry and the residential sector. Over the past thirty years, natural gas production 
has remained between 5 and 6 BCM annually.
355
 Most of Azerbaijan’s gas production 
is associated with offshore oil production (associated gas belongs to SOCAR), and oil 
production is on a very slow increase compared to previous expectations. Due to the 
inefficient infrastructure collecting natural gas from offshore oil fields, natural gas has 
been flared off.  
The Shah Deniz Phase I gas field has four wells, each producing 4 MCM per day 
delivered to the Shangachal terminal and then into the SCP. The annual production 
rate has increased to the capacity of 8.9 BCM in Phase I in 2011.
356
 According to IEA, 
the country’s gas production is projected to increase modestly by 2015 to around 20 
BCM, before increasing of production from 2018 as Phase II of the Shah Deniz field 
development. This is projected to bring total production to 36 BCM by 2025, of which 
about 23 BCM will be available for export. The remaining gas resources are expected 
to keep output moving steadily upwards, reaching 43 BCM in 2025.
357
 
5.4.2. Diversification in Azerbaijan’s Energy Market 
According to IEA, overall regional gas demand in the South Caucasus and southern 
Russia is projected to grow by roughly 23 BCM between 2005 and 2025.
358
 If 
Gazprom is willing to purchase gas from Azerbaijan at European prices, minus 
transportation charges (known as netback prices), it could purchase gas from Phase II 
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of the Shah Deniz project and pipe it north through existing infrastructure to southern 
Russia. In June 2009, Gazprom Chairman Aleksey Miller met with Azeri President 
Ilham Aliyev and offered to purchase Azeri gas at ‘market prices’ in a long-term 
contract. Gazprom reportedly defined market prices as the price of gas in Europe 
minus transportation costs and a ‘reasonable profit.’359 The Azeri-Russian deal was 
only about 1 BCM in 2009.
360
 However, all of the Shah Deniz Phase II gas will flow 
west to Turkey. This phase is expected to provide a plateau volume of 16 BCM a year 
(first gas in 2016 with a plateau in 2017/18).
361
 
On one side, due to ethnic unrest in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s border with 
Armenia remains closed, though the cease-fire between the two countries continues. 
To its southeast, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is separated from the rest of 
Azerbaijan. Due to tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Azerbaijan in late 2006 
began a swap deal with Iran that provides natural gas to Azerbaijan’s geographically 
separate Nakhchivan enclave. Azerbaijan ships natural gas into Iran via the Baku-
Astara Pipeline and Iran, then delivers the gas via a new 48 km pipeline into the 
enclave. Volumes were slated to rise to 350 MCM by 2009.362 Azerbaijan fully 
intends to become a major player and has tried to alleviate the region’s geopolitical 
tensions.  
5.4.3. Turkey-Azerbaijan Gas Agreement (October 25, 2011) 
Azerbaijan has achieved diversification of the energy market and become Turkey’s 
most promising source of new pipeline gas. In 2001, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a 
15-year agreement to supply the Turkish market with 2 BCM in 2006, rising to 5 
BCM in 2007, and reached the plateau level at 6.6 BCM from 2008.
363
 All of the gas 
from this stage of the project was consumed in Azerbaijan or exported to Georgia and 
Turkey, or re-exported from Turkey to Greece.
364
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With Turkey’s enthusiasm to diversify its gas supply sources by exporting gas from a 
country with which it has close ties, along with Azerbaijan’s desire to develop the 
Shah Deniz Phase I field with a feasible export solution, the sales of Azeri gas to 
Turkey have naturally become a part of the negotiations. Under the long-term deal, 
Turkey was able to get a price much more favourable than its other pipe-gas 
alternatives — that is, the Russian and Iranian gas. Although this price of USD 
120/1000 m3 was not considered ridiculously low at the end of the 1990s (when oil 
prices had been as low as USD 10/barrel), the gradual rise of oil and gas prices since 
then and, in particular, the massive price hikes in 2008, urged Azerbaijan to revise the 
price, in accordance with the contract terms.
365
 Within that context, Turkey also 
expressed its interest in receiving additional volumes from the Shah Deniz Phase II 
project, which is also closely eyed by the Southern Corridor project’s companies. 
Furthermore, setting the terms for transiting Turkey has been a pre-requisite in order 
to make progress in these projects, though Turkey expressly stressed its agreement 
with ‘cost-reflective’ transit tariffs. Eventually, the volume and price of Azerbaijani 
gas to Turkey and the transit conditions via Turkish territories and secondary 
conflicted problems (BIL, entry to Turkish Market, contract revision, etc.) have been 
taken up as a package deal and are considered by Turkey as a package. However, the 
negotiations did not progress as swiftly as expected, and the delay in the process 
brought about accusations against Turkey for blocking transit of Azeri gas, 
consequently restraining the progress in the European projects. In addition to this, 
within the context of Turkey’s ‘Zero Problems with Neighbours’ policy, the political 
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia made the relations with Azerbaijan even 
more complicated. Nevertheless, the MoU dated 7 June 2010 concluded between the 
two countries seems to have smoothed the complication. 
Azerbaijan and Turkey finally reached the strategic documents signed by the Minister 
of Industry and Energy of Azerbaijan, Natig Aliyev, and the Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources of Turkey, Taner Yıldız, as well as SOCAR President Rovnag 
Abdullayev, the President for the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Region of BP, and the 
Operator of the Shah Deniz field, Rashid Javanshir, and the General Manager of 
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BOTAŞ, Fazil Senel, in Izmir (Turkey) on October 25, 2011. The documents include 
an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) between the two countries; Gas Sales 
Agreements for the Shah Deniz Consortium for Phase II gas up to 6 BCM annually 
between SOCAR and BOTAŞ and also between the Azerbaijan Gas Supply Company 
(AGSC) and BOTAŞ International Limited (BIL); a Gas Transit Agreement for Shah 
Deniz Phase II gas up to 10 BCM annually between SOCAR and BOTAŞ; a 
Framework Agreement (FA), a General Terms & Conditions (GTC) between SOCAR 
and BOTAŞ, a Technical Cooperation Agreement between BP, SOCAR and BOTAŞ 
and Gas Contract Transfer Agreement between BOTAŞ and SOCAR Gas Turkey. 
The IGA and FA envision transit through Turkey either via an upgrade to the existing 
BOTAŞ transmission network or via the development of a standalone pipeline, Trans-
Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), across Turkey. The agreements provided a legal 
framework to regulate the sale of Shah Deniz Phase II gas to Turkey and its 
transportation to European markets through Turkey. The signing of these agreements 
will also allow the Shah Deniz Consortium to proceed with its European pipeline 
selection process, and to confirm gas sales agreements with potential customers. 
366 
 TANAP was selected by the Turkish and Azerbaijan Governments as well as Shah 
Deniz Consortium with the successive agreements signed on 31 December 2011 and 
26 June 2012 instead of the upgrading of the BOTAŞ Grid. Therefore SCPX 
(Upstream part) and TAP or Nabucco West (Downstream part) will be tied-in to the 
56” TANAP pipeline. 
Map 5.2: TANAP Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
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Source: TANAP 
5.4.4. South Caucasus Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) 
The South Caucasus or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline (SCP) has a 
length of 692 km which has been designed to transport gas from the Shah Deniz field 
in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea, through Georgia and on to the Georgia–
Turkey border.
367
 It was constructed in the same corridor as the BTC pipeline with a 
view to minimizing environmental and social impact and improving the pipeline 
economics and using the same integrated project team. Inside the Turkish territory, it 
is connected to the Turkish national gas grid at Erzurum.
368
 The pipeline feeds into the 
BOTAŞ-operated pipeline network to Erzurum. As mentioned above, gas 
transportation began in December 2006. The current capacity of the pipeline is 8.8 
BCM.
369 
The South Caspian Pipeline Expansion (SCPX) is being developed for 
additional westward gas export from Azerbaijan starting with Shah Deniz Phase II, or 
transit of gas from Turkmenistan. SCPX is 56” looping to the existing SCP line 
allowing a total capacity of over 25 BCM/year. SCPX will be interconnected to 
TANAP on the Turkey-Georgia border 
370
 
Map 5.3: Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline 
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Sources: SOCAR and BOTAŞ. 
The second stage of the Turkish natural gas transport strategy brings 15 or 25 BCM 
gas for the Southern Corridor and continues to expand the BOTAŞ Network (now 
TANAP) for Caspian gas to the Greek and Bulgarian borders via the Southern 
Caspian Pipeline (SCP - now SCP Expansion: SCPX).
371
 Currently, Turkey is 
receiving 6.6 BCM of Shah Deniz gas a year under Phase I. In addition, under the 
Shah Deniz Phase II agreement of October 2011, Turkey will receive 6 BCM for its 
domestic consumption and 10 BCM a year for transit to Greece and Bulgaria. 
If the TANAP project is not realized, those volumes will require upgrades to the 
company’s gas pipeline network before 2015. In future, thinking strategically, Turkey 
plans to build connectors to deliver Azerbaijani gas to Syria, Bulgaria, and Greece, as 
mentioned earlier. According to Turkey’s BOTAŞ’ medium term strategic planning, 
BOTAŞ expects transit deliveries of Phase II gas from Shah Deniz to begin in 2018–
2019, with volumes of Azerbaijani gas shipment increasing in 2020–2022 (including 
Shah Deniz Phase II, even Phase III according to the announcement of BP on March 
2013 of deep-lying horizons at Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli, Ümit field and the Absheron, 
Alov, Shafaq-Asiman and other structures) including the potential transport volumes 
from Iraq, Qatar and Turkmenistan. To substantiate this strategic plan, Shah Deniz 
Phase I covers extraction of 178 BCM of gas and 34 million tons of condensate. 
Production under Phase I is sold under contracts with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
and has seen construction of a 690-kilometre pipeline to Turkey (442 km in 
Azerbaijan and 248 km in Georgia). In addition to this, annual production under Phase 
II will total at least 16 BCM/year.
372
 
Even though Azerbaijan has a small capacity of natural gas, it plays an essential role 
as a starting point of the Southern Corridor. Thus, the Turkish-Azeri deals on June 7, 
2010 (MoU) and 25 October 2011 (IGA and GTA) provided the first Azeri gas for 
Turkish energy geopolitics from Shah Deniz Phase II.
373
. In particular, TANAP is 
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implemented for further Caspian volumes which can also be transported through 
Turkey.  
The main reason behind the change of the concept of Nabucco could have occurred 
with the transit agreements between Turkey and Azerbaijan for Shah Deniz Phase II 
gas signed in October 2011 and December 2011. The Shah Deniz Phase II 
Consortium clearly opted for the BOTAŞ Grid and/or New Standalone Pipeline, 
which will be regulated, owned and operated by the consortium rather than the 
struggling and cost-overrun Nabucco Classic which was owned and operated by 
transit and downstream countries’ companies. However, the base concept of Nabucco 
may be theoretically still valid for future prospects; it is very unlikely to compete with 
TANAP.
374
  
5.5. SOUTHERN CORRIDOR TOWARD SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
There are two major pipeline projects going through Turkey to Europe. As we 
mentioned above, the Shah Deniz consortium has chosen the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
for their own market strategy. Therefore, both Turkish and Azeri prefer to have more 
co-operative relations with Russia by not challenging Russia’s potential market in 
Central Europe, which the Nabucco pipeline project was targeting. 
5.5.1. Trans-Adriatic Pipeline  
The TAP project is one of the three projects under development within the Southern 
Gas Corridor that relies on gas supplies mainly from the Caspian region crossing 
Turkey. The pipeline, 520 km in length, will begin its route in the Greek city of 
Thessaloniki, crossing Albania before running across the bottom of the Adriatic Sea 
for 115 km to Brindisi in Italy.
375
 TAP will initially have a capacity of 10 BCM; 
however, its transportation capacity can be expanded to 20 BCM. The TAP offers the 
shortest pipeline link in the so-called Southern Gas Corridor, and competes with the 
ITGI pipeline project. In addition, TAP offers an underground storage facility, which 
it is currently investigating in Albania, as well as reverse flow capability of up to 8.5 
BCM that will ensure that countries in the South East European and Balkan region 
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will be in a position to secure the energy they require.
376
 
After the preliminary feasibility studies were concluded, the project was recognised 
by the EU as a Project of Common Interest (Trans-European Networks-Energy) and 
categorized as an EU interconnector in September 2006.
377
 However, Swiss EGL, 
who launched the TAP project, estimates that construction of the pipeline will cost 
about EUR 1.5 billion. The Albanian government in 2007 approved the pipeline 
routing. Geographical tie-in point was agreed with SNAM ReteGas in Italy in May 
2008. A petition on the transit, design, construction and ownership of an independent 
natural gas system was also submitted to the Greek authorities in June 2008.
378
 
Map 5.4: Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
 
Source: TAP. 
At the one end, the legal framework depends on the Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA) signed between Albania, Greece and Italy on February 2013, which constitutes 
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the main legal framework for the project. IGA provides the endorsement of the TAP 
at a high political level and shows the commitment of Italian and Albanian 
governments to support implementation of the project. More specifically, the 
agreement confirms the status of the TAP as a project of EU Interconnection and 
allows it to continue with various application procedures to the Italian authorities. 
Additionally, a MoU was signed between Switzerland and Turkey on November 5, 
2009, and between EGL and BOTAŞ on May 2011, for setting up conditions of gas 
transit through Turkey.
379
 With the first document, transfer of Iranian natural gas to 
Switzerland via Turkey is envisaged, and the TAP project is specifically mentioned in 
this context. The MoU and Co-operation agreement was signed between the TAP and 
the Albanian Government in May 2010.
380
 This created an aligned framework for 
TAP and the Government in respect of the various inter-governmental and Albanian 
host Government discussions relevant for the TAP project. In addition, the MoU 
acknowledged the time schedule associated with meeting first gas requirements from 
Azerbaijan.  
Since the beginning, the business structure of the project has been supported by two 
major shareholders, including an equal partnership and interest in developing, 
building and operating the pipeline. On February 13 2008, Statoil-Hydro, which is a 
shareholder and commercial operator of the Shah Deniz consortium, joined the project 
by purchasing 50% of the shares in TAP AG from EGL. On May 20, 2010, E.ON 
Ruhrgas became the third shareholder in the project.
381
 Accordingly, the new 
shareholder structure comprises of BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), Statoil (20%), Fluxys 
(16%), Total (10%), E.ON (9%) and Axpo (5%).
382
 In February 2012, TAP was 
selected by the Shah Deniz Consortium as the southern option.
383
 If the Shah Deniz 
Phase II gas is marketed to the Italian market, TAP is selected as the pipeline that will 
be filled with Azeri gas. Moreover, in September 2012 Albania, Greece and Italy 
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signed a MoU in order to support the realization of TAP.
384
 TAP Company also 
introduced IAP (Ionian Adriatic Pipeline), WBR (West Balkan Ring) and Greece-
Bulgaria interconnections for feeding the entire Balkan market. 
5.5.2. Interconnector Turkey- Greece- Italy 
The Inter-connector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) could be considered as the southern 
section of the South Corridor linking Greece to Italy. It is a project led by the Italian 
company Edison. The project was planned to deliver Caspian and Middle East gas to 
Europe via Turkey.
385
 Like the other Southern Corridor pipelines, the EU has 
supported the ITGI for gas supply security. The pipeline consists of three sections: 
Inter-connector Turkey-Greece (ITG), Inter-connector Greece-Bulgaria, Inter-
connector Greece- Italy. 
Map 5.5: Interconnectors From Turkey to Italy 
 
Source: Interfax. 
ITG is a 297 km-long natural gas pipeline, which connects the Turkish and Greek 
national gas grids. The Turkish section starts in Karacabey in Turkey and runs to 
Komotini in Greece. The length of the Turkish section is 210 km, of which 17 km is 
under the Marmara Sea. The length of the Greek section is 86 km. The 26 BCM in the 
pipeline has the capacity of 7 BCM of natural gas. By 2012 the capacity had been 
expanded to 11 BCM, of which 8 BCM will be delivered to Italy after the Greece-
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Italy pipeline becomes operational.
386
 The realization of Inter-connector Turkey–
Greece (ITG) (together with supply of gas from Turkey to Greece) is based on the 
Intergovernmental Agreement between Greece and Turkey dated 23 February 2003.
387
 
Turkish BOTAŞ and Greek DEPA currently operate the ITG section of pipeline.  
The Greece–Italy pipeline will be more than 807 km, of which 590 km will be 
onshore pipeline in Greece and more than 217 km will be laid on the Adriatic seabed. 
The pipeline will be connected to the Turkey–Greece pipeline at Komotini and will 
run to Igoumenitsa, Thesprotia. The offshore section (Poseidon pipeline) will go from 
Igoumenitsa to Otranto in the Apulia region in Italy.
388
  
Concerning the development of the Inter-connector Greece–Italy (IGI), an 
Intergovernmental Agreement was concluded between Greece and Italy on 4 
November 2005. Finally, the Intergovernmental Agreement among Italy, Greece, and 
Turkey regarding the development of the Turkey–Greece–Italy Transportation 
Corridor was signed on 26 July 2007, covering an additional 15% discounted gas 
offtake to Turkey over netback price.389 However, the agreement for the construction 
of a connector (Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria or IGB) between companies was in 
March 2010. Finally, the framework for transit agreement was signed between Italian 
energy company Edison, Greek energy company DEPA, and Turkish company 
BOTAŞ, on 17 June, 2010.390 This Memorandum of Understanding defines the 
general terms and conditions for the gas transit for the ITGI Project through Turkey, 
including the use of Turkey’s existing domestic pipeline system. 
As an extension of projects, the IGI will establish the link between Greece and Italy 
— the so-called Poseidon pipeline. The project is under development by IGI Poseidon 
SA, a joint venture between Edison and Greek company DEPA. IGI also involves the 
onshore section in Greece and the offshore section to Italy (planned for 2015). 
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Poseidon aside, other efforts to build ITGI include the realization of the Inter-
connector Greece-Italy (IGI), which comprises a 600 km pipeline through Greek 
territory. The initial capacity of the Poseidon pipeline will be divided into Exempted 
Capacity that is equal to 1.015 MM CM per hour (approximately 8 BCM) and Open 
Season Capacity to be determined through the Open Season procedure. The ITGI-
Poseidon is among the Southern Gas Corridor Projects included in the European 
Recovery Plan with EUR 100 million. Accordingly, the EU agreed to finance the 
construction costs up to 45 million (more than 30% of its cost). The total project cost 
and transportation is estimated at USD 1.3 billion — ITG: USD 300 million, IGI-
Greece: USD 500 million and IGI-Poseidon: USD 500 million. Additionally, the IGB 
(160km) was proposed as a branch of the ITGI to Bulgaria, known as Stara Zagora-
Komotini, and partly financed from EU funds. The IBG will have a transportation 
capacity of 3-5 BCM/year.
391
 
As mentioned before the first natural gas that will fill the Southern Corridor Projects 
will be produced in Shah Deniz Phase II, the consortium announced that the ITGI 
project had been eliminated from the options in 2012.
392
 Therefore the ITGI project 
could be possible when new natural gas transport opportunities (South Stream 
southern branch, EastMed Gas via Greece, other non-Caspian options) emerge, then 
ITGI would become an option again. 
5.6. TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS TRANSIT STRATEGY  
According to BOTAŞ Gas Master Plan 2030, Turkey could transport 150 BCM gas 
volumes on the Anatolian Gas Corridor.
393
 Turkey has already a well-diversified 
domestic pipeline system, which is currently receiving gas from three different 
sources. One is Russian sources that deliver inlet points via Thrace and the Black Sea. 
The other two, Azerbaijan and Iran, also sell their gas to Turkey. Hence, Turkey is 
naturally viewed as a ‘Natural’ or ‘Physical’ Gas Hub Centre and competitive sources 
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from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions are the foundation of Turkey’s Southern 
Corridor strategy. Levent Özgül, strategy and business development manager at 
Turkey’s BOTAŞ, the state pipeline company, outlined Turkey’s energy profile and 
its capacity in his outstanding conference paper which was presented in Baku on April 
18, 2011. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he clarified the potential of Turkey’s 
domestic capacity for transportation of Caspian gas. He added that Turkey has more 
than 12,000 km of high pressure domestic pipeline system, which has 340 MW 
installed capacity in eight compressor stations, and has well-defined and well-
regulated Entry-Exit points. He claims that the pipeline system has 85 BCM/year 
physical maximum throughput capacities on gas inlet/entry points if further upgrades 
were performed, but it was only designed for 58.2 BCM current gas receiving design 
capacity as well as having further bottlenecks for transportation from east to west due 
to the lack of investment on the pipeline routes.
394
 According to CERA 2010 reports, 
BOTAŞ would have the lion’s share of gas trade (at 90%) and control 38 BCM gas 
transportation. At the moment, the Turkish pipeline network could not transport much 
more than 12 BCM per year of Caspian or Middle Eastern gas across Turkey to 
Europe due to domestic demand increasing, which is further limiting Turkey’s ability 
to act as a transit state.
395
 The Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Ministry has 
drawn up Turkish natural gas transit strategy in three stages. According to long term 
strategic planning submitted by Levent Özgül, Turkey’s main target is to transport 35 
BCM — 50 BCM to Europe.  
Turkey has two LNG terminals, of which only one of them is available for 
Qflex/Qmax, and 535.000 m
3
 LNG total storage capacity. However, the technical and 
energy policy of BOTAŞ has not enough capacity to operate the Southern Gas 
Corridor by using the domestic pipeline system.
396
 Hence, the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources introduced three stages of the country’s national energy strategy, 
short-term, medium-term and long-term strategies. 
5.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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Turkey is one of the significant players in the formation of the Southern Gas Corridor. 
Turkey’s natural gas transit strategy is not competitive with the Russian South Stream. 
Turkey’s constructive relations with Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan will help to establish 
confidence building between natural gas producer and consuming countries. By doing 
this, Turkey is becoming an attractive option for the pipelines and other energy 
projects. Turkey supports interconnecting pipelines in the Southern Gas Corridor in 
order to create interdependencies among supplying and demanding countries in the 
region.  
Turkey stands equal to all possible projects which serve to enhance the EU’s energy 
supply security. Turkey has the ability to expand Mature Trunk line capacity 
interconnections with most major pipelines serving the Turkish energy grid and 
expand the BOTAŞ domestic network with Caspian-Middle East and Europe gas 
networks. Turkey will manage to transport more gas from Azeri Shah Deniz Phase II. 
It is important to note that the transit strategy of Turkey could be replaced with the 
realization of TANAP in which the BOTAŞ network would not need to be upgraded. 
Moreover Turkey has a bigger perspective to attract gas from other resources to meet 
its growing demand and the extra capacity could be transported through TANAP and 
other projects to Europe that have already made Azerbaijan the first gas supplier to 
the southern corridor. Despite not having enough supply sources, the Nabucco 
concept was considered to be the best option for the EU’s natural gas supply. The 
project was not politically and economically feasible to access Caspian, Middle East 
and Eastern Mediterranean sources. Turkish authorities believe that together with 
Azeri gas, the additional feeder of the Southern Corridor will be Northern Iraqi 
sources and Turkmenistan’s gas sources and Iranian and Qatari sources will be added. 
Hence, this thesis will present further options for the Southern Corridor and evaluate 
Turkey’s energy diplomacy capacity to realize those ambitions from which Turkey 
and the European Union would mutually benefit. 
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Chapter 6  
EASTERN ROUTES OF THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR: 
TURKMENISTAN AND IRAN 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the controversy over the status of the Caspian 
Sea between the five littoral states — Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and 
Azerbaijan — dominated regional energy politics. The root of this problem originates 
from uncertainty about the definition of the Caspian Sea (whether it is a ‘sea’ or 
‘lake’) under international law. The importance of the Caspian Region is that it has 
rich hydrocarbon sources, with proven reserves of conventional natural gas amounting 
to 13 TCM (without the new discoveries in Turkmenistan), or 7% of the world total. 
Remaining recoverable resources are much larger, at an estimated 26 TCM.
397
 
However, the production potential in the Caspian Region is still a controversial issue. 
Due to the lack of export infrastructure and capital investment the region’s gas 
resources have not yet been fully discovered.  
If the region opens up to the international market, the developments will generate a lot 
of projects to bring the flow of petroleum to Europe; however, most of them would 
avoid transfer through Russia. For instance, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have taken 
their own initiatives to diversify their energy trade due to disputes with Russia in the 
last decades. Hence, some difficulties between Russia and the Caspian states have 
apparently not been resolved; nevertheless, economic co-operation has increased a 
balancing of relations between parties. These up-and-down relations change gas 
supply contracts and create various joint ventures between some Russian oil 
companies and the Caspian states’ national petroleum companies. 
According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2010 calculations, marketed gas 
production in Caspian countries has dramatically increased (from around 188 BCM in 
2008, and estimated to reach 260 BCM in 2020). It seems that gas demand of Caspian 
countries is less than production, contributing to the region’s net export figures. 
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According to BP, in 2011, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
produced 14.8 BCM, 19.3 BCM, 57 BCM and 59.5 BCM of natural gas, 
respectively.
398
 Moreover it is estimated that total net exports will be 100 BCM in 
2020 and 130 BCM in 2035.
399
 
For the Southern Corridor, it is important to note that Turkmenistan is the key long-
term supplier country. Kazakhstan has the potential to join this corridor as another gas 
supplier to Europe with its conventional and unconventional gas resources that are so 
far unexploited due to oil priorities. Additionally, Uzbekistan can also be added as a 
possible contributor to the Southern Corridor going through Turkey. These countries 
are landlocked by the two hydrocarbon rich countries, Russia in the North and Iran in 
the South, and looking possibly as much eastward as westward for their oil and gas 
exports. However, the uncertainty about energy governance and the complexities of 
financing for constructing pipelines through several countries is a major barrier to 
their development.  
There are two other regions playing a key role in transportation of energy from the 
Caspian Sea; the Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus. Compared to the Caspian Sea, 
despite being geopolitically important for transport of oil and gas, the natural 
resources of the Black Sea have not been discovered yet. Turkey is more confident 
that the Black Sea is classified as international water, which is naturally divided 
between littoral states. At the one end, the Southern Caucasus is more problematic due 
to ethnic unrest and civil war in Georgia and Azerbaijan, which forces Turkey to 
follow more diplomatic policies towards the region, especially since the JDP 
government’s coming to power in December 2002. As a result of more balancing 
policies, Turkey left behind the scepticism towards Russia and Iran and then 
successfully managed to launch strategic projects such as Blue Stream with Russia 
and the Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline with Iran. In this framework, the other two projects 
have been under way: the South Caspian and Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline 
Projects.  
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This chapter investigates the role of the two countries’ (Iran and Turkmenistan) 
pipelines for Turkish energy trading strategy and the certainties and uncertainties 
regarding the pipeline project reaching Turkey from the Caspian and Black Sea 
regions. In fact, in comparison to the Persian Gulf, Turkey has got direct access to the 
Caspian Sea energy sources by joining pipeline consortia and oil and gas pipeline 
projects. Geopolitically thinking, Turkey is located in a place between Europe and 
Asia; however, this geopolitical condition has inspired Turkey to introduce itself as an 
energy trader and hub country between these supplier and demanding countries of 
EU-28. Turkey has already gained great credibility as an energy transit country in the 
energy environment. However, there are still many conflicts between Turkish and EU 
energy policies. Hence, this thesis also explains the European initiatives of the 
Caspian Development Corporation and Turkey’s energy regime. Consequently, it will 
give a great depth to discussions of the contingencies and certainties of the pipeline 
politics between Caspian Sea states and Turkey. The general argument of this chapter 
is that Turkmen gas deposits are more essential sources of the Southern Corridor to 
Europe, while both Azerbaijan and Iran are viewed as ‘transit countries’ for the 
Turkmenistan natural gas sources. Moreover, the additional natural gas supplies from 
Turkmenistan could feed the spare capacity of TANAP and TAP if possible. 
6.2. THE CASPIAN SEA DISPUTE 
“Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, a dispute began over the maritime 
borders of the Caspian Sea. The fact is that there is no consensus for common use or 
equal share among the littoral states. Hence, it is not governed by a condominium 
system, even though the littoral states ratified Treaty-1940 between Soviet Union and 
Iran in 1991.”400 Turkmenistan, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, the littoral 
states surrounding the Caspian Sea, have yet to come to an agreement over the 
borders. “The dispute essentially revolves around whether or not the Caspian has the 
legal status of a lake or an inland sea; the former implying that the waters should be 
divided out in their entirety in proportion to coastline length, and the latter denoting 
that there should be a central area of the Caspian which has international status.”401 
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“Turkmenistan's dispute with Azerbaijan over the Serdar/Kapaz field in the southern 
Caspian is one example of how the lack of agreement on maritime borders has kept 
fields from being developed. Azerbaijan has chosen to proceed with hydrocarbon 
resource exploitation in its national sector of the Caspian regardless, having recently 
drilled the deepest gas well in the waters at its Shah Deniz field. Turkmenistan will 
need to strike a deal with Azerbaijan on their maritime border in the Caspian before 
any subsea pipeline linking the two countries is built, and even then Russia and Iran 
may raise objections if there still is no multilateral agreement on the division of the 
sea’s resources and its legal status. A resolution to the dispute is still a long way off; 
however, until then Turkmenistan will be deprived of its proposed new export 
route.”402 
6.3. PIPELINE POLITICS IN THE REGION 
There are four pipeline options for Caspian Sea oil and natural gas exports: namely 
North–Northwest (Russia), Westbound (Georgia and Turkey), Eastbound from 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China, and Southbound (Iran). Some scholars claim 
that the ‘Great Game’ between the great powers and the regional powers has also been 
played out in pipeline politics and their relative gain in the oil and natural gas 
consortia in Caspian Sea resource management. The exclusion of Russia and Iran 
from the Baku–Ceyhan petroleum consortium in 1994 was an important Turkish 
challenge against Iranian and Russian initiatives in the Caspian Sea.
403
 Additionally, 
Turkey managed to complete building of the Blue Stream pipeline with Russia and the 
Tabriz–Erzurum gas pipeline with Iran. In the sense that Azerbaijan’s oil was the 
centre of energy exploration and transportation disputes while Kazakhstan–
Turkmenistan’s hydrocarbon sources are larger than the Azeris’, and mostly rely on 
the Russian transportation system. Turkmenistan, a fairly small and isolated country, 
has been mostly ignored in the European energy environment; however, it is 
purported to have the fourth largest natural gas deposits in the world. What we 
consider here is that Iran is one of the best options for transportation of Turkmen gas 
to the Southern Corridor. If nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US reach some 
                                                          
402
 Ibid. 
403
 Ahmet Özturk, “Management of Trans-boundary Mega-projects in the Post-Cold War Eurasia: The 
Case Studies of GAP Water and Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline Projects” (unpublished Ph.D diss., Keel 
University, 2006).  
 157 
success, Iran will be entering the global energy market. We will explain in the 
following section what huge capacity of natural gas Iran has. Consequently, it 
supports our argument that Iran will be either a transit country for Turkmenistan gas 
or one of the biggest feeders of the Southern Corridor. Since the beginning, Iran-
Turkmenistan relations have been friendly and more co-operative in the Caspian Sea 
region. In order to explain the importance and export capacity of Turkmenistan, this 
chapter outlines both Turkmenistan’s and Iran’s natural gas profile in the following 
sections. 
6.4. THE FIRST EASTERN OPTION FOR THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR: 
TURKMENISTAN 
Despite on-going discussions about the exact size of Turkmen gas reserves, the 
country has undoubtedly significant gas resources — the highest in the whole region 
after Russia. Further exploration offshore in the Caspian Sea should further add to 
reserves in the future.
404
 The majority of reserves are located in the east (72%); 
however, there are also sufficient reserves in the west (28%) of Turkmenistan. In BP’s 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, it is declared that Turkmenistan’s proven 
natural gas reserves are 17.5 TCM.
405
 According to BP, the proven reserves of 
Turkmenistan were 2.3 TCM in 2002.
406
 The reason behind this incredible increase of 
reserves is the new giant discoveries of natural gas fields in recent years. The largest 
natural gas fields are in the Amu Darya basin, with perhaps half of the country’s 
natural gas reserves located in the giant Dauletabad-Donmez field. In addition to Amu 
Darya, Turkmenistan contains large natural gas reserves in the Murgab basin, 
particularly the giant Yashlar deposit. During the last ten years, Turkmenistan has also 
discovered seventeen new natural gas deposits in the Lebansky, Maryinsky, and 
Deashoguzsky regions of the country.
407
  
There was a speculative dispute in the Gaffney, Cline and Associates’ (GCA) report 
on the estimation of Turkmenistan’s South Yolotan-Osman gas fields (renamed as 
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Galkynysh), one of the world’s largest. The consulting firm’s low estimate for the 
field was 4 TCM, and the high estimate was nearly 14 TCM.
408
 The optimum estimate 
of 6 TCM would make Galkynysh one of the five largest gas fields on earth. It would 
also make it approximately five times larger than the Dauletabad gas field, previously 
believed to be Turkmenistan’s largest, with 1.4 TCM.409 However, the Russian 
newspaper Vremya Novostey criticised the report as GCA did not actually produce 
their own data but based their estimations on the same possibly spurious Turkmen 
data.
410
 “The World Energy Outlook 2009 of IEA report evaluated the new 
discoveries in the Galkynysh and Yashlar fields as the most significant reserve 
reappraisals, amounting to over 6 TCM. However, the problem for Turkmenistan is 
that the areas are not linked by pipelines and serve different markets. Therefore, the 
East-West Pipeline project is an important one to connect the east and west of 
Turkmenistan.”411 
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Map 6.1: Gas Fields and Pipeline Infrastructures in Eastern Turkmenistan 
Source: CERA 
The IEA, in its publication The World Energy Outlook 2009, projected that 
Turkmenistan will likely supply 2.4% of the world’s natural gas production in 2007-
2030.
412
 The production of natural gas in the four Caspian producers (Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is projected to grow from 180 BCM in 
2008 to almost 220 BCM in 2015 and 310 BCM in 2030, making a significant 
contribution to production growth in Eurasia.
413
 
“Natural gas reserves in Turkmenistan are more than sufficient to support an 
expansion in gas production and export in comparison to the other Central Asian 
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countries.”414 In 2011 Turkmenistan has produced 59.5 BCM in 2011, while it was 
only 36.4 BCM in 2009 and the domestic consumption was 22.5 BCM in 2011.
415
 On 
the other hand Turkmenistan’s total gas exports were 34.6 BCM in which Russia 
imported 10.1 BCM, Iran imported 10.2 BCM and China imported 14.3 BCM.
416
 
“Due to free consumption in the domestic market of Turkmenistan, the country has 
had the fastest consumption growth in the region, averaging 16.1% annually from 
2000 to 2006, as compared with 6.3% per year for the rest of Central Asia.”417 “The 
Turkmenistan government has ambitious targets to raise production to 250 BCM per 
year by 2030, of which 200 BCM would be exported. Turkmenistan’s total revenue 
from gas export in 2008 was USD 6.2 billion in 2009, and this is the main source of 
Turkmenistan public sector spending.”418 
“Russia provides the route to market for over 85% of the gas exported from 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This dependency relationship between 
Russia and Central Asian natural gas suppliers has become a major source of 
contention on the pricing issue when European gas demand is weak.”419 Turkmenistan 
was a substantial natural gas producer under the Soviet Union. However, after the 
country became independent, Turkmen natural gas became a competitor with Russian 
natural gas. Since Turkmenistan’s only natural gas export routes ran through Russia, 
Gazprom limited Turkmen natural gas exports. “As a result, Turkmenistan’s natural 
gas production sagged throughout the 1990s. Following the resolution of a pricing 
dispute with Russia in 1998 and the construction of an export pipeline to Iran, 
Turkmenistan's natural gas production began to climb steadily.” 420 
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Map 6.2: Existing and Possible Natural Gas Export Routes of Turkmenistan 
Source: EIA 
“It should be noted that although Turkmenistan has huge reserves, another key 
problem is how production will be mobilized. The current investment regime is not so 
conducive to foreign investment. International oil companies (IOCs) are allowed to 
have production sharing agreements (PSAs) only on offshore fields – which are not as 
attractive – while onshore fields are open to technical service contracts only.”421 On 
the other hand, China, as the new and strongest buyer of Turkmenistan gas, has 
heavily invested in Turkmen fields, secured some government-to-government 
supported PSAs (e.g. Bahtiyarlık field) on the right bank of Amu Derya and 
commissioned massive financing plans for the development of Galkynysh via the 
state-run CNPC. The geology of the Turkmen offshore section of the Caspian Sea is 
not as prospective as the Azeri side. Besides China, India and Pakistan are now new 
markets for Turkmen gas from the TAPI Project (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India Pipeline). IGA, GTA and Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) 
were signed in 2012. 
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6.4.1. Turkmenistan-Iran Natural Gas Relations 
Turkmenistan plans to increase gas sales to neighbouring Iran to 14 BCM after the 
building of the Devletuabad Serakhs-Khangiran pipeline in the east, which increases 
export capacity by 6 BCM a year. The two sides have also discussed the possibilities 
of further increasing supplies to Iran to 20 BCM. The capacity of the Korpedje-Kord 
Kuy pipeline in the west will reach at least 14–14.5 BCM, from the current capacity 
of 8 BCM. Iran could be a transit territory for Turkmen gas to Turkey by using the 
existing natural gas pipeline, which could be expanded to 27 BCM transport capacity: 
Turkey is only buying 8 BCM from Iran, which will increase to 10 BCM. It is 
important to note that the Turkmenistan–Iran trade from the western pipeline is 
equally balanced, 8 BCM from Turkmenistan to Iran and 8 BCM from Iran to 
Turkey.
422
 
“In conclusion, Turkmenistan’s role in supplying gas to China and Iran will grow this 
decade. China met 4.6% of its natural gas demand with Turkmen supplies in 2010, 
increasing to nearly 15.4% in 2015. Iran will also depend heavily on Turkmen gas 
imports during 2010–15, with almost all new Iranian gas projects, especially in the 
South Pars, delayed.”423 “The high dependency on Turkmen gas in China and Iran 
will allow Turkmenistan to set a price in line with European market prices for these 
countries. High-priced Turkmenistan gas will signal to other Central Asian gas 
producers, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to expect a higher value for their gas 
in Asia as well, prompting them to set higher gas prices on any potential export 
projects.”424 
“It is clear that the new export plans and agreements have changed the geopolitical 
power balance in the region. While China and Iran have strengthened their positions, 
Russia struggles, and the West is losing. At the one end, the strategic engagement of 
Russia and China in the region serves their geopolitical interests, which rejects the 
unipolar world under US domination. In the Caspian Sea region, their interests in the 
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region will not clash as long as China’s main priority remains economic and Russia’s 
political.”425  
6.4.2. The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project 
The project was promoted by PSG International, which was formed by Bechtel 
Group, General Electric and Shell jointly. The pipeline was estimated to cost USD 2.8 
billion. No information is publicly available concerning the estimated transportation 
tariffs.
426
 The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) is a proposed underwater pipeline 
between Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan and Baku in Azerbaijan, possibly with a 
connection to the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. It is noted that Turkmen gas, possibly 
together with Kazakh gas, through TCGP would further be shipped west through 
Georgia and Turkey via the South Caucasus Pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor, 
in particular the Nabucco pipeline. As the pipeline aims at bypassing Russia, the 
project received strong support from the USA and Europe but was nonetheless 
difficult to implement without a strong intervention by the consumer countries of the 
West.  
The Presidents of the Republic of Turkey and Turkmenistan signed a Framework 
Agreement on October 29, 1998 for the implementation of the Turkmenistan–Turkey–
Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project. According to this Agreement, 30 BCM of 
Turkmen gas would be transported through this pipeline, with 16 BCM being supplied 
to Turkey and the remainder to Europe.
427
 The following year, on May 21, 1999, a 
Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement valid for thirty years was signed by 
BOTAŞ and the Competent Body for the Use of Hydrocarbon Resources of the 
President of Turkmenistan, starting in 2002, and further to Europe at a later stage. The 
pipeline was to carry 16 BCM of Turkmen gas to Turkey and 14 BCM to Europe 
annually. The 1592-km-long Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline was planned with a capacity 
of 30 BCM.
428
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The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline was seen by the west as a means to ending Russia’s 
monopoly over gas export routes from landlocked Caspian and providing the EU 
markets with an alternative to Russian gas.
429
 The US considered the project as a 
means of isolating Iran. The project was heavily criticised by Russia and Iran, who are 
also resource owners. Russia claims that any gas or oil pipelines across the floor of 
the Caspian Sea would be environmentally unacceptable.
430
 Russia has also taken the 
legal position that a potential pipeline project, regardless of the route it takes on the 
seabed, would require the consent of all five Caspian littoral states in order to 
proceed. Iran has pointed out that treaties signed by Iran and the Soviet Union in 1921 
and 1940 are still in force and that any action taken without the consent of all the 
littoral states would be illegal.
431
 
Map 6.3: Caspian Offshore Gas Fields 
Source: CERA 
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On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have bilateral and littoral problems 
with the Caspian Sea. The capacity allocation of Azerbaijan caused second thoughts 
about sharing the pipe capacity after discovery of the Shah Deniz gas field, making it 
difficult to agree with Turkmenistan on capacity allocations for the pipeline by asking 
for a larger share in the pipeline capacity. In addition, there were payment and price 
issues. Turkmenistan demanded an advance payment, which was found unacceptable 
by the potential investors. Secondly, the absence of a legal framework governing the 
use of the Caspian Sea made the project unfeasible.
432 
However, there are some 
significant new efforts to materialize the project. For instance, during 2007 and 2008, 
new steps have been taken by many Western actors to revive the project as well as 
gain access to gas fields that might feed into the pipeline. However, no concrete 
results have been achieved. In the meantime, Turkmenistan focused on developing 
alternative projects, such as the Caspian Coastal Pipeline with Russia and Kazakhstan 
(that would reinforce Russia’s control over Turkmenistan’s exports, though the 
project seems suspended at present) or the Turkmenistan-China pipeline (which is 
now already operational).
433
 
In December 2008, OMV and RWE established the Caspian Energy Company to 
assess options for the building of a Trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan, and to 
look for partners for a project which would build and operate such a pipeline. When 
Turkmenistan stressed in a statement on April 4, 2009 that it wished to see new routes 
developed that constituted the shortest and most convenient routes to market, hopes 
were raised again for revitalizing the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
434
 
Today, three possible options are considered for bringing Turkmen gas to the Western 
markets: ‘transportation by pipeline’ joining Azeri and Turkmen offshore installations 
with a 60-km pipeline onshore link to Kazakhstan, to connect with a route to 
Azerbaijan; ‘transportation as LNG’; and ‘transportation as CNG’. It is a fact that the 
strong Russian opposition to the concept of laying a physical pipe on the Caspian 
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seabed makes the pipeline option problematic, and the other two options are currently 
too costly when the distance travelled is considered.
435
 
Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan-EU dialogue has been continued since 2011 to implement 
an IGA between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for development of the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline and Turkmen gas flow through Europe. Turkey is attending the meetings as a 
broker/mediator and observer state.  
6.5. THE SECOND EASTERN OPTION FOR THE SOUTHERN CORRIDOR: 
IRAN 
Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world with proven reserves of 
33.6 TCM.
436
 Two-thirds of Iranian natural gas reserves are located in non-associated 
fields and have not been developed.
437
 In 2011 Iran produced 151.8 BCM and 
consumed 153.3 BCM. Iran exported 8.4 BCM to Turkey and 0.7 BCM to Armenia 
and imported 10.2 BCM from Turkmenistan.
438
 Although Iran has immense reserves, 
the numbers prove that Iran is a net importer of natural gas. The main reason is 
considered to be the sanctions of the West. 
Whilst the Tehran government continues to be one of the largest crude oil and gas 
exporters in the world, they are facing many difficulties in finding and replacing crude 
oil and natural gas reserves due to the international economic sanctions that have been 
imposed in response to Iran’s secret nuclear program. Under the US Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA), US and non-US companies are discouraged from doing 
business in Iran. These sanctions have potentially blocked the involvement of foreign 
companies in the development of the South Pars gas field development projects. In 
2012, the EU governments imposed sanctions on Iranian state companies covering oil 
and natural gas sales.
439
 However, the rapprochement of Iran with the West in 2013 
has the potential to change this picture but a positive development for Iranian gas was 
not recorded in the international media. 
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On the other hand, Tehran governments are looking for partnerships with Eastern 
state-owned companies, such as CNPC, Indian Oil, ONGC, and Gazprom, to develop 
Iran’s under-invested oil and gas fields as European oil and gas companies withdraw 
from their operations in the country.  
Iran has also looked toward firms from India, China and Russia to take an increased 
role in Iranian natural gas upstream development. Iran’s buy-back scheme is 
considered insufficient for upstream investors, where foreign firms hand over 
operations of fields to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) after development 
against payment from natural gas production to cover their investment. Iran’s 
government policy is now focused on exploration and development of gas projects, 
substituting gas for oil products in the domestic market, increasing the share of export, 
utilizing gas in petrochemicals and other gas-based industries (including GTL); 
increasing the use of compressed natural gas in transport, investing in LNG 
production and reducing gas flaring.
440
 
6.5.1. South Pars Gas Development Projects 
Of this, over two-thirds of Iranian natural gas reserves are located in non-associated 
fields (such as South and North Pars, Kish and Kangan-Nar) and have not yet been 
developed. After South Pars, the most important gas field of Iran is North Pars, 
followed by the Agnar, and the onshore Nar-Kangan, Tabnak, Homa, Shanoul and 
Varavi fields.
441
 Although there are several other fields, which are currently online or 
in the development phase, most of their use is currently restricted to serve the 
domestic market and reinjection.  
The South Pars field, covering 3700 km
2, is the world’s largest offshore natural gas 
field. It falls within the Qatari and Iranian territorial waters in the Persian Gulf. 
Current estimates are that South Pars contains 8 TCM or more of natural gas, of 
which a large fraction will be recoverable.
442
 South Pars has already attracted around 
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USD 15 billion in investment; however, its development has been delayed by 
technical, contractual and political problems. The development of the South Pars gas 
field ranks high among Iran’s exploration and development projects. Although the 
Iranian authorities have chosen to develop this huge field through thirty different 
phases (each one of at least 10 BCM, some even 20 or 30 BCM), presently the phases 
of 28 need to be developed. At the moment, all the gas produced from the first 10 
phases will either be consumed domestically as final energy or will be used for 
reinjection for oil recovery. Further developments up to Phase 24 will be envisaged in 
Iran’s fourth five-year economic development plan, which is scheduled to be finalized 
in the future. However, two withdrawals from the South Pars Phases in May 2005 
(Petronas’ withdrawal from a joint venture with TOTAL to develop Pars LNG, and 
Aker Kvaerner’s withdrawal in June from the South Pars Phases 15-16, both in May 
2005) created some pessimism regarding the development of projects.
443
 Turkey 
would like be one of the investors in the South Pars gas field. In so doing, TPAO 
would develop Phases 22, 23 and 24 of South Pars and BOTAŞ would participate in 
the construction of the 1850-km IGAT-9 gas trunkline from Assaluyeh to Bazargan, 
close to the Turkish-Iranian border. However, they have failed to do so.
444
 It is 
important to note that Turkish TPAO and Iranian authorities sat at the negotiation 
table for the South Pars gas field development, but failed to sign a long-term 
agreement. There are two reasons behind this failure: UN economic sanctions and 
business risk for Turkish TPAO investment in Iran. Furthermore, the Iranian side did 
not allow any PSA agreement or any netback pricing mechanism and did not mitigate 
any compensation for insurance and financial risks. Turkish authorities complain that 
doing business in Iran is very difficult and non-profitable.
445
  
6.5.2. Iran’s Pipeline Infrastructure and Export Capacity 
Export infrastructure and projects of the Iranian transmission system, developed in the 
1970s, were designed to export about 10 BCM to the then-Soviet Union, through the 
IGAT I pipeline, which has a maximum transport capacity of 12 BCM. The Iranian 
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revolution put an end to this program, and the domestic system was progressively 
upgraded to feed the internal market. The domestic gas infrastructure mainly consists 
of two corridors. The main one from the Southern gas fields, near the Gulf coast, to 
the North comprises four pipelines (IGAT I, II, III and IV) for a total capacity of more 
than 100 BCM. The second corridor brings gas produced in the Eastern field of 
Sarakhs to the west and is also used to ship imports from Turkmenistan (up to 8 
BCM). The IGAT V, VI and VIII pipelines will reinforce the existing domestic 
network.
446
 
Iran has also built an east-west line to export gas to Turkey and Armenia (and 
possibly to Europe in the long term strategic planning). As we mentioned above, the 
current export capacity to Turkey is 10 BCM. Another main gas export pipeline 
project consists of building a 35 BCM gas line (IGAT VII) from Asaluyeh, in the 
south-west, towards the east to supply Pakistan and further to India (Iran-Pakistan-
India Pipeline – IPI). The SPA between Iran and Pakistan was finally signed in 2012 
and the kick-off meeting for construction was held in the first quarter of 2013 despite 
the massive pressure of the US for TAPI. There is also a project to build an offshore 
pipeline across the northern Gulf to supply Kuwait with 3 BCM. Finally, Iran also has 
important LNG export projects linked to the development of South Pars.
447
 
There are four liquefaction plant projects on the Persian Gulf coast near Kangan with 
capacities between 12 and 13 BCM each. If they all materialized, Iran would have an 
additional export capacity of 50 BCM in 2010.
448
 However, such timing and volumes 
remain rather uncertain given the increasing competition in the LNG business and the 
US embargo on Iran. It should also be mentioned that most LNG plants use processes 
developed by US companies. Two of these projects (Iran LNG and Pars LNG, with a 
total capacity of 25 BCM) would be used to export gas to East Asia, especially to 
India and China.
449
 The 13 BCM Persian LNG plant should be dedicated to Europe, 
while destinations for the 12 BCM NIOC LNG terminals remain open. On the other 
hand, all LNG investments have been postponed or delayed due to international 
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pressure and shortfall of finance. Planned Iranian export capacity (but not realized as 
of 2013) is shown in Table 6.1 by LNG and pipeline. 
Table 6.1: Iranian Gas Export Capacity (BCM) 
 2004 2010 2020 2030 
Pipeline 6.5 19 56 56 
To Turkey 6.5 14 20 20 
To Kuwait  3 3 3 
To Armenia  2 2 2 
To Pakistan/India   31 31 
LNG 0 24 50 50 
Pars LNG   20 20 
Iran LNG  12 13 13 
Persian LNG   13 13 
NIOC LNG  12 12 12 
TOTAL 6.5 44 106 106 
Source: ‘An Overview of Iranian Gas Industry’ National Iranian Gas Company, 2009. 
6.5.3. East Anatolian Pipeline to Turkey (Tabriz-Ankara) 
As some detailed information is given in Chapter 3 regarding Turkey’s imports from 
Iran, this section focuses on the pipeline system between Turkey and Iran and Iran’s 
relations with Turkey regarding the natural gas trade. The Iran–Turkey pipeline is a 
long distance natural gas pipeline, which runs from Tabriz in Northwest Iran to 
Ankara in Turkey. The Iran-Turkey pipeline was to be completed in 1999. However, 
due to political dispute between the two capitals resulting in delays, deliveries started 
only in 2001. 
The project started with the signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement between 
Turkey and Iran on August 30, 1996. However, since the beginning, the agreement 
has created a huge controversy between Washington and Ankara and the US 
government openly expressed their objections to the Turkish energy strategy. US 
officials tried to convince the Turkish government not to continue with the project. 
However, the Turkish policymakers were determined to diversify Turkey’s gas supply 
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and therefore went ahead with the contract. According to the 1995 US Iran Sanction 
Act (ISA), companies that make an investment of more than USD 20 million within 
one year in Iranian’s energy sector will be liable to sanctions. However, no sanctions 
were imposed on Turkey due to each country being responsible for the construction of 
its section of the pipeline, which meant that this could not be regarded as a Turkish 
investment in Iran. Furthermore, the US State Department did not impose ISA 
sanctions, on the basis that Turkey would import gas from Turkmenistan that would 
transit through Iran. 
The content of the agreement basically provided for the delivery of natural gas over a 
period of twenty-three years with exports of 4 BCM in 2002 rising to 10 BCM after 
2010.
450 
According to the Agreement, both countries were responsible for their 
respective parts of the pipeline: Turkey’s share includes the segment of the 1095-km 
pipeline from the Iranian border, plus other delivery costs to the point of consumption, 
and Iran’s share relates to producing gas and its own pipeline costs, including its 275-
km section of the pipeline. The project cost of the Turkish section and transportation 
reportedly amounted to USD 600 million; however, no information is publicly 
available concerning transportation tariffs.
451
  
6.5.3.1. Interruptions and Difficulties in The Iranian–Turkish Gas Trade 
Since the beginning of Iranian natural gas exports to Turkey, there have been ongoing 
disputes between the two sides about either the volume or the price of the gas. In 2002 
Turkey postponed Iranian gas imports due to lack of gas demand and gas storage 
capacity. The new Turkish government was not happy with the contract agreement of 
1996 and wanted to renegotiate the price and/or the take-or-pay terms of the contract. 
Both sides agreed on securing a lower price and reduction in take-or-pay.  
The renegotiated agreement provided for the following conditions: a price reduction 
by 9% with that percentage increasing proportionately with the quantity of gas 
purchased; if Turkey purchases the entire annual contract quantity, the reduction 
would be more than 12%; a decrease in the take-or-pay level, from 87% to 70% was 
achieved. In other words, if BOTAŞ does not purchase up to 30% of the annual 
                                                          
450
 “Gas Export Infrastructure in the Caspian Region and its Neighborhood: Today and Tomorrow” 
(OME Discussion Paper HC‐3/2010, July 2010). 
451
 Ibid. 
 172 
contract quantity, it will not be obliged to pay for the rest. The dispute over price 
continued during 2004, and the natural gas flow from Iran was cut off for four days 
during December 2004 because of ‘technical reasons’. Due to this ongoing dispute, 
Turkey once again halted deliveries of gas from Iran in mid-April, 2005.
452
 
Turkey tackled Iran over the price of natural gas in 2004 in the International Court of 
Arbitration (ICC), and also requested compensation for the unstable flow of natural 
gas into Turkey and the below-par quality of the gas. The case was decided in favour 
of Turkey in February 2009 with respect to the pricing aspects of the dispute. 
However, the court stated that the insufficient quality and the instability in the flow 
should be left for another case. Turkey may consider taking further steps against Iran 
at the ICC over the ‘take-or-pay’ conditions.453 In 2006, Iran cut off supplies to 
Turkey on 19 January due to cold weather in Tabriz. Turkey had to compensate by 
importing more from Gazprom through the Blue Stream pipeline. In September 2006 
and August 2007, supplies were once again interrupted when explosions three times 
on both sides of the border hit the gas pipeline. Turkey again compensated by 
increasing its imports from Gazprom through Blue Stream. In late December 2007 
and January 2008, Turkmenistan cut off gas deliveries to Iran which forced the latter 
to use its own gas for domestic demand and, in turn, led to an interruption in 
deliveries to Turkey.
454
 Turkmenistan claimed the interruption was due to technical 
problems and the need for emergency repairs. However, there has been speculation 
that the real reason was more due to a price dispute between Turkmenistan and Iran, 
with the latter refusing to accept what Turkmenistan regarded as a market price.  
As a result, Turkey halted deliveries to Greece, since the Azeri flows intended for 
Greece were used domestically. BOTAŞ also purchased LNG to make up the shortfall 
and used up to a third of its stored gas. Eventually, on 17 November 2008, Turkey and 
Iran signed a MoU on natural gas production and export. The document stipulated that 
Turkey would be involved in the development of the South Pars gas field and a 
proposed pipeline that would both deliver Iranian gas to Europe via Turkey, but also 
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supply the Turkish market.
455
 Reference is given to the possibility of Turkmen gas 
transiting Iran and Turkey to Europe. Like such foreign investors as Royal Dutch 
Shell, Spain’s Repsol, French Sofregaz and French Total, Turkey considered that the 
political situation in Iran made the country unstable for investments. Hence, Turkey 
withdrew some investment from Iran.
456
 Having Iranian gas recorded as the most 
expensive gas (~550$) in its import portfolio, BOTAŞ applied to ICC one more time 
for price revision in 2012.457 
6.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Based on the pipeline-specific data and information presented in the chapter, and just 
for illustration purposes, a comparison of four pipeline systems was made; this aimed 
to show the potential of Caspian Sea countries and the political difficulties of 
exporting gas to Europe. The comparisons, which are based on technical, economical 
and regulatory characteristics of the pipelines, take into account each of the pipelines, 
those already operational, and those at different stages of development.  
There were no projections given in this chapter in order to follow the rationale of the 
work; however, the analysis offered an insight into long-term supply contracts and the 
necessary investment for both parties. The question remains as to which transport 
option for the Caspian Sea region is feasible enough to attract the international gas 
companies’ investment in the region. Caspian energy producers wish to sell their oil 
and gas directly at market prices to have security and continuity of demand and to 
diversify their export sources and routes to maintain balanced energy geopolitics. 
They do not want the militarization of energy security nor to rely on one single 
foreign country poking its nose into their domestic affairs. Transit countries (Georgia, 
Turkey and Azerbaijan) also want to stimulate their interests in strengthening their 
bargaining positions with the West by becoming energy hubs, and to enjoy the 
economic benefits from the Azeri oil and gas production, which are expected to peak 
in the present decade. 
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Stern’s article offers five different scenarios on Turkmen gas export to the European 
energy market. The first scenario looks at the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, a 300 km 
shore-to-shore pipeline connecting Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan natural gas 
networks.
458
 The SCP, which has operated since 2007 with a 7 BCM capacity 
transporting gas from the Shah Deniz Phase I to Turkey, could be increased to a 
technical maximum of 20 BCM as SCPX expansion project to allow Azerbaijan to 
transport gas from the second Shah Deniz Phase II to the west through TANAP and 
then TAP. For any additional transit gas from Turkmenistan, SCPX or further 
expansion of that corridor is required to increase the transport capacity over 30 
BCM.
459
  
The second scenario needs technological advances that could be applied in the 
Caspian Sea. European companies have tie-in solutions for offshore transport between 
two platforms. A tie-in solution can interconnect Turkmen and Azeri gas production 
platforms using the existing offshore pipeline grid. The concept consists of the tie-in 
pipeline itself, and a subsequent landfall pipeline to the Azeri shore, which can draw 
on existing pipelines and routes. This solution through the Caspian Sea is seen as 
technically and economically the most realistic option in terms of implementation. 
The offshore connections between the two platforms could comprise more than 2,000 
km of oil and gas pipelines; however, this requires a solution to the problem of 
defining national sectors in the Caspian Sea. 
460
 
The third scenario uses the traditional natural gas transport solution of shipping gas 
across the sea in CNG and LNG vessels. LNG is clearly not economical due to the 
short distance of transportation, on the other hand the more feasible CNG is a new 
technology and an important challenging point for a massive investment decision for 
Caspian. The fourth scenario involves the rehabilitation and extension of the existing 
pipeline from Iran to the Turkish border and uses that to transport gas. European 
companies are still refraining from involving Iran due to the international political 
environment.  
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With the signing of the successive Turkey–Azerbaijan natural gas agreements in 
October 2011, December 2011 and June 2012 introducing TANAP, Ankara loudly 
repeated its goal of becoming a future ‘energy hub’ by allowing the creation of a 
Southern Corridor. This is one of the EU’s highest energy security priorities. While 
Azeri gas supply contracts with Russia and Iran are similar to the Turkish one,
461
 
Europe has not been ready to see Turkey’s new opening as an act of a regional power. 
Turkey gives unconditional support to most of the projects, sharing common interests 
of the Caspian region and EU countries, and applying EU laws on Turkish territory 
that would primarily serve EU interests; however, the EU has lacked long-term 
coherent policies on supply security. Turkey and the EU have failed to complete all 
the regulations in regard to thirty-five chapters of EU accession so far. Thirteen 
chapters, including energy, are still blocked by the EU commission, the self-interest of 
which should be served by Turkey’s new energy policy. For instance, European Co-
ordinator Van Aartsen defined Turkey’s role as an ‘interconnector’ and also wrote 
that Turkey should act as a bridge. He presumes that rather Baku, Romania, Greece 
and Italy have more potential to be energy hubs.
462
 In addition, some energy lobbies 
undermine Turkey’s geostrategic position in energy transport. Turkey’s development 
as a European energy hub is not a foregone conclusion; however, it is promising, 
given its lucky location between countries that harbour over 70% of the world’s oil 
and gas reserves to its east, north and south, and one of the world’s biggest energy 
markets to its west.  
On the other hand, Turkey’s role as a regional facilitator, its rhythmic diplomacy and 
‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy have helped improve its relations with 
neighbours, especially Armenia. In the Caucasus region, Turkey’s incentives 
increased following the ‘football diplomacy’ in September 2008, which helped in the 
creation of the Caucasus Stability Platform.
463
 However, this rapprochement does not 
affect Turkish-Azeri relations. The question remains as to how practical the protocols, 
which were signed by the Turkish and Armenian governments, will be in terms of 
developing a secure energy corridor from the Caspian Sea to the EU.  
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The chapter reached the conclusion that Turkmenistan has the necessary resources to 
provide Europe, Russia, Iran and China with gas. The main obstacle for Europe, 
unlike the other three export outlets, is the lack of a reliable transportation route. The 
only way that Turkmen gas can reach Europe is via Russia, Iran–Turkey, or 
Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey. This is the biggest challenge because both Russia and 
Iran will be unwilling to let their current and future domination of Turkish and 
European gas markets be captured, even in a small measure, by Turkmenistan. Hence, 
the option for transport via Turkey through Azerbaijan is the most desirable from a 
security of supply perspective. 
The main fact is that Europe will depend on Russian gas for many decades. The 
Heartland of energy geopolitics, to diminish Russian dominance in Europe (i.e. the 
Main Objective), will be based on accessing/paving the way and tapping for either the 
giant Iranian or Turkmen sources. Based on the recent global gas market conditions 
and geopolitics, with the severe pressure on the Iranian regime, exploitation and 
westward evacuation of the supergiant Galkynysh field could be considered as the 
eastern extension of the Southern Corridor.  
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Chapter 7  
SOUTHERN ROUTES OF THE SOUTHERN 
CORRIDOR: MIDDLE EAST AND EAST 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
After the Ottoman Empire’s withdrawal from the region, and the discovery of oil, the 
Middle East region — especially the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal 
— has become a key strategic location for the management and transport of 
hydrocarbon sources in the global and regional power struggle. Following the 
withdrawal of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf, an independent Arab Gulf Sub-
Security System emerged in 1971. As an aftermath of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, 
the importance of the region dramatically increased, and the rift created a new 
regional alliance against the rising threat to the Gulf Arab states — namely, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain — which came together to establish the 
Gulf Co-operation Council in 1981. Due to the Iran–Iraq war, there was a chance of 
Iraq being excluded from this regional co-operation. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was 
followed by the US-led war in 1991 against Saddam Hussein and the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 removed Saddam Hussein’s regime. Although war and instability have 
become a part of the oil- and gas-rich countries, the presence of the US’s proxy 
powers in the 1970s and its hard powers since the 1980s have successfully managed 
the risks to the energy trade.  
Due to the complex interdependency relations between the supplying and demanding 
countries, energy-related institutions such as OPEC have been established to develop 
an energy regime and pricing regulations. Consequently, the corporate states in the 
Middle East integrated with the global economic system. At a domestic level of 
analysis, the export dependency of the Middle Eastern states has created corporatist 
states, which restrict the power and rent distribution in Middle Eastern societies.
464
 
However, the post-colonial state structure, especially the Arab monarchies and the 
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authoritarian states in the Middle East, could not respond to the new societal 
dynamics of the Middle East anymore. Hence, the inception of the Arab revolution is 
a radical response of the Arab Street, triggered in Tunisia and expanded throughout 
the Middle East.
465 
Although there has been a huge impact of this political 
development on societal, regional and systemic levels, this chapter’s focus is on the 
gas pipeline projects of Turkey–Iraq, the Pan-Arabian and the possible Turkey–Qatar 
gas pipelines connecting Turkey with Europe. 
 
The new critical discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin 
introduce Israel, Cyprus and potentially Lebanon as other players in the energy 
market. After this groundbreaking discovery, Israel needs to consider energy sources 
management and a secure transport regime for south-bourne supply that will possibly 
be added to the southern section of the Southern Corridor. However, it needs a legal 
solution regarding the contesting claims on EEZs for license exploration from Turkey 
and Lebanon. 
Since the Post-Cold war, there have appeared threats to the territorial integrity of Iraq 
(due to the US-led invasion) and Syria (due to the catastrophic civil war), which 
influence the Justice and Development Party’s regional politics. Turkey pursues 
bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives, such as the Iraq’s Neighbouring 
Countries process or the High Level Strategic Co-operation Council between Iraq and 
Turkey. Turkish policy makers achieved some success in creating an interdependent 
relationship based upon energy co-operation through which political and security 
relations have also been stabilized not only with KRG, but also with the central 
government of Iraq. However, due to the military coup of General Sisi in Egypt, 
Turkey’s relations with Egypt are getting worse and that put an end to the Pan-Arab 
Natural Gas Pipeline project as a southern route option of the Southern Corridor. The 
uneasy relations with the Bashar Al-Assad regime also block the Pan-Arab Natural 
Gas Pipeline. On the one hand, Turkey’s worsening relations with Israel challenge 
Turkish Cyprus and put at risk Turkey’s initiative on uncertain maritime continental 
shelves issues in the international community. This argues that there is only one 
feasible option, which is basically that Iraq gas and oil will join to the southern route 
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of the Southern Corridor. Therefore, this chapter will basically explore Turkey’s 
capability to access Middle East and East Mediterranean natural gas sources to 
develop the southern section of Southern Corridor. 
7.2. MIDDLE EAST NATURAL GAS RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
Proved natural gas reserves in the Middle East were estimated at almost 80.5 TCM as 
of December 2012, accounting for almost 43% of world natural gas reserves.
466
 The 
region has nine super-giant oil fields, each exceeding 1 TCM of proved reserves, out 
of around twenty such structures in the world. The world’s largest non-associated gas 
field is in Qatar’s North Field. Many experts believe that the natural gas reserves in 
the Gulf have been underestimated, possibly to a large extent. In this context, a 
comparison of the ratio of oil reserves to gas reserves on a regional basis is very 
revealing. The Gulf might be a particularly ‘oily’ region, but should the average 
global ratio of oil to gas reserves be applied to the region, the potential for new gas 
discoveries is indeed vast.  
Although exploration of the Gulf hydrocarbons sources have been carried out for 
almost a hundred years, most of it has been heavily concentrated on crude oil rather 
than gas. As a result, gas discoveries have occurred accidently rather than by design. 
Indeed, gas discoveries in the past were often not given much value, and many wells 
encountered that had gas rather than oil were considered dry holes, or were not fully 
delineated or appraised. Vast quantities of gas have been located in the oil fields or 
accumulated in deep structures. Huge unconventional gas prospects in Saudi Arabia 
and exploration campaigns in Oman, the UAE, the unexplored Western Iraq Desert 
and Qatar are important possible resources in the Middle East. It is only in recent 
years that expeditions have been specifically carried out for discovering gas in various 
Gulf countries. This effort has involved drilling in previously identified but 
unexplored structures by using more state-of-art technology for exploring deep wells. 
Deep horizons promise to hold more gas reserves than oil, though it is this very fact 
that has discouraged the drilling of expensive deep wells in many countries in the east. 
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The average undiscovered resources in the Middle East are estimated at 36,000 
BCM.
467
 
7.2.1. Developments in Natural Gas Production and Consumption 
Since the mid-1970s, countries in the Gulf have made considerable strides towards the 
exploitation of their natural gas reserves, especially the associated ones. A number of 
important gas projects have subsequently been undertaken or are currently under 
construction or study. Apart from Qatar (and Iran, with which it shares South Pars) 
most of the gas produced in the region, still in associated form, is linked with crude 
oil, which is not expected to increase greatly beyond the current level in the 
foreseeable future. This implies serious constraints on domestic gas flows. The most 
significant gas-related developments in the Gulf are taking place in the UAE, Qatar 
and Oman, where petroleum industries have been less politicised and where foreign 
investment in petroleum projects has been permitted. However, after the recent 
sanctions on Iran, we expect Iraq and Egypt to become the gas exporter countries. 
Israel can be also added as a new player in the energy market. A considerable amount 
of gross gas production is used in the re-injection of oil fields. The re-injected gas is 
expected to continue to grow in the ageing oil fields, to extract which, enhanced oil 
recovery facilities are installed.
468
  
The major portion of marketed natural gas production in the Gulf is consumed locally 
without trading in a gas market and has been growing inexorably. The natural gas in 
the region is used in various vital and politically sensitive applications such as power 
generation, water desalination, industries and petrochemicals, gas-condensate 
recycling plants, oil reservoir uplift, enhanced oil recovery and gas-to-liquids plants. 
All these sectors are expected to continue growing vigorously. The policy of utilising 
natural gas domestically offers the advantage of reducing the local demand for oil, 
hence reserving a maximum share of crude oil production for export. This growth in 
gas demand, coupled with supply constraints, is resulting in an increase in gas deficit 
in most of the countries in the region, as well as a growing potential for gas trade 
within the area, where non-associated gas-rich producers can supply gas to the 
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countries or regions that are facing shortage of gas. The conclusion for the coming 
years is that only the Gulf countries with large non-associated reserves (Qatar and 
Iran) are the current candidates to become major gas exporters.
469
 
There are three regional natural gas pipeline projects that would be connected with 
Turkey — the Iraq–Turkey, Egypt–Turkey (also called the Arab) and the Qatar–
Turkey via Iraq–Turkey gas pipelines. It is essential to note that the Northern Iraq 
non-associated gas resource is considered as the most feasible and affordable source 
for Turkey’s medium- and long-term energy strategy. Although Qatar has the third 
biggest natural gas reserves, considering its huge investment in the LNG trade, the 
Qatar-Turkey pipeline connection is still under consideration although many 
challenging points exist. However, the Egyptian and Qatar options for Turkey’s 
energy strategy are far beyond the natural borders. 
7.2.2. The First Potential Southern Option for the Southern Corridor: Iraq 
BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy (2013), estimates that Iraq’s proven natural 
gas reserves are 3.6 TCM and that 70% of these resources lie in the Shia dominated 
Basra region in the south of Iraq.
470
 Iraq’s proven gas reserves are the tenth largest in 
the world; however, around two-thirds are associated with oil fields, including the old 
and tired Kirkuk oil field in the north. According to OME’s report,471 a large part of 
the proven gas reserves in Iraq, estimated at around 3.1 TCM, are in the form of gas 
caps (10%) and associated gas (70%). Almost all gas caps are located in the northern 
and central Iraqi fields, while most of the associated gas reserves are located in the 
southern oil fields. The ten proven non-associated gas fields are located in the north-
east regions of Iraq; however, only Kormor and Chemchemal gas condensate fields in 
KRG in the north and Akkas field in Anbar province in the west are in production for 
Iraq. 
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Map 7.1: Natural Gas Infrastructure of Northern Iraq 
Source: CERA 
The Arab Petroleum Research Centre estimates that the Iraqis have an undiscovered 
gas potential of 9,250 BCM, of which 4,600 BCM is non-associated and 4,650 BCM 
is associated gas.
472
 Considering the fact that northern Iraq has been exploited with 
‘hi-tech’ tools recently, the western desert region is largely unexplored and the 
geological studies highlight the presence of several prospective exploration areas, the 
above-mentioned resource potential seems highly plausible.
473
 (See Map 7.1) 
Iraqi gas production has risen since 2003 and had reached 0.8 BCM in 2012.
474
 
Significant volumes of associated gas is either flared or reinjected to enhance oil 
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recovery efforts. Iraq’s ten-year strategic plan for 2008–2017 set a goal of increasing 
the natural gas production to 70 BCM per year and to end the flaring of natural gas. 
Reportedly, Iraq has an export potential of 10 to 15 BCM
475
 in so doing, and several 
export proposals, including the northern export routes through Turkey to Europe, have 
been considered by international gas companies. Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector is 
underdeveloped and waiting for a huge investment. The injection of almost USD 5 
billion in foreign and government funding has been the only reason the country has 
remained able to continue exporting oil until now. In the meanwhile, the cash is 
running out fairly fast, and future funding will not be forthcoming until the instability 
and security issues are resolved. If these obstacles are overcome, Iraq could become a 
very important gas supplier, especially to Europe through Turkey, considering its 
relatively abundant resources.  
According to OME estimates, the Iraqi gas production can reach around 50 BCM in 
2030, taking into consideration the possible development of the non-associated fields 
and the reduction in flaring. Half of this can be locally used, leaving the remainder for 
export. The domestic gas consumption will most probably concentrate on electricity 
generation, especially after converting the oil-fired power plants into gas-fired plants 
and constructing new gas-fired power plants. As was the case before the war, the 
current government in Iraq would like to increase the domestic gas consumption in 
order to release more oil for export. Currently, Iraq has about 1000 MW of unused 
generation capacity owing to its lack of gas feedstock. As of April 2005, the operating 
generation capacity stood at about 5,500 MW (below the peak demand figure of about 
7,800 MW).
476
 The current total installed capacity, however, is close to 9,500 MW. 
According to the Economic Intelligence country report, Iraq will probably need 
40,000 MW of total generating capacity over the next 10 years.
477
 Currently, all gas 
produced is consumed domestically.
478
 Because of the present uncertainty and chaos 
in the country, it is not possible to have a clear understanding about what the future 
may hold. However, it is clear that Iraq needs oil and gas exports to help develop its 
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economy. 
The natural gas network is still underdeveloped in Iraq, notably because of the 
geopolitical context during the last few decades. Iraq’s gas system consists of a north-
south corridor bringing gas from production fields near Kirkuk to Bagdad and Basra. 
One difficulty Iraq presently faces is the timing and the cost of repairing the pipelines 
that are frequently sabotaged following the American invasion. While the attacks on 
the oil and gas infrastructure continue, it is apparent that the existing infrastructure’s 
condition is a great obstacle to the reconstruction effort. The on-going work is costing 
a vast amount of time and money for fixing and replacing existing units rather than 
boosting capacity.  
Two export projects — the Turkey-Iraq pipeline and the Kuwait-Iraq pipeline—have 
been discussed by the Turkish-Iraqi and Kuwaiti-Iraqi governments. The MoU for gas 
exports from the Rumailah field at market prices to Kuwait for up to 2 BCM was 
agreed by the Kuwaiti and Iraqi governments in December 2004. The Turkey–Iraqi 
pipeline will start from Kirkuk to the southeast of Turkey, and is planned to bring 10 
BCM to 20 BCM to Turkey, thereby supplying an important amount of gas to 
Europe.
479
 
7.2.2.1. The politics of the Turkish and Iraqi energy trade 
Since the Ankara Agreement in 1926, Turkey–Iraq energy relations have been 
steadily developed in accordance with political development and the recognition of 
Iraq as a legitimate state under the British Mandate. By the signing of this agreement, 
Turkey left behind the Ottoman territorial claim, including oil and gas fields in the 
densely populated Kurdish Northern Iraq. With this positive attitude towards a new 
state, namely Iraq, Turkey’s neighbourhood relations became more friendly, which 
resulted in the Sadabat Pact in 1936 and the Baghdad Pact in 1954. The Baathist 
revolution in 1958 was a breaking point for Turkish–Iraqi relations. Though Turkey 
kept away from internal Arab power struggles, especially Arab nationalism, Turkey 
and Iraq successfully managed to construct the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık Petroleum 
pipeline, which was commissioned in 1977, and has carried Iraqi oil to the 
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international energy market. While the Iraq-Syria petroleum pipeline was closed 
during the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey successfully managed to follow an active neutrality 
policy to benefit the war time economy of Iraq by keeping the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil 
pipeline open. Turkey and Iraq also agreed the right of hot pursuit in 1984, which 
allowed Turkey to operate military incursions in Northern Iraq.  
The situation, however, changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kurdish 
nationalism became a transnational issue, especially with the revival of Saddam’s Iraq 
as a regional hegemonic power after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Turkey supported 
the UN’s economic sanctions against Saddam’s regime by closing the petroleum 
pipeline and allowing access to Turkey and İncirlik airbases during the US-led 
operation in 1991. Rather than co-operating with the Iraqi government, Turkey made 
a right of hot pursuit agreement with the Kurdish Autonomous Government against 
the Kurdish guerrillas located in Northern Iraq. In addition, in accordance with the 
Turkish-Kurdish co-operation, Turkey deployed four military units to Northern Iraq to 
avert the possible civil war between the Kurdish groups.  
However, Turkey’s initiatives in Iraqi Kurdistan were brought to an end by the US-led 
invasion of Iraq. Due to the failure of the March 1st Memorandum in 2003, Turkish–
American relations have undergone scepticism and strain in the Middle East. In 
addition, the ‘bag affair’ made Iraq a place of power struggle between two allied 
countries. Turkey, however, successfully followed a soft power strategy to gain a 
foothold in the Middle East and restore its relations with the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG). Turkey avoided participating in the political dispute between the 
central government of Iraq and the KRG regarding the development and allocation of 
oil and gas resources management in Northern Iraq. Besides, the questions that 
continue to mount over the security of the energy infrastructure, the uncertainties in 
relation to financing of the projects and the share deals in Iraqi Kurdistan are yet to be 
properly addressed. 
The international media announced as a major milestone that the Turkish Government 
and KRG signed a comprehensive oil and gas co-operation agreement in spring 
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2012
480
 Based on this strategically ground-breaking agreement, a new state entity 
established under BOTAŞ will farm-in to five licenses of KRG, of which three of 
them including Choman and Hindren will be operated by the company.
481
 
Map 7.2: Oil Blocks of Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq 
Source: Northerniraqinfo 
Moreover, the company will also farm-in to main game changer ExxonMobil’s six 
licenses as well as securing some special investment opportunities related to Ninewa 
and Kirkuk Provinces. On the other hand the company is also on the negotiation 
rounds for securing long-term gas SPA for Genel Energy’s Miran and Bina Bawi 
fields. The cost of exploration, development, production and supplying the KRG gas 
to the Turkish border is far lower than that of the costly Caspian gas resources. 
Therefore accessing and securing the KRG gas resources even as an upstream player 
is very important for growing and expanding the Turkish economy for the 2020s.  
The plan also covers several oil and gas pipelines bringing the hydrocarbons to the 
BOTAŞ system for domestic consumption, to Ceyhan LNG liquefaction facility, 
Ceyhan Marine Oil Terminal and for marketing to Europe. This landmark agreement 
comprises multibillion dollar investment plans of Turkish entities for KRG and plays 
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the main actor role in the gas value chain instead of that of a simple transit country. 
This agreement resulted in strong objections from Baghdad, including the expelling of 
TPAO from the consortium which won the fourth round exploration and development 
tender for Block-9 in the south. TPAO is also a partner in the consortiums for the 
service contracts of the Mansuriya and Siba gas fields tendered by the central Iraqi 
Government as the third round. TPAO has eventually $5.5 billion investment 
responsibilities in the central Iraq oil and gas fields, which requires 25 billion capital 
expenditure.  
7.2.2.2. Turkey-Iraq Natural Gas Pipeline Project 
Turkish energy strategists consider that the Iraq-Turkey Gas Pipeline Project has 
become one of the most feasible projects for the Turkish national gas grid and 
ultimately makes Turkey the corridor to Europe by transporting Middle Eastern gas. 
Additionally, an LNG liquefaction terminal in Ceyhan (Turkey) is also being 
considered to process and transport a portion of the gas to the world markets. The 
south-eastern branch of BOTAŞ’s natural gas grid connecting the Iraqi border 
province Şırnak is planned to be commissioned in 2018.482 Looking at the political 
process, the chronological developments demonstrate the geo-strategic importance of 
the project for the Southern Gas Corridor. 
The legal framework of this project, notably the Intergovernmental Agreement, was 
signed by the Iraqi and Turkish governments on 26 December 1996. The agreement 
envisages an integrated project involving field development, production and the 
processing and pipeline transportation of gas from the north-eastern part of Iraq. After 
signing of the ITGEP (Iraq-Turkey Gas Export Pipeline) consortium between Shell, 
BOTAŞ, TPAO and Tekfen in 2005 and signing of the Governmental MoU in 7 
August 2007, Turkey and Iraq declared their intention to transport Iraqi gas to Europe 
through Turkey as well as their decision to form a group that could establish co-
operation between the Iraqi Petroleum Ministry, BOTAŞ and TPAO in order to 
initiate the related feasibility studies.
483
 With this inception, European companies such 
as OMV from Austria and MOL from Hungary, as well as Crescent Petroleum and 
Dana Gas from the United Arab Emirates, completed the deal with the Iraqi 
                                                          
482
 BOTAŞ. 
483
 BOTAŞ and TPAO. 
 188 
government to develop gas resources in Northern Iraq on 17 May 2009. Accordingly, 
OMV and MOL took a 10% stake each in the regional operating unit handling of the 
project. On 27 May 2011, the European Union signed a MoU on ‘Strategic Energy 
Partnership’, which provided a political framework for reinforcing energy relations 
between Iraq and the EU.
484
 The MoU included an assessment of the Iraqi 
hydrocarbon transit and supply network, plans for the safety and reliability of the 
pipelines, and identification of sources and supply routes for gas from Iraq to the EU.  
On the other hand, EMRA has given engineering firm Siyah Kalem until the end of 
2013 to prove it has a contract to import gas from Northern Iraq, in the third and 
longest extension to the company’s application. The company has applied to Turkish 
energy regulator EPDK to import an initial 700 MCM from Iraq in 2014, rising to 1.5 
BCM in 2015, 2.5 BCM in 2016 and 3 BCM/year from 2017-31. It needs to submit a 
valid purchase contract with the Northern Iraqi authorities to win the licence. The 
extension comes amid disagreements between Turkey and its southern neighbour over 
access to hydrocarbon resources in the semi-autonomous north of Iraq. The central 
Iraqi government disputes the right of the Kurdish north to make independent 
agreements for oil and gas.
485
 
7.2.3. The Second Southern Option for the Southern Corridor: Qatar 
Qatar is the third huge reserve of natural gas in the world which immediately makes 
them one of the important players in the international natural gas market. In 2011 the 
total natural gas production was 146.8 BCM, the consumption was 23.8 BCM and the 
exports were 121.8 BCM.
486
 In total 102.6 BCM has been exported through LNG 
facilities which made Qatar the world’s largest LNG exporter in 2011.487 Despite huge 
investment in LNG technology, the Qatari government began to consider pipeline 
options to increase its natural gas exportation. As mentioned above, the Qatar–Turkey 
gas pipeline is considered one of the most reliable options. Whether Qatar’s options 
for pipeline routes go through the Saudi territory or the offshore pipeline goes through 
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Kuwait is still controversial. It will be possible to export Qatar’s natural gas to Europe 
using an alternative pipeline passing through Iraq and Turkey, which is a cheaper and 
more secure method. Qatar has already been selling gas to Kuwait by using the LNG 
route in the Gulf. One of the major causes of concern for Qatar is that they do not 
want to have inter-dependency with Saudi Arabia. Qatar can possibly use subsea 
pipelines, which will be interconnected with the Iraqi pipeline, through the Bahrain 
maritime border and reach Kuwait. It is obviously of particular importance for Qatar 
to secure long-term sales contracts for natural gas transported through these pipeline 
projects to the EU countries.
488
  
In fact, not only the EU, but Iraq and Turkey also need Qatar’s natural gas for their 
domestic consumption. As mentioned above, Iraq does not have sufficient natural gas 
reserves in the central and southern parts of the country. For this reason, even the oil 
wells in Basra utilise seawater instead of natural gas. Natural gas drilling in the 
Kurdish regions of Iraq can only supply Northern Iraq. It will, therefore, be beneficial 
to Qatar if its natural gas is also supplied to Turkey and Iraq, and integrated with the 
Southern Corridor. However, Qatar insists on continuing to sell its natural gas in the 
form of LNG. Doha is not enthusiastic about a pipeline project, but could be 
persuaded.
489
 Thus, the Kuwait pipeline was shelved owing to the political 
disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  
Turkey’s access to the Gulf energy sources is one of its long-term strategies; it aims to 
interlink with the Arab pipeline to the Turkish national grid. Turkish Prime Minister, 
Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during the third World Future Energy Summit held in 
2010, said that the project was part of his country’s strategic plan to secure energy for 
the future. “The most important project is the Qatar-Turkey natural gas pipeline that 
we are working on, and it will be implemented soon. We strongly believe that, besides 
its economic value, this project will be very important for all the countries in the 
region”, he said.490  
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In 2013, the Turkish and Qatari energy ministries discussed establishing a ‘working 
group’ of officials to negotiate the agreements. Qatar is shipping 7.5 BCM to the EU 
but is expected to supply 30 BCM of natural gas annually.
491
 Turkish Energy 
Minister, Taner Yıldız, described the Qatari-Turkish ties as historic, after which both 
Turkish and Qatari governments discussed the purchase of 4 BCM of LNG from 
Qatar. The trade volume between the two countries nearly reached USD 1.5 billion in 
2010; however, the bilateral trade capacity of Turkey and Qatar can be met at USD 8 
billion if the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline project materialises in the coming decades.
492
 
According to the Qatar–Turkey energy working group, the gas pipeline is planned to 
start from Ras Laffan in Qatar, pass through Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the neutral 
zone and Kuwait waters and then finally reach the Iraqi waters, and the joint domestic 
line connection of Basra and Haditha along the strategic pipeline.
493
 The pipeline will 
reach Turkey via parallel routes of Kirkuk-Ceyhan petroleum. The length of the 
pipeline over the territories is estimated to be 1,200 km in Iraq, 650 km in the Iraq–
Turkey pipeline route, and 500 km between Ceyhan and Ankara, with 2,900 km 
length in total, including the sea section. Though the pipeline is planned with an initial 
annual capacity of 20 BCM, it has an actual capacity of 30 BCM. The total estimated 
cost of the pipeline is about USD 10.1 billion.
494
 
7.2.4. The Third Southern Option for the Southern Corridor: Egypt’s Pan-Arab 
Gas Pipeline 
The proven natural gas reserves of Egypt have increased immensely over the past two 
decades, from 265 BCM in 1986 to 1,869 BCM in 2004.
495
 According to the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, Egypt’s total proven natural gas reserves 
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were 2 TCM.
496
 The rise of Egypt in the gas sector was largely due to intensified 
exploration activities that have led to twenty-six new discoveries, which are primarily 
the non-associated fields in 2007 and 2008 alone in regions of the Mediterranean, 
Western Desert, Nile Delta, and the Gulf of Suez.
497
 In 2012 the gas production was 
60.9 BCM and the domestic consumption was 52.6 in Egypt. 
498
 
The Pan-Arab natural gas pipeline aimed to transmit Egypt’s natural gas to Turkey 
across Jordan and Syria, and to Europe. Egypt has the capacity to transport 10 BCM 
of natural gas to Jordan, Israel and Syria. Egypt supplies 80% of the electricity 
generation of Jordan. Jordan receives 3.4 BCM natural gas in plateau term, and the 
remaining 6.6 BCM is planned to be given to Turkey across Syria.
499
 In tandem with 
Russian Storytransgaz operating the Syrian section of the Arab Gas pipeline, the 
pipeline belongs to the state’s energy company EPC, owner of the project, and is 382 
km in length.
500
 The construction of the pipeline started in 2005 and was successfully 
completed in 2010.
501
 
The first two phases of the Arabian Natural Gas Pipeline, which was 1,236 km in 
length, was completed, while the third phase of the Arab Gas Pipeline was half 
completed (see Map 7.3). The pipeline reached the Humus province of Syria during 
this phase. Two MoUs were signed between the Energy Ministries of the two 
countries, on 20 August 2009 and on 23 December 2009, within this concept. In 
addition, and within the frame of the MoUs signed between Turkey and Syria, the 
natural gas networks of the two countries planned to establish the pipeline network by 
the end of 2011. In this framework, tender decisions were taken for the 
interconnection of Turkey’s and Syria’s natural gas networks (Interconnect Turkey-
Syria, ITS) on 21 September 2010, the preparations for which were in process before 
the internal war in Syria. The MoUs also provide an opportunity for the sale of natural 
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gas transmitting from Arab countries. However, Turkey’s energy strategies for Syria 
are sceptical but open to co-operation. The deterioration of the relations of Syria with 
its neighbours has frozen the development of the pipeline extension through Turkey. 
Map 7.3: The Arab Gas Pipeline Project 
 
Source: BOTAŞ 
7.2.5. Turkey-Egypt Energy Relations 
The Arab Gas pipeline project is designed to connect with Turkey, starting from the 
Syrian city Homs, reaching to Kilis province in Turkey and possibly transporting 
Egyptian gas to Europe. Related to this project, a Framework Agreement was signed 
in Cairo by the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey and the Oil 
Minister of Egypt on 17 March 2004, in order to import natural gas by BOTAŞ from 
the Egypt Natural Gas Company, EGAS, and to transit gas from Egypt to Europe 
through Turkey. According to the agreement, Egypt will export 2–4 BCM of natural 
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gas to Turkey and 2–6 BCM to the European markets through Turkey.502 The legal 
framework of the agreement between Egypt and Turkey mentioned above maintains 
continuance of co-operation and collaboration between the two countries in natural 
gas supply. 
7.3. THE RISE OF THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA IN THE GAS 
SECTOR 
The discovery of a giant natural gas field in the eastern Mediterranean promises to 
bring an entirely new dynamic to the Levant. Houston-based Noble Energy plays an 
essential role in the offshore field of Cyprus, block 12 (shown in Map 7.5) and the 
Israeli Leviathan structure. The reservoir of natural gas amounts to an estimated 459 
BCM in the Leviathan structure in Israel’s offshore exclusive economic zone. The 
discovery of the Noble gas field in 2009, the giant Tamar gas field and the smaller 
Dalit gas field has increased the importance of the Mediterranean Sea’s geopolitical 
position, and particularly the importance of Egypt, Cyprus and Israel (see Map 7.4). 
Map 7.4: Hydrocarbon Basins of Eastern Mediterranean 
 
Source: Energy Tribune 
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Controversies over the maritime zone between Lebanon and Israel could not stop the 
development in these offshore boundaries. The Noble-Delek partnership, which was 
in the process of initiating the development of the Tamar gas field for the delivery of 
gas to onshore Israel by 2013, halted work on the USD 3 billion project, arguing that 
the new tax regime would make it much more difficult to secure finances.
503
 
Map 7.5: Natural Gas Field Searches at South of Cyprus 
 
Source: ERPIC 
On a number of occasions, Turkey has complained to the UN about Nicosia’s actions 
in seeking to establish an EEZ — that lies entirely to the south of the island — and 
explore the hydrocarbons there. Ankara has also expressed its displeasure with Egypt 
and Lebanon for signing delineation agreements with Cyprus, although the accord 
with Lebanon has yet to be ratified by the Lebanese parliament. Cyprus has, in turn, 
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complained to the UN that Turkish warships have, on occasion, harassed the vessels 
conducting seismic surveys in its waters.
504
  
Map 7.6: Turkey’s Reaction to Exploration by Greek Cypriot Administration  
Source: ERPIC 
Like Israel, Cyprus is totally dependent upon imports to meet its energy needs. Israel 
used to depend on Egypt and other regional energy giants for natural gas. The Israeli 
Energy Company made an agreement with the East Mediterranean Gas Company for 
supply security of gas to Israel in August 2005. In this endeavour, Mr. Yitzhak 
Tshuva, the owner of the Israeli Energy Company and the Leviathan co-owner of 
Delek Energy, was quoted saying that Leviathan has made Israel ‘an energy-
independent country’.505 
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Israel will export some of its massive offshore gas finds and wants its first customers 
to be the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.
506
 Besides these small markets, Israel is 
also looking to export LNG to Europe and Asia and Israel does not have a preference 
among the larger markets, despite current higher prices in Asia. The level of gas 
exports is not defined by the Israeli government, but it will be at least 300 BCM.
507
 
The final decision will be made by the Israeli government, but definitely there will be 
exports. The new Israeli Government, elected in February 2013, would likely make 
the final decisions on gas exports and it would be one of the most important issues 
facing the new government. 
On April 5, 2012 the governmental gas committee released preliminary 
recommendations that gas exports be permitted after a 25-year reserve of gas supplies 
is guaranteed for Israel’s domestic use. The committee said the 25-year reserve level 
should begin in 2018 and, prior to that, a minimum reserve of 400 BCM should be 
guaranteed. Israeli gas discoveries, in the form of proven reserves and potential 
reserves, totalled 750-800 BCM, and the committee added that the figure could 
double within the next few years as exploration activity is expected to increase 
dramatically.
508
 
According to a 2010 report by the US Geological Survey, the Levantian Basin in the 
Eastern Mediterranean Sea has potential gas reserves of 3.5 TCM of gas, and about 
40% of those reserves would fall within Israel’s exclusive economic zone.509 
Domestic demand in Israel is now about 5 BCM/year but is expected to rise to 16 
BCM/year by 2016. Israel generates most of its electricity from coal and oil, and also 
plans to install 3,000 MW of solar generation capacity by the end of the decade, 
accounting for 10% of demand. 
Houston-based Noble Energy has major stakes in the Leviathan and Tamar fields, the 
two largest Israeli offshore fields discovered so far, as well as stakes in several other 
licenses. The interim report recommended that exports be based on the size of each 
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reservoir. A reservoir with reserves exceeding 200 BCM would be required to supply 
a minimum of 50% of its total output to the local market, reserves of 100-200 BCM 
would be required to supply a minimum of 40%, 50-100 BCM for a minimum of 
25%, and reservoirs of less than 50 BCM would not face any restrictions. However, 
no gas exports would be permitted until the requirements of the Israeli economy are 
met. The committee estimated that total domestic demand through 2040 would be 420 
BCM. 
Israel is exploring a number of options for exporting gas, including building an 
onshore liquefaction plant near the Red Sea port of Eilat, installing a floating 
liquefaction facility or developing a joint venture with Cyprus, as that island’s marine 
Exclusive Economic Zone borders Israel’s and Noble is spearheading Cyprus’ gas 
exploration efforts. Building a liquefaction plant near Eilat would allow LNG cargoes 
to be shipped to Asia without traversing the Suez Canal.  
In March 2012, initial talks were under way for the sale of LNG from the Tamar field 
with Russia’s Gazprom Marketing & Trading. The talks are between Gazprom and 
Next Decade, a joint company set up by South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & 
Marine Engineering and its partner D&H Solutions, specifically to sell LNG from a 
proposed floating LNG facility at the Tamar field. The volumes being discussed were 
2-3 MTPA on a non-exclusive basis beginning in 2017, based on LNG prices in Asia 
or an alternative price mechanism to be agreed upon by the parties. An Exclusive 
Commercial Agreement was signed on February 2012.
510
 
The partners in the Tamar consortium have been given an option to participate in the 
marketing company as well as in the proposed FLNG facility. The maximum level of 
gas sales is likely to peak at 11.84 BCM/year. The maximum production level is 
expected to be reached in 2018 and to continue through 2035, and would take into 
account sales to the local and export markets.
511
 
There is a second agreement between DSME and Israel Land Development Energy 
for a similar FLNG facility. The exact terms would be worked out in the future once 
the size of potential gas reserves in the Sarah and Mira offshore licenses are 
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determined, the Israeli company said. Two exploratory drillings are due in the first 
half of 2012. The two companies are also discussing the sale of 4.3 BCM of gas over 
a 15- to 20-year period. 
In addition, there have been discussions about a joint Israeli-Cypriot liquefaction 
terminal in Vasilikos along the island’s southern coast to export gas from the two 
countries. The plan calls for gas from the Cyprus Block 12 prospect (198 BCM) and 
from the adjacent Leviathan to be sent by pipeline to the terminal and then exported as 
LNG. Noble and its Israeli partners - Delek Drilling and Avner Oil and Gas - plan a 
second exploration drilling to determine the exact size of the Block 12 discovery. 
Cyprus and Israel also are looking at building electric lines linking the two countries, 
as they are both currently on isolated electric grids and would have nowhere to turn in 
case of a shortage. Cyprus is also looking at a power line connection to Greece via 
Crete. If both projects happen, Israel would be connected to the European Union 
power grid and could sell electricity to Europe that would be produced from Israeli 
gas, adding that it could help reduce the widespread perception of the “crazy Middle 
East.”512 Israel would be a reliable Middle Eastern supplier, unlike many other 
countries in the region. Israel also is looking to use its gas resources to develop a gas-
based chemical industry and fuel its transportation industry with gas. Israel has been 
getting gas from its offshore Mary B well and from Egyptian pipeline supplies, but 
both sources are seen as unreliable, as Egyptian supplies have repeatedly been 
interrupted since the forced resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in 
February 2011, and the Mary B is being quickly depleted. 
The East Mediterranean Gas Supply venture, known as EMG, delivered 2.5 BCM of 
gas to Israeli customers in 2010 and was due to increase volumes to 3 BCM last year. 
But with the fall of the Mubarak regime, the pipeline and related infrastructure that 
move Egyptian gas to Israel have been attacked 14 times, as many militants do not 
want Egypt to send gas to Israel and also criticise the peace accord that was reached 
between Israel and Egypt in the 1970s. Egyptian supplies fell 67% in 2011 to 825 
MCM with deliveries to local customers on only 137 days that year. The gas deal 
between Egypt and Israel was the most important economic outcome of the peace 
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accord, and it has been said that one lesson from the political tumult in the Arab world 
is that Israel should take contracts with Arab countries “with a grain of salt.” 
Israel agreed a couple of years ago to pay Egypt more for its gas than what was 
originally agreed, after some Egyptian leaders claimed the Israeli supplies were being 
sold at an unfairly low price, but it would not be willing to do so again. Egyptian 
supplies to Jordan have also been interrupted due to the attacks on the infrastructure. 
Earlier in 2012, the Energy and Water Ministry instructed the Yam Thetis consortium 
— comprising Noble Energy, Delek Drilling and Avner Oil and Gas — to cut back on 
its gas production in order to extend the limited supply from the Mary B wells to at 
least partially cover peak demand in the summer.  
Before the end of January 2013, a consortium of Italy's ENI S.p.A. and Korea Gas 
Corporation (Kogas) signed contracts with the Cypriot government to explore for 
hydrocarbons in Blocks 2, 3 and 9 within the EEZ. This consortium will see ENI as 
operator with an 80% stake in the blocks, while Kogas will hold the remaining 20%. 
ENI stated at the time that the award was of "significant importance", with the firm 
excited about the potential for the eastern Mediterranean's Levantine Basin as an 
exploration frontier with "giant gas potential". Then, French major Total S.A. signed 
an agreement on February 6, 2013 with Southern Cyprus to drill for oil and gas in two 
blocks – Blocks 10 and 11. These blocks are adjacent to Block 12 and its Aphrodite 
field, which Noble estimates holds up to 257 BCM of gas.
513
 
Cypriot exploration for hydrocarbons would not be a proper oil and gas story without 
the territorial disputes that often accompany the whiff of petroleum. Just as another 
island territory, the Falklands in the South Atlantic, has been the subject of renewed 
diplomatic antagonism between Argentina and the UK recently, old tensions are being 
reawakened in Cyprus. Drilling for oil in the Falkland Islands helped bring attention 
once again to the question of its sovereignty, with Argentina's foreign minister 
declaring that any hydrocarbons there are Argentinean. In the same way, Turkey has 
barged into the Cypriot oil and gas story, with Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız 
declared that “revenues generated from drilling should be shared between the Turkish 
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Republic of Northern Cyprus and the ethnically Greek-dominated Republic of 
Cyprus”.514 
Turkey has threatened that it might take action against any companies involved in 
drilling for hydrocarbons in the EEZ. But the Cypriot government has made it clear 
that it has a sovereign right to explore for natural resources on its territory and will 
continue to do so, while acting in line with international and European Union law. 
Despite the Turkish warnings, the companies involved in exploring for hydrocarbons 
are moving ahead with their plans. Total is expected to begin drilling in its blocks in 
2014, with the construction of a terminal beginning in 2015. Meanwhile, Noble 
Energy has asked for permission from the Cypriot government to present its data from 
Block 12 to Total, ENI and Australian company Woodside Petroleum Ltd. In 
December 2012, Woodside bought a 30-percent stake in the Israeli Leviathan field, 
which borders Block 12.
515
 
Noble has stated that Leviathan represents the largest exploration success in the 
company's history. Discovered in 2010, it holds gross mean resources of 485 BCM of 
gas. Noble has a near 40% working interest in the discovery. Noble seems to be in the 
driving seat with the Leviathan discovery in Israeli waters being next door to the 
Aphrodite discovery in Cyprus and it could even be the same reservoir, according to 
most of the analysts. The Israeli discovery could be developed by producing to an 
onshore LNG plant on Cyprus or through a Floating LNG (FLNG) development. 
During the next three years, up to ten exploration wells are expected to be drilled in 
Cypriot waters. But before then, this year will likely see Total and ENI work out and 
present plans for how they will acquire seismic data on their newly-purchased blocks. 
After the successive discoveries on Tamar (257 BCM), Leviathan (481 BCM) and 
Block 12 (198 BCM) which are three of the world’s five largest discoveries of the 
decade, Greek DEPA proposed an “Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline” for exportation 
of the resources
516
 (shown Map 7.7). 
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Map 7.7: The East Mediterranean Pipeline Project and Possible Connections 
Source: DEPA 
Due to the further announcements of USGS that the total reserves at the Levantine 
basin could be three times more than what has already been discovered, the pipeline 
options have been studied and discussed in the international arena. DEPA 
preliminarily estimated that the region could export more than 16 BCM/year. Several 
scenarios have been considered by DEPA to carry East Med gas to Europe:  
1) A pipeline from the field to Cyprus;  
2) a pipeline connecting Cyprus with Crete;  
3) a pipeline from Crete to mainland Greece. 
The pipeline would be able to carry around 8 BCM/year and will have a total length 
of around 1150km. DEPA underestimated a major subduction zone along the route 
and stated that none of the constructability challenges are insurmountable based on 
experience from similar projects (e.g. Galsi, Medgaz). DEPA announced (based that 
the paper studies) the pipeline is technically feasible. The ITGI System and its 
branches will be integrated to the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline on the onshore 
section after landfall Greece.  
It was proposed that a pipeline from the Eastern Mediterranean will create strong 
synergies with the ITGI system and will connect the East Med to the European grid. 
Moreover, evaluation of geological and geochemical data acquired since 1985 from 
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scientists working in the Libyan Sea indicate the possible existence of huge 
hydrocarbon deposits in an area of 80,000 km
2
, which is equivalent to the Levantine 
Basin (combined EEZ of Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Southeast Cyprus). Ionian Sea 
(Apulian Platform), southern Crete, Herodotus Basin and the Mediterranean Ridge are 
accounted as huge potential hydrocarbon prospects for Greece who have declared an 
EEZ for exploration. 
However, the Eastern Mediterranean Project could be very expensive for the upstream 
investors in the Eastern Mediterranean and so a short connection from Cyprus to the 
Turkish network system could be a cheaper and better alternative. If the political 
atmosphere becomes more suitable for the talks to evaluate the upstream and pipeline 
projects for the benefit of all parties then the most economic and convenient option 
may be realized. It is also important to note that the recent discoveries of Eastern 
Mediterranean could be used as a peace instrument to foster the weak political 
relations of the region. 
The discovery of the Tamar gas field will have the potential to transform not only 
Israel’s economy, by fulfilling its domestic demands for power generation over the 
next 30 years and still yielding export earnings from the surplus produced,
517
 but also 
its relationship with the regional actors. Since Israel has realized its energy potential is 
dependent on co-ordination and co-operation with Cyprus and Greece, in line with a 
tradition of seeking security from its neighbours, a realignment of interests can be 
observed; not only rapprochement with Cyprus and Greece but also alienation from 
Turkey.
518
  
7.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The importance of the Middle East for the Southern Corridor dominates the Eurasian 
energy environment in which the discovery of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas 
sources has changed the regional balance in the maritime zone of Egypt, Israel, 
Cyprus. Turkey, however, is interested in the Iraqi pipeline as a means to introduce 
itself as a transit country in the Eurasian natural gas environment. The case with Iraqi 
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gas transported from the Kurdish region, the internal competition between the Arab 
states in the Arabian Gulf and the rise of Israel in the Mediterranean Sea are some of 
the challenging issues for Turkey’s energy geopolitics. Even though Turkey’s use of 
the energy economy as an instrument of soft power facilitated the attempts to improve 
relations with the KRG; Turkey’s policy of balancing its relations with Baghdad and 
Erbil was problematic during the crisis between the KRG and the central government 
in Baghdad due to the disputed territories, oil contracts with international companies 
and KRG’s share of the national budget. The Baghdad government’s centralization 
efforts, Maliki’s Shia discourse and strong alliance with Iran, and his government’s 
support of the al-Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, are mutual discomforts shared 
by the KRG and the Turkish government. Additionally, the high level of trade 
relations and energy co-operation also made the relationship more vital to both sides. 
Turkey and Israel have not only lost their alliance relationship but have also realised 
that the two countries’ interests in the Mediterranean Sea and Northern Iraq are 
incompatible. Israel’s close ties with Greek Cyprus and the Kurdish Regional 
Government, and Turkey’s close ties with Hamas, tightened the bilateral relations in 
the last decades. Due to the discovery in the Mediterranean Sea, especially in the 
Israeli maritime zone, Turkey has suspended the Blue Stream extra transport capacity 
to Israel. Any possible gas export routes to European markets through the 
Mediterranean connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece will be considered as a threat to 
Turkey regarding its ambitions as a transit hub in the region. Turkey believes that this 
option is not economically and politically feasible. The southbound routes are the best 
transit options for East Mediterranean natural gas transport. Turkey would rather 
establish interdependence relations with Iraq. Finally the ambiguous situation of Syria 
and increasing tension in the region creates great risk for the utilization of natural gas 
resources and impedes the future natural gas pipeline projects. 
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Chapter 8  
TURKEY AS A REGIONAL NATURAL GAS HUB: 
‘ANATOLIAN GAS CENTRE’ 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Geopolitically speaking, Turkey has a very strategic position at the crossroads 
between energy supplier and consumer countries, especially from the Caspian Sea 
region and the Middle East region to Europe. This strategic positioning helps us to 
describe Turkey as a natural gas hub, transit or crossroad country in international gas 
markets. Turkey has already hosted the major oil and gas pipeline system of Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık petroleum pipelines and the Baku-Erzurum, 
Tabriz-Erzurum and Blue Stream natural gas pipeline systems. Turkey aims to expand 
and complete eastern and southern natural gas pipeline systems to feed the Southern 
Corridor and would like to establish an Anatolian Gas Centre.  
Since the late 2000s, Turkey’s successful management of the nexus of foreign policy 
and energy geopolitics has proved a great initiative to play an essential role in the 
natural gas sector. Turkey’s foreign policy and long term natural gas strategy aims to 
establish interdependence relations between gas producer and consumer countries. 
This thesis has already developed the feasibility, availability and sustainability of the 
Southern Corridor in previous chapters. Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to 
explain how Turkey fulfils a role in the region as an anchor of stability, reliable 
energy supply and a meeting place between Europe and Asia. It is assumed that 
Turkey has an opportunity to establish a physical hub mechanism, which would be 
more effective in the international energy market. There must be a strong sense of 
strategic direction, and a credible commitment that this direction will be consistent 
and sustained in Turkey’s energy diplomacy. Turkey’s rational energy diplomacy and 
reasonable natural gas pricing and trading mechanism give us necessary evidence to 
assess Turkey’s foreign policy capacity and the rationality of its energy strategy for 
being a natural gas hub. 
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8.2. DISCUSSION OF TURKEY’S CAPACITY FOR BEING AN ENERGY 
HUB 
A large literature has appeared on the discussion about the importance of Turkey’s 
geopolitical position and whether it provides Turkey with any initiatives for being a 
natural gas hub. Simone Tagliapietra discusses Turkey’s potentiality for being a gas 
corridor and a gas hub in his article.
519
 He identifies that even though Turkish-Azeri 
relations achieved the TANAP project, there are many difficulties in transporting 
Turkmen, Iranian and East Mediterranean gas to Europe via Turkey. He concluded 
that Turkey has no potential to become a hub in the region in the medium term (up to 
2020-2025). He believes that the Southern Gas Corridor, which supplies 10 BCM of 
natural gas to the EU, will only provide less than 3% of the EU natural gas demand. 
Looking at the long term (2025-2030), Tagliapietra sees that Turkey’s potential to 
become an energy hub is still uncertain. He clarifies the conditionality for being a 
natural gas hub as follows:  Azerbaijan could well be able to supply more volumes of 
natural gas to the EU, Turkmenistan could be in the position to supply a considerable 
amount of natural gas (20-40 bcm/year) to Turkey and to the EU, Iraq could also be in 
the position to supply some natural gas volumes to the EU from KRG and Iran could 
well have the potential to improve its natural gas supply to Turkey.  
Furthermore, if substantial additional natural gas reserves are discovered in offshore 
Israel and Cyprus, the project to evacuate Eastern Mediterranean gas to Turkey via 
pipeline could become commercially viable and politically feasible, but only if in the 
meantime the Cyprus dispute were finally resolved.
520
 Since those are the conditions 
for Turkey to become a regional natural gas hub, it is not seen that Turkey will be a 
hub in the long term. On the other hand, in another discussion the real weakness of 
Turkish foreign policy has been given as the East Mediterranean Sea dispute. Ebru 
Oğurlu argues that any possible gas export routes to European markets through the 
Mediterranean, connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece, will be considered as a threat to 
Turkey’s energy policy of being a transit hub in the region.521 Even though there are 
some oil and gas discoveries that can raise hopes of the prospect of significant wealth, 
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they have many risks and uncertainties in the region. These discoveries have the 
potential for destabilizing the region, which could lead the way for a competition 
among regional actors.
522
 According to Oğurlu, since energy geopolitics is an 
important element of Eastern Mediterranean politics, regional relations have been also 
bruised because of the claims and rivalry between Turkey and Cyprus regarding the 
recently discovered energy sources. Oğurlu states that the discovery in Israeli offshore 
occurred at exactly the same time as relations with Turkey were rapidly worsening 
because of the Freedom Flotilla incident. The closeness of the resource-rich area to 
the Cypriot-Israeli maritime border and then the souring Turkey-Israeli relations 
paved the way to a rapprochement between Israel and Cyprus.
523
 Israel and Cyprus 
signed a maritime agreement in December 2010 agreeing to collaborate on oil and gas 
explorations in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Thus, Turkey has opposed the 
legitimacy of this agreement since Turkey has claimed that Greek Cypriots do not 
represent the entire island and are not authorized to conclude such agreements. 
Consequently, the energy dispute will possibly widen the already existing gap 
between the two parts of Cyprus.  
Alan Craig and Clive Jones open another discussion about how the discovery of gas 
fields, Tamar in 2009 and Leviathan in 2010, will have the potential to transform not 
only Israel’s economy and energy security but also its relationship with the regional 
actors. It is estimated that Israel will have sufficient gas to fulfil its domestic demands 
for power generation over the next 30 years and still profit in export earnings from the 
surplus produced.
524
 Furthermore, the discovery of these gas fields will have impacts 
on security relations across the region. Since Israel has realized its energy potential is 
dependent on co-ordination and co-operation with Cyprus and Greece, in line with a 
tradition of seeking security from its neighbours, a realignment of interests can be 
observed, not only rapprochement with Cyprus and Greece but also alienation from 
Turkey.
525
 The authors also place emphasis on the need for a legal solution regarding 
the contesting claims on EEZs for the license exploration from Turkey and Lebanon. 
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According to them, some Israeli analysts argue that Turkey’s objections are mainly 
presented because of its concern over whether the discoveries of gas fields might 
lessen Turkey’s importance as an energy transit hub by proposing alternative routes of 
gas supply.
526
 In conclusion, Craig and Jones argue that for the first time in Israel’s 
history, it is close to achieving its energy policy based on reliability, affordability and 
environmental sustainability, despite the regional tensions. Thus, the emergence of a 
security regime with Greek Cyprus, a market demanding energy supply in Europe and 
Asia, and its military superiority in the region would serve Israel in exploiting its new 
resources.
527
 
Bud E. Fackrell’s article emphasizes the importance of energy security for almost 
every human activity.
528 
The uneven distribution of energy resources and the 
geopolitical situation necessitate a growing interdependence and the need for co-
operation between not only producer and consumer but also transit countries. He 
argues that like many other countries, Turkey has to secure reliable energy for its 
economic development. Thanks to its geopolitical position, Turkey neighbours the 
hydrocarbon countries and can access abundant supply for its growing economy, but 
not without challenges for many different reasons. Despite the challenges in the 
region, Turkey has played its role in the region successfully.
529
 He states that with the 
interconnections of energy projects from the eastern and southern routes, Turkey will 
become the primary route for natural gas transport. Fackrell also mentions the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project and the Southern Corridor as Turkey’s contribution 
to regional and global energy security. He underlines the importance of Shah Deniz 
Phase II as the key to opening the Southern Corridor and bringing the Caspian gas to 
Europe for the first time.
530
 In Turkey, with the Shah Deniz partners and under the 
leadership of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), TANAP 
will be a strategic connection for the Southern Corridor. Since TANAP will take the 
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gas from Turkey’s eastern border with Georgia to the western border, the project will 
play a crucial role in developing Turkey as a gas hub.
531
 
Gareth Winrow emphasizes the role of Turkey as an energy transit state to meet the 
energy demands of the European Union. The Southern Gas Corridor has been 
acknowledged by the EU as a priority in order to diversify its energy sources and 
decrease European dependence on Russian energy. Within this perspective, Winrow 
states Turkey’s importance as a transit country; however Turkey’s becoming an 
energy hub country is seen as less promising in the near future.
532
 Winrow argues that 
being an energy hub would mean that Turkey could utilize its economic and strategic 
advantages. Firstly, Winrow argues that Turkey’s gas demand will likely increase by 
presenting statistics about Turkey’s energy outlook. On the other hand, Winrow 
makes a distinction between an energy transit and an energy hub state. Winrow 
defines a transit state as “oil and gas from energy producing states cross the territory 
of energy transit states to reach energy consumers”, while an energy hub is defined as 
“physical energy hubs, on the other hand, have extensive infrastructure which makes 
the state a focal point for energy transportation. This may entail a developed pipeline 
network, refineries, storage facilities, gas liquefaction plants, regasification terminals 
and petrochemical units”.533 Regarding becoming an energy hub, Turkey needs a 
considerable amount of investment in gas storage and the gas pipeline network. 
According to Winrow, Turkish officials perceive the energy hub concept as 
controlling energy trade to their advantage by using Turkey’s geographical location.  
Furthermore, Turkey also could want to use its strategic position to heighten its 
international influence and ease its accession to the EU. Winrow also concludes that 
helping EU member states to diversify their energy imports will not accelerate 
Turkey’s prospects for membership of the EU.534 Nonetheless, being an energy transit 
country has not enhanced Turkey’s accession process to the EU. The Greek Cypriots 
have vetoed the opening of the energy chapter, since Turkey has opposed oil and gas 
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exploration in the eastern Mediterranean by the Greek Cypriot government.
535
 Since 
the South Stream Project has been perceived to be the major rival to Nabucco, Turkey 
seems to be involved in a delicate balancing game. According to Winrow, Turkish 
authorities may be seeking to ensure that supporting the South Stream Project does 
not endanger the prospects for Nabucco, the ITGI or the TAP.
536
 However, the failure 
of the Nabucco project does not reduce Turkey’s nomination as an energy hub. 
According to an energy expert, John Roberts, Turkey currently cannot be truly 
defined as an energy hub in the framework of trade and energy market privatisation 
and regulations. According to him, a real hub could be a trading hub which provides 
open, transparent and competitive market opportunities for multiple suppliers that 
meet multiple customers.
537
 Turkey’s EU accession process may facilitate establishing 
a true transparent functioning hub. On the other hand, ex-European Co-ordinator for 
the Nabucco Pipeline Project, Jozias Van Aartsen, defined Turkey’s role as ‘an 
interconnector’. He believes that Turkey should behave in her foreign policy as a 
bridge country rather than as a hub country.
538  
8.3. TURKEY’S POSSIBLE ECONOMIC GAINS FROM BEING ENERGY 
HUB 
The major discussion in this section is if Turkey’s Anatolian Gas Centre were 
established, what kind of initiatives and gains it would bring for Turkey?  In order to 
answer this question, we have to look at pricing questions in the natural gas market. It 
is certain that, unlike other internationally traded commodity markets, the dominant 
prices mechanism for the international gas trade uses ‘oil indexation’, which 
originated in Europe in the 1960s. The oil indexation mechanism also spread to the 
Asian energy trade. Minister of Economic Affairs Jan Willem de Pous established the 
new Dutch concept of gas pricing in 1962. The Dutch model became known as the 
Nota de Pous.
539
 This model encourages a state to get maximum benefit from end-
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user pricing. However, the ‘Netback-Pricing’ model with the market value principles 
is aimed at reducing end-user pricing. The ‘cost-plus’ pricing starts with the 
production cost, and adds transportation services, overheads and profit margin, to 
arrive at the sales price.
540
 The ‘netback-pricing’ is calculated by taking all of the 
revenues from the oil, less all costs associated with getting the oil to a market. 
Netback-pricing is a contractual arrangement in which the price of gas at the wellhead 
is based upon the processed gas or products. 
Nevertheless a new development in the energy sector has changed pricing 
mechanisms in the European Union. The US Henry Hub has introduced a new 
mechanism to the gas sector based on hub pricing.
541
 The British liberal natural gas 
mechanism promotes the US hub model. The first link was established between the 
UK gas network and the Belgium gas system, which led to spreading commodity 
markets to continental Europe. In terms of pricing system, almost half of European 
gas pricing is still linked to oil prices.
542
 Norway, UK and the Netherlands led spot 
indexation. Russia and North Africa remain oil linked prices systems, but the trend is 
shifting towards spot indexation. According to a Reuters report, only 34.8 to 37.7 
percent of all major European gas supplies are now priced off openly traded hubs such 
as Britain's National Balancing Point.
543
. There are commonalities of nine European 
hubs on the price indexation system. The hub system offers different gas prices 
options. These are: (1) National Balancing Point (NBP), based in Great Britain;(2) 
Title Transfer Facility (TTF), based in the Netherlands; (3) Zeebrugge Hub (ZEE), 
based in Belgium; (4) Central European Gas Hub (CEGH), based in Austria;5) 
Gaspool (GSL), based in Germany; (6) Net Connect Germany (NCG), based in 
Germany; (7) Points d’Echange de Gaz (PEG) including Peg Nord, Peg Sud and (8) 
Peg TIGF, based in France; (9) Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV), based in Italy. 
Table 8.1 below demonstrates the European Hub price, which is lower than Turkey’s 
purchasing gas prices. 
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Table 8.1: European Gas Hub Prices (per TCM) 
EU’S HUB Day Ahead June 
 
Day Ahead $ / 1000 m3 June $ / 1000 m3 
UK-NBP 292.16 289.92 
Dutch TTF 282.83 297.38 
Belgian -Zeebruge 286.19 299.62 
French PEG Nord 293.28 304.85 
French PEG Sud 376.12 373.88 
German GasPool 288.06 301.86 
NET Connect Germany 288.80 301.86 
Austrian CEGH VTP 305.59 318.28 
Italian PSV 316.04 315.29 
Source: PLATTS, May 1, 2014 
As we mentioned in the theory chapter, Turkey’s Post Cold War geopolitics are 
changing. Rather than a security oriented foreign policy agenda, Turkey has continued 
to pursue a more proactive policy to gain a foothold in the new international system. 
Turkey sees itself as a centre of the universe, which gives Turkey full confidence to 
take initiatives on the Southern Corridor and to establish an Anatolian Gas Centre. If 
Turkey increased its attractiveness for the establishing of an Anatolian Gas Centre, 
Turkey would be able to go through price revision close in order to reduce purchasing 
prices. The arbitration cases between Turkey and Iran about gas price revision close 
demonstrate that Turkey currently has no capacity to bargain with Iran or others. For 
instance, according a Press TV report, Iran charges Turkey $490 for every 1,000 cubic 
meters of natural gas. This is while Turkey claims that the Republic of Azerbaijan and 
Russia supply gas to Turkey at $335 and $425 per 1,000 cubic meters respectively. It 
seems that although Turkey is the closest country to the natural gas producing 
countries, the table demonstrates that Turkey is paying the highest prices.
544
 Turkey 
rather prefers to diversify its supply and demand sources than to re-export strategy 
towards Europe. To this end Turkey’s soft power strategy has become more 
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applicable by creating interdependent relations in the economic and political 
environment and its natural gas dependency on Iran and Russia will be dramatically 
reduced.  
 
Table 8.2: BOTAŞ Import Prices 
Country 
2012  
(Price $/100m2) 
2013 
(price$/100m2) 
Discount 
(% in 2013) 
Russia (Western Line) 446 429 3.81 
Russia (Blue Stream) 445 428 3.82 
Azerbaijan 354 449 1.41 
Iran 530 507 4.34 
Sources: Gulmira.  
8.4. THE ANATOLIAN GAS CENTRE AS THE NEW ENERGY 
HEARTLAND OF EURASIA ON THE CROSSROADS
 
Given its unique position, Turkey’s objective of being an energy hub for ‘East-West’ 
and ‘North-South’ energy corridors is not just an ambition. The fact is that Turkey has 
the potential to transport 6–7% of the world’s oil by 2020. For instance, Ceyhan port 
is expected to become a major ‘energy hub’ and the largest oil outlet terminal in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.
545
 The Ceyhan Terminal has already been designed to receive 
the crude oil reaching Ceyhan from Kirkuk/KRG, Basra, Baku and Samsun (Russian 
supplies to Samsun), even Tabriz/Tehran in the longer term.  
The security of the European energy supply is required for diversification of sources 
of energy import by building new transit ways and influence in its immediate region 
through mutual dependence. In tandem with the EU, Turkey can play a crucial role for 
Europe in maintaining its energy security by diversifying its gas sources, decreasing 
Europe’s dependence on gas provided by the Russian Federation.  
Turkey is considered as an energy hub and a big energy market as a consumer itself in 
the Eurasian energy environment. Hence, it is essential to examine Turkey’s 
dependency on energy and its related policy strategies, especially for natural gas 
supply and transport to the EU. Turkey’s overall energy picture in the first part of this 
chapter will demonstrate the potential energy market in Turkey as well as explain 
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Turkey’s strategies and positioning as an ‘energy corridor’. In later sections, the 
concept of being a hub in natural gas markets will be examined with Turkey’s unique 
position between Asia and Europe.  
Therefore, this chapter tries to highlight the foundation of the main gas strategy of 
Turkey: not only to be an “energy corridor” or “energy terminal” but to become the 
most comprehensive “Anatolian Gas Centre as the New Energy Heartland of Eurasia 
on the crossroads” (in the unique geography of Turkey) where the energy is to be 
produced, procured, transported, transited, transformed, processed, exchanged, 
interchanged, traded, stored and marketed in a well-regulated, liberalized, accessible 
and internationally correlated environment. Turkey has developed an inter-agency 
capacity within the country and interaction abilities for co-operating and co-ordinating 
energy policies with regional and international actors. Turkey liberated its foreign 
policy from the confines of security rhetoric and appropriated a new policy of 
maximizing political and economic relations with the neighbours and prioritizing high 
level political dialogue and economic interdependence in regional policy. While 
having such a regional perspective, Turkey restructured the institutional framework of 
foreign policy and regional economic relations and created new structures to enforce 
the existing framework. Turkey’s domestic capacity in terms of pursuing a central role 
in regional energy geopolitics is at the highest level, and capacity building at home 
leads to projection of this capacity to regional involvement, leading or taking part in 
various energy projects. Turkey’s search to host multiple oil and gas pipelines 
accommodates this search to evolve to a regional energy hub. Turkey aims to develop 
domestic capacities and regional energy policies to go beyond being a host country of 
pipelines and emerge as an energy trading state with the necessary legal and physical 
infrastructure. 
8.5. TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERDEPENDENCE 
RELATIONS FOR BEING A GAS CENTRE 
The dynamic shift in Turkish foreign policy occurred when the Justice and 
Development Party took power in Turkish politics in 2003. The architect of Turkey’s 
critical geopolitical discourse, Ahmet Davutoğlu, was appointed as Foreign Minister 
of Turkey in 2009 and has changed energy geopolitics. His interdependence strategy 
in the economic sector, especially upstream project investment and long term pipeline 
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politics, has encouraged a new vision of Turkish energy diplomacy. The integration 
between the Ministries of Energy and of Foreign Policy have facilitated the 
development of a more coherent energy diplomacy, which has already achieved the 
opening of the Southern Corridor that gives a great ability to launch the ‘Anatolian 
Gas Centre’ project. Davutoğlu argued that Turkey, thanks to its geographical 
position, possessed a strategic depth which it had hitherto failed to exploit and that 
Turkey should develop an active engagement in the regional political systems in the 
Middle East, Asia, the Balkans and Transcaucasia.
546
 Together with BOTAS, the 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs and the EU General 
Directorate operate daily and long term energy diplomacy. 
According to CERA’s report, Turkey was already the sixth biggest natural gas 
consumer country in Europe and will be the second biggest market in Europe in 
2030.The major problem in pricing issues of natural gas purchasing contract is that 
BOTAS operates 80% of long-term contract management between Turkey and natural 
gas exporting countries. Therefore, we cannot talk about the existence of supply-
demand prices that determine Turkey’s natural gas pricing. In this regard, BOTAS is 
the only actor which determines natural gas prices in the Turkish natural gas market. 
If there is no transparency or liberalized market conditions, we do not have any 
chance to introduce Turkey as a trading hub country for the Southern Corridor. 
Geopolitically speaking there is only the strong argument that Turkey is natural 
physical hub and has a chance to establish an Anatolian Gas Centre. Turkey’s 
physical hub concept and Anatolian Gas Centre is making the Southern Corridor 
feasible that would diversify Turkey’s and the EU’s natural gas supply security. In so 
doing, since the last two decades, Turkish foreign policy has achieved some success in 
receiving Azeri Gas from Shah Deniz Phase I in 2007 and will have more potential 
gas from Shah Deniz Phase II in 2018. It is a fact that Turkey is heavily dependent on 
Russian and Iranian gas supply. It is important to note that the opening of the 
Southern Corridor with TANAP has not only been reducing Turkey’s dependency on 
these countries but also satisfies its own domestic market. TANAP also encourages 
Turkey’s transit strategy towards the West. If Turkey’s energy supply security 
strategy and the interdependence strategy of Turkish foreign policy gain initiatives in 
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the eastern and southern routes of the Southern Corridor, the Anatolian Gas Centre 
will transport 150 BCM gas to Turkey. Since 2007 Turkey’s foreign policy and the 
state-owned company BOTAS have already achieved success in initiating Azeri 
natural gas sources management. Turkey has launched transport from Shah Deniz 
Phase I to the Greece national grid and will transport Shah Deniz Phase II in 2018. 
As discussed in previous chapters, Nabucco is the famous project for the Southern 
Corridor. Since the beginning, Turkey has supported the policies of the EU’s Caspian 
Development Co-operation and Energy Charter Treaty for the Nabucco pipeline 
project, which is why Turkey signed an International Government Agreement (IGA) 
in 2009. In fact Turkey continuously encourages in various diplomatic environments. 
However, due to lack of a common energy policy, EU had to announce its dissolution 
in January 2014. One of the key reasons behind the failure of Nabucco is that the EU 
started supporting Russia’s South Stream pipeline project after crises had twice 
occurred between Russia and Ukraine. Due to changes in the politics of Nabucco, the 
owners of the Shah Deniz Phase II consortium, BP and SOCAR, had launched new 
projection and transportation prices for gas towards South Eastern Europe. In fact, 
Azerbaijan does not want to compete with Russia’s Central Europe market. That is 
why the Azeri-Russian deal on purchasing 1 BCM from Shah Deniz proves that they 
have very balanced relations in choosing the Shah Deniz Phase II consortium sale 
strategy toward South Eastern Europe. The Consortium evaluated the options of 
Nabucco Classic and Nabucco West to transport Shah Deniz Phase II, but the final 
decision has been made in favour of TANAP, which separated from Turkey’s national 
grid.  
Turkey’s positive approach to new policy change is very rational for the opening of 
the Southern Corridor. Therefore, Turkey signed the Intergovernmental Governmental 
Agreement (IGA) of TANAP in 2012 while the Nabucco project was alive. Some 
policy makers believe that the failure of the popular Nabucco project will cause the 
fading of Turkey’s discourse of being a hub which will attract the resources located in 
the south and east of the Southern Corridor. However, Turkey’s interactive capacity in 
energy and foreign policy diplomacy facilitates opening the Southern Corridor via 
TANAP and TAP gas networks. This achievement in Turkish energy strategy makes 
more feasible Turkey’s Anatolian Gas Centre concept.  
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The most recent development between Russia and Ukraine in Crimea enforces EU 
policy strategy for supply security. The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US 
create a new option for Turkey’s Anatolian Gas Centre concept, which feeds the 
Southern Corridor. In parallel with this, the investment decision for TANAP and TAP 
projects in December 2013 can be considered as a great success of Turkey’s policy 
strategy. If Turkey succeeds in obtaining natural gas from southern and eastern gas 
resources, Turkey will certainly establish the Anatolian Gas Centre. In addition to 
this, Turkey’s good relations with the KRG will be increased with the Anatolian Gas 
Centre. On the other hand, Turkey’s uneasy relations with Israel and Southern Cyprus 
weaken Turkey’s energy policy in East Mediterranean Sea sources management. 
As we concluded, Turkey is naturally ‘a physical hub’ from north to south and from 
east to west, but due to state-owned company BOTAS’ market monopoly in the 
Turkish natural gas market, there is no evidence to introduce Turkey as ‘a trading 
hub’ in the international energy environment. Even though TANAP transports 10 
BCM natural gas to Europe, which is counted as 3 % of Europe’s natural gas supply, 
it enables Turkey to continue her claim of being a natural gas hub by opening the 
Southern Corridor after the failure of the Nabucco project. Turkey’s hub concept is 
different from the EU’s hub concept that more often determines prices of natural gas 
in international markets. However, Turkey’s hub is only aimed at reducing its own 
natural gas price, which is the highest purchasing contract of Europe, and securing its 
own natural gas supply-demand security by operating the new pipelines form east and 
south. Finally, the Anatolian Gas Centre is aimed at materializing the country’s 
energy strategy plan by developing more reliability and interdependence between 
producing and consuming countries. 
8.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has explained that Turkey has every major gas and oil producer within 
easy reach of Eurasia which has already offered Turkey an opportunity for being a 
hub, or bridge, or corridor, between Asia and Europe and also a market in its own 
right. If Turkey achieves the Anatolian Gas Centre strategy and makes the Southern 
Corridor operational, Turkey will reduce its highest purchasing prices and guarantee 
its supply-demand deficit. Turkey, which does not have major energy resources, is as 
mindful as the EU countries of a dependence on Russian gas, and has been seeking a 
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deal to import LNG from Qatar and Iraq and pipeline options from Caspian Sea. 
Therefore, Turkey has been trying to make the most of its geostrategic position 
between energy-rich regions like Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and the 
European market. By diversifying energy supply sources from different sources, 
Turkey’s dependency on Russia and Iran will be dramatically reduced for the long-
term strategic plan. Arguably, a more strategic question about Europe’s natural gas 
security alternatives could be the buyers’ (mainly the EU, specifically Germany) and 
sellers’ (mainly Russia and Iran) preferences. In this case, if Iran and Russia choose to 
use the Iran, Iraq, Syria as the transit routes by-passing Turkey to European markets, 
Turkey’s strategies to become an energy hub may fail, though at least the effort to 
secure supply for the growing energy needs in the Turkish market may profit from 
these attempts. Nevertheless, alternative pipeline routes for the southern corridor over 
Anatolia to transfer natural gas are not restricted to the Turkish option solely. There 
are other options such as Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Mediterranean Sea and Europe 
about which many signatories have intentions to expand alternative routes and 
corridors. Turkey supports the pipeline projects envisaged to secure the energy supply 
of the region. The fact is that Turkey stands equal to all possible projects which serve 
the EU energy supply security. Turkey is becoming a centre of attention for the 
pipelines and other energy projects. Turkey endorses the inter-connecting pipelines 
that create interdependencies among the countries in the region to become an energy 
centre. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Natural gas politics has introduced new phenomena into the foreign policy making of 
Turkish geopolitics since the last two decades. So it would create an awareness of 
Turkey’s power of geopolitics spatially and in use of the geopolitics for creating a 
“natural gas centre” in the region. Hence, this chapter provides a general framework 
and findings for the descriptive and analytical chapters. It also reviews all the 
discussions, within three sections, in order to consolidate findings. This thesis 
assesses Turkey’s foreign policy behaviour and the capacity of geopolitics in 
confidence building between Central Asia-Caspian Sea-Middle East-North African 
regions and European Union. This research provides an analytical evaluation of the 
Eurasian natural gas puzzle in order to identify Turkey’s role in the so-called Southern 
corridor. The detailed discussion and assessment of the Southern corridor offers an 
important comparison between the possible projects and the natural gas pipeline 
passing through the Turkish border to the European natural gas market. 
2. ARTICULATION OF THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY AND ENERGY 
INTERDEPENDENCE RELATIONS 
This thesis has attempted to present three types of theoretical approaches from 
International Relations paradigms, in Chapter 1. It has given some implications for 
foreign policy making theories in Chapter 2, explaining Turkey’s new vision in the 
international energy environment. One of the significant contributions of this study is 
the measurement of continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy and its 
interaction capacity in energy diplomacy. The capacity of Turkish foreign policy has 
been explained, that reflects a progressive development in Turkish energy and foreign 
policy. Turkey’s interaction capacity with both the regional and international systems 
has been explained in the concept of these structural approaches. In a sense Turkey’s 
interaction capacity has become the major unit level of analysis in this thesis. Rather 
than energy security issues, the major focus of this thesis is on the role of the energy 
interdependence relations of Turkey, which manage supply security by providing 
transit security in the region. From a theoretical perspective, the thesis has 
successfully applied the energy sector to international relations as an instrument of 
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Turkish foreign policy making. Hence, this pluralistic model and pluralistic 
theoretical explanation introduces the new concept of an Anatolian Natural Gas 
Centre (AGC). 
Henceforward, the research has ascertained that the combination of these theoretical 
propositions encourages using an integrated model for natural gas geopolitics as the 
means of Turkish foreign policy making. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Turkey’s 
foreign policy behaviour overlaps with the EU’s foreign policy behaviours in the 
context of common energy policy. In addition to this, Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ 
approach to neighbouring countries and ‘soft power’ strategy has been matched with 
the general principles of interdependence theory of IR. This thesis has ascertained that 
Turkey has expanded its economic sphere of influence by co-operating with 
conflicting parties in the Caspian Sea and Middle Eastern regions. This thesis has also 
showed that Turkey recognises its capacity to contribute to the EU’s energy security 
and is able to regulate its market liberalisation in parallel with the European Union. In 
a sense, Turkey’s co-operative and independent attitude and its confidence building 
between suppliers and demanding countries does support the EU-27’s energy security 
by the opening of the Southern Corridor, which is certainly diversifying the EU’s 
natural gas supply and transport.  
3. TURKEY AND THE EURASIAN NATURAL GAS PUZZLE 
Since the coal and steam agreement of the EEC in 1951, energy has become a major 
variable for European integration. Nuclear technology is not only used for military 
purposes but also for electricity generation, especially in the European energy market. 
Europe achieved the creation of a single body under Euratom in order to control 
nuclear technology.  
On the one hand, Europe was faced with OPEC’s oil embargo in 1974, which created 
a dispute about the necessity for common energy politics. In this framework, Europe 
has followed more dynamic politics to achieve energy efficiency, competitiveness, 
and market liberalization policies. However, even though EU-27 creates Energy 
Directives under the body of the European Commission to create a common energy 
policy, the politics of natural gas is characterized by differences between EU27 
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countries. The fact is that each country generally follows independent policies to 
manage long- and short-term contracts with the supplier countries.  
On the other hand, the absence of a single body that could be responsible for energy 
relations in the European Commission provides diversification in a positive way 
because natural gas supplier countries worry that one voice in the EU would reduce 
the price while facilitating long term contracting. Due to this concern, Russia and 
Turkmenistan launched energy market diversification towards the Asian market, 
especially China, Pakistan and India, whilst increasing import dependency on Russia. 
Furthermore, the reducing of indigenous production in the EU has become a major 
issue for the EU’s energy security. The EU and Russia have to establish reliable 
natural gas relations in terms of pricing and long term contracting. Russian 
dependency on gas export is the main determining factor in the Russian economy. 
This could contribute significantly to the interdependent relations between Russia and 
the EU. In addition to the Southern Corridor, Turkey plays a crucial role in co-
operation between Russia and the EU as Turkey gave permission for the South 
Stream. 
As has been explained, Turkey is considered to be the second fastest growing energy 
market in the world after China and an expanded economy unique in Europe in 2012. 
However, Turkey is very much dependent on energy imports. Among others, natural 
gas plays a very crucial role in Turkey’s primary energy supply. The growing demand 
for natural gas has to be met with new import options in parallel with the EU-27 
countries. This thesis has found that Turkey has to introduce new energy liberalization 
policies that can be integrated with the EU’s common energy policy agenda. This 
integration process can be continued with Turkey’s grand strategy about the EU 
accession process. Therefore, Turkey has to create its own natural gas market 
dynamics and transit regime in order to attract the most significant natural gas 
reserves of the Caspian-Middle Eastern region. It is a fact that 70% of natural gas 
reserves of the world are located in these regions. If Turkey manages to transport 
some part of this, this will support the EU’s natural gas supply security.  
The thesis has introduced the importance of being an integrated and effective gas 
centre rather than being a simple transit country (as in the case of BTC). Turkey has 
transformed its energy geostrategy into the concept of the “Anatolian Gas Centre” 
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(AGC) with the realisation of the. This strategy is also highly dependent on resolution 
of the Caspian Sea’s status between littoral states. Turkey has maintained support of 
Azerbaijan’s initiatives and encouraged improving Turkmen-Azeri relations. The 
controversies over Caspian Sea delimitation between Azeri and Turkmen impede the 
entrance strategy of the EU to Turkmenistan which has huge natural gas reserves. The 
background of this long enduring conflict is interactive due to the facts of continuous 
Azeri blockage of Turkmenistan until the last volume of Azeri gas has been booked 
for EU and continuous Turkmenistan blockage of interconnection because of the non-
robust and non-unified support of the EU against RF and China which are dominant 
positions in Ashkhabad. It is a fact that alongside Russia or the EU, the existence of 
Chinese investment and long–term contract challenges both parties in the Caspian Sea 
region. It is a fact that if Turkmenistan’s natural gas is transported from Azerbaijan 
and reaches Europe via AGC, this will create balancing relations between Turkish-
European and Russian natural gas trade but also be a strong geopolitical achievement 
against the “backyard” of the Russian Federation.  
Diversification is an important factor in securing energy supply. It is a fact that this 
might help not to politicise the Russian-European natural gas trade and to improve 
confidence building between the EU and gas supplier countries. Shah Deniz Phase II 
will be the first natural gas for the AGC directly transited through Turkey to the EU-
border(s).  
The expansion of AGC seems to be difficult due to Russian political pressure over 
Caspian Sea littoral states. The other sources of AGC would be Iran’s natural gas. 
Again, this could not be added to the AGC in the short term because of the EU’s 
economic sanctions against Iran. However, Turkey expects that Iran’s natural gas 
should be transported via AGC through Turkey to the European natural gas market. 
One of the potential sources of AGC is the Middle East region, especially from Iraq, 
Qatar and Egypt. Whilst the instability in the Middle East region impedes the 
expansion of AGC, the author believes that Middle Eastern sources of natural gas 
should be added to the AGC. Turkey needs to develop balancing relations with 
Middle Eastern countries and has to introduce a rational energy mechanism to 
transport both Caspian Sea and Middle East natural gas to the European energy 
market. The civil war in Syria and political instability in Iraq has caused the 
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suspension of the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline which starts from Egypt and goes 
through Syria and Turkey to Europe. Eastern Mediterranean gas is also one of the 
important sources for “Expanded” AGC. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Turkey’s new foreign policy concepts (soft power, zero 
problems with neighbours and multidimensional politics), that have been introduced 
by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, provide a new vision for Turkey in 
the region. This new vision also becomes a useful tool for evolution of Turkey’s 
natural gas geopolitics. Turkey has allowed Russia’s South Stream pipeline project to 
pass through the Turkish maritime border in the Black Sea. This is the major 
characteristic of Turkish initiatives, demonstrating that Turkey does not follow 
competitive policies towards Russia, providing an alternative energy corridor from 
Russia to Europe. On the other hand, Turkey takes an active role in the AGC concept, 
which diversifies natural gas import routes for the EU and decreases the dependency 
level on Russian gas.  
This thesis concluded that Turkey’s unbiased position on the natural gas transport 
projects increases the confidence with which it is regarded in the Eurasian energy 
market. It reached the conclusion that the major aim of Turkish foreign policy echoed 
by its energy politics is to interconnect natural gas pipelines with Turkey and to create 
interdependent relations with natural gas supplying and demanding countries, and to 
transform Turkey into a physical natural gas hub.  
3.1. The Opening of The Southern Corridor 
Europe already receives natural gas from Russia, Norway and North Africa. However, 
Europe certainly needs the AGC to provide additional natural gas for long term 
contracting with Caspian-Middle Eastern regions. This thesis has reached the 
conclusion that the EU has a capacity shortage on the horizon. As a partner of EU27, 
Turkey does not prefer to be a passive player; it rather uses its initiative to play an 
active role in natural gas contracting. The initiatives of Turkey have met with great 
success, especially in realisation of the TANAP, which has made Turkey a dominant 
figure in the Eurasian natural gas environment. This thesis analysed how, after the 
failure of the Nabucco pipeline project, pipelines will be developed within the context 
of the AGC under the following four sub-categories: 1) transit pipeline through 
 223 
Turkey (TANAP), 2) pipelines connecting Turkey to Europe (ITG, ITB, and TAP), 3) 
pipelines interconnecting the Caspian Sea region to Turkey (SCP/SCPX-BTE) and 4) 
pipelines interconnecting the Middle East region to Turkey (Iraq-Turkey, ITS, Iran-
Turkey). The signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) of TANAP on 26 
June 2012 made a standalone pipeline more realistic for transit, allowing important 
off-take to Turkey, and this will be constructed through Turkey, increasing Ankara’s 
initiatives in the region. This thesis concluded that the initial gas will come from Shah 
Deniz Phase II in 2018. Pipelines connecting the Caspian region to Turkey happened 
with the South Caspian Pipeline. However, the capacities of this pipeline need 
expansion to transport additional volume from Shah Deniz Phase II to the Turkish 
border (SCPX). 
Even though Turkmen gas has a long-term contract with China and prefers to expand 
its market options towards Asia, it is thought that Turkmen gas will be one of the 
suppliers of AGC. On the one hand, Iraqi gas sources and Qatar’s LNG and pipeline 
options for the Southern Corridor will be developed by Turkey’s initiatives if the 
region becomes more stable and attractive to foreign direct investment. As mentioned 
previously, Turkey has short-, medium- and long-term strategies regarding natural gas 
transport projects characterized by more co-operation with Russia and Iran. However, 
Turkey’s transit policy and market liberalisation not only contribute to the EU’s 
transport diversification but also help Russia not to use natural gas as a weapon in the 
Eurasian natural gas environment. Neither the Caspian Sea littoral states nor gas-rich 
Middle Eastern states want the militarization of energy security, and do not want to 
rely on one single transit country.  
Georgia and Turkey are considered as transit countries, and each wants to increase its 
own interdependence relations with supplying and demanding countries, and would 
like to benefit from natural gas to feed domestic markets. In addition to this, 
Azerbaijan and Iran are considered as transit countries for Turkmenistan gas transport 
in this thesis. As explained, the development of energy technologies, such as the tie-in 
solution for Turkmen-Azeri gas production platforms, would supply natural gas to the 
existing pipelines in the Caucasus. In addition to this, this thesis has ascertained that 
Turkmen gas can be transported to Europe by using the Russian and the existing Iran-
Turkish routes, or the routes of Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey. The option for transport 
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via Turkey through Azerbaijan and Russia will support Turkey’s energy geopolitics. 
Turkey’s strong interest is an Iraq–Turkey natural gas pipeline, massive upstream 
investment in Northern Iraq and rhythmic diplomacy to bring about the Qatar-Turkey 
natural gas pipeline and the desire for LNG trade focuses on the Middle East for 
diversification of energy geopolitics. 
Turkey worries about the rise of the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas region as 
possible challenging actors. Turkey has classified the “Eastern Mediterranean 
Pipeline” from offshore Cyprus via Greece through Europe as simply “non-
affordable” and an LNG export option is probable but needs huge capital expenditure. 
On the other hand, the situation would force Turkey to undertake initiatives in the 
maritime border of the Eastern Mediterranean, while Israel’s co-operation with Greek 
Cyprus not only deteriorates political relations with Tel-Aviv but also creates a 
concern about the emergence of a ‘Cold War’ in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. This 
thesis notes that if these crises are managed well in terms of the EU’s energy security, 
Turkey’s relations with the EU and Israel-Greek Cyprus can be questionable in energy 
geopolitics. 
4. SYSTEMATIZING THE FINDINGS FOR TURKEY’S NATURAL GAS 
GEOPOLITICS 
The discussion in this thesis, including this chapter in use for contextualizing the 
findings on Turkey’s natural gas geopolitics, provides us with an explanation of 
Turkey’s energy relations with energy suppliers and demanding countries, especially 
in Europe. This generalization, in a systematic explanation, can be narrowed and 
listed as follows: 
(1) The thesis has successfully employed a pluralistic model and pluralistic theoretical 
explanation to explain how the energy sector has become one of the instruments of 
foreign policy making, in the sense that the geopolitics and interaction capacity of the 
country have been presented in the field of political science/international relations. 
(2) Rather than identifying Turkey as an energy hub, transit corridor and hub, the 
thesis presented the new concept of an Anatolian Gas Centre, which makes more 
feasible the Southern Corridor. 
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(3) In the Eurasian environment, this thesis has found that the natural gas relationship 
between the EU and Russian Federation has been characterized by imbalanced 
interdependence relations so far. An integrated, well-planned, multi-dimensional and 
well-established AGC provides an alternative and strong option for EU energy 
security, even if it has initially a small amount of natural gas transporting, compared 
to the Russian and African corridors. Turkey’s geopolitical importance in terms of 
energy transport and supply has been seen as economically and politically feasible in 
this thesis. 
(4) This thesis has found that the Shah Deniz Phase II gas in Azerbaijan is the initial 
natural gas reserve that could be supplied through the AGC into Turkey and EU 
markets, among other natural gas reserves of Caspian Sea-Middle East regions.  
As explained above, the most possible natural gas sources that would provide the first 
gas in the AGC were Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Phase II resources; an IGA and 
Investment Agreement were signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan governments to 
construct a TANAP pipeline within the territory of Turkey that will transport Shah 
Deniz Phase II gas from the Eastern Border to the Western Border of Turkey. This 
means that EU regulations and stabilization of the Turkish transit regime via Nabucco 
IGA was replaced by new rules which are equally beneficial for all Turkish-Azeri and 
SDC parties. 
In pipeline politics, (5) this thesis assumed that if the suppliers became partners of the 
consortium of the pipeline, the AGC would be opened for natural gas transport. The 
difference between TANAP and Nabucco Classic pipeline projects has been revealed 
to be that (6) if the natural gas supplier company becomes the pipeline shareholder, 
the project will become more feasible in economic and technical respects.  
This thesis concluded that the AGC passing through Turkey to Europe will be opened 
with the realization of TANAP. (7) Beyond the TANAP pipeline, we believe that if 
the 10 BCM/a natural gas volume is marketed to South Eastern Europe, this gas will 
be carried by by the TAP natural gas pipeline. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, natural gas politics has become the main component of 
Turkish foreign policy making over the last two decades. Turkey prefers to be more 
active in long-term natural gas contract management, as that would create 
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interdependent relations between Turkey and supplying and demanding countries. 
Hence, this thesis concludes that (8) introducing interdependence relations between 
parties would provide confidence building for common energy politics and energy 
security in international relations. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is predicted that Turkey will become the second largest 
natural gas market in Europe in the 2030s. Hence, (9) the realization of the AGC does 
not only provide geopolitical advantages for Turkey; it also facilitates additional gas 
supplies for Turkey’s growing natural gas market. Moreover, as Turkey is very much 
dependent on Russian natural gas supplies, (10) the AGC not only diversifies 
Turkey’s natural gas supplies but reduces Turkey’s dependence on Russia. (11) The 
additional natural gas coming from the AGC will also confer the ability to compete 
with the existing natural gas import contracts and to reduce the natural gas prices in 
the Turkish natural gas market. 
5. THE SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This research has provided the geopolitics of natural gas pipelines in considering 
Turkey’s energy relations with Europe and Caspian-Middle Eastern regions. 
However, there is scope for further research about the possible instruments of 
geopolitical game changers, such as future technological development in LNG trade, 
unconventional natural gas, Turkish accommodation of an international natural gas 
regime for being an energy hub, and the emergence of a Fifth Corridor of connecting 
Mediterranean resources directly to European markets via Greece. 
There are two types of transport of natural gas: LNG and pipeline; this thesis mainly 
deals with pipeline politics because the pipelines cover the majority of natural gas 
transportation. In future, if LNG technologies become cheaper and expand in the 
global energy market, this balance could be changed and affect the geopolitics of 
natural gas. Further study will explore new LNG technologies and further CNG 
(Compressed Natural Gas) that might influence the natural gas trade in global politics. 
In addition to this, unconventional natural gas (includes revolutionary methane 
hydrates) phenomena may have a potential that can change the proven natural gas 
reserves map of the world. If the environmental concerns can be eased and if 
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unconventional gas production becomes cheaper, the natural gas geopolitics may 
change fundamentally. 
The absence of common energy policies between EU-28 countries and Turkey 
requires further examination in order to create a regional energy regime. Moreover, 
whether the natural gas market liberalization process that has been executed by the 
Turkish Government can introduce an alternative natural gas regime requires further 
research. 
The other important issue for a new direction in energy studies is the transportation of 
Russian natural gas from Turkey to Europe. The co-operation between Moscow and 
Ankara about the South Stream pipeline project (this is a real milestone for Turkey’s 
new multi-dimensional energy geopolitics) will change the paradigm in the energy 
sector. Hence, this is another parameter in Russian and Turkish foreign policy 
behaviour that needs to be researched. 
In addition to this, this thesis only dealt with the East-West natural gas corridor 
passing through Turkey to the European energy market but has not dealt with 
Turkey’s options of South-North. In fact, Turkey has the potential to act as a transit 
country for Ukraine. This country is dependent on Russia for its own natural gas 
security. However, it plays a crucial role between Russia and Europe for natural gas 
transportation. If a Turkish initiative for Ukraine’s natural gas needs is implemented 
and the Russian South Stream passes through Turkey, this situation creates balancing 
relations between Ukraine and Russia. It is important to note that the crisis in recent 
years between two neighbours created insecurity for energy transportation. It is a fact 
that Russia could not have presented any alternative for Turkmenistan’s natural gas 
except Ukraine. On the other hand, Turkey can transport natural gas from the Caspian 
Sea and Middle East by using the South-North Corridor and using the Bosporus for 
LNG shipping. This scenario is also considered as another option for natural gas trade 
and transport in international energy trade. Hence, this needs further research in the 
foreign policy making of three Black Sea countries. 
This thesis has endeavoured to elaborate Turkey’s natural gas geopolitics and the 
impact of energy in Turkish foreign policy making. Whilst the thesis has provided 
detailed information about Turkey’s growing energy market for investors and its role 
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in energy transport, it ignored the absence of Turkey in upstream for production, 
especially on the Caspian Sea and Middle East natural gas investments. We believe 
that Turkey needs to increase its investment for production of natural gas in those 
regions. If Turkey would like to be a major player and a transit or hub country, 
Turkey needs to make investments in both domestic and international upstream 
projects. Therefore, this is another important issue in Turkish foreign policy related to 
energy politics that requires further research. 
6. EPILOGUE 
This thesis investigates the natural gas geopolitics of Turkey and explores the impact 
of energy variables as foreign policy making tools. The major emphasis is on the 
importance of Turkey’s geopolitical location for the so-called Fourth Corridor 
(Southern Corridor) which is now redefined with a broader perspective as the 
“Anatolian Gas Centre” and on the fact that Turkey’s growing energy market 
increases its economic capacity. This thesis has tried to demonstrate that Turkey has 
enough physical, technical and human capital to integrate with the East-West and 
South-North corridors. In doing so, Turkey has been trying to increase 
interdependence relations and confidence building with supplier and consumer 
countries. Turkey’s initiatives in the TANAP, TAP and Nabucco West projects put 
Turkey in the centre of the Eurasian energy environment. The existing pipelines 
connected with Russia (Balkan route and Blue Stream), Iran and Azerbaijan establish 
a grant for Turkey’s regional energy mechanism that attracts the other natural gas 
producers and demanding countries. Moreover, Turkey’s long-term Europeanization 
project together with its historical and cultural ties with Middle East and Caspian Sea 
countries have facilitated its implementation of an efficient and active international 
energy politics over the last two decades. Hence, this thesis succeeded in showing the 
importance of Turkey’s existing and future role and impact in Eurasian natural gas 
security and growing natural gas market that attracts new supply sources. 
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